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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The eighteenth-century moral weekly adapted the Enlightenment dictum to 
combine edification and entertainment and helped popularize proactive reading by 
critiquing mores and dramatizing moral experience.  Enlightenment anthropology as the 
"Wissenschaft vom Menschen" defined the human relationship to the world and the 
internal interplay of body and soul, of man's material and intellectual being.  Through the 
analysis of human experience in the world, philosophical, theological, legal and medical 
texts integrated anthropological themes and converge with the seemingly unrelated moral 
weekly. A prime example of this interplay is the integration of the case study into literary 
and professional writing, and its application to the essay in weeklies. The goal of this 
study is to examine how Enlightenment moral and anthropological discourses develop 
symbiotically not only in novels of sensibility but also in moral weeklies. 
 In the forefront of this investigation are German-language texts published 
between 1720 and 1798, in particular in the years from 1740 to 1770. This middle phase 
of the Enlightenment represents a period of refinement and reorientation of the moral 
weekly and at the same time, the consummation of Enlightenment anthropology. The 
focus on the observation of human experience at this time acknowledges the larger 
paradigm shift in human self-evaluation, what Reinhard Koselleck has called a 'Sattelzeit' 
and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann and Ralph Häfner have described as an 
'anthropologische Wende' (Schmidt-Biggemann and Häfner 168; Koselleck 1:XV). While 
existing research on eighteenth-century philosophical anthropology has argued that an 
anthropological turn occurred with the publication of Ernst Platner's Anthropologie für 
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Ärzte und Weltweise , this study suggests with Carsten Zelle that the shift occurs at least 
as early as 1740 ("Nachwort" 80-84). 
 In the search for the sources of eighteenth-century anthropological and moral 
discourses, I turn to Halle (Salle). With the 1694 founding of the Brandenburg University 
of Halle, also called the Fridericiana, Halle led the German university reform movement. 
Renewing university education involved developing modern systems for scientific 
research and bureaucratic training under the new leading sciences of law and history. 
With the appointment of August Herman Francke as parish pastor at Glaucha, just outside 
of Halle, the city also emerged as an international center for the social and religious 
reform movement of Pietism. Together Halle Pietism, philosophy, and medicine made 
significant contributions to anthropological and moral discourses on the academic and the 
popular level. Using knowledge developed in theoretical writings, Halle natives Samuel 
Gotthold Lange and Georg Friedrich Meier published long-lived weeklies focused on 
educating and entertaining readers in essays and stories about human nature. The 
periodicals exemplify the Enlightenment as a complex dynamic that incorporated 
literature and anthropology in the public sphere. 
 
 There are multiple reasons to look beyond the novels of sensibility in the first half 
of the eighteenth century and to include periodical literature in an investigation of the 
interrelationship of eighteenth-century moral and anthropological discourses. During the 
Enlightenment, many literary authors also worked as journalists and published reviews, 
essays and fictional texts in magazines and journals (Martens, Die Botschaft der Tugend 
3). Institutions of literary public opinion shaped the development of the eighteenth-
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century writer, especially in the context of the evolution of the professional writer, the 
expansion of the book trade and book production, the slow rise in the literacy rate, and 
the establishment of a literary market (Wilke 1:64-65). The periodical publication 
represents one of these institutions that provided opportunities for novice and 
experienced writers as columnists, editors, critics and literary historians. Writers 
determined to achieve success wrote for periodicals for literary or economic reasons--or 
both.  
Thus journalists, literary and scientific authors, and readers were connected. 
Jürgen Wilke's Literarische Zeitschriften des 18. Jahrhunderts (1688-1789) provides a 
summary of the most important literary periodicals of the German Enlightenment and 
reviews secondary literature published up to the beginning of the 1970's. Paul Raabe's 
article "Die Zeitschrift als Medium der Aufklärung"  contextualizes Enlightenment 
magazines as one of the most popular and varied means of communication, education, 
moral edification and entertainment for a diverse public of readers and authors. Reinhard 
Wittmann's chapter "Die Entstehung des modernen Lesepublikums--die 'Leserevolution'"  
functions as a sociological history of Enlightenment reading and situates magazines in a 
bourgeois context focused on practical and moral applications for the benefit of society. 
In the article "Die Geburt des Journalisten in der Aufklärung" (1974), Wolfgang Martens 
defines the function of the Enlightenment journalist as one who improves the individual 
through moral edification, education, aesthetic critique and engagement for societal 
improvement.  
 The periodical provided Enlightenment authors the opportunity to publish for an 
anonymous, general reading public. This mode of publishing provided readers with 
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moral-religious edification as well as education and thereby played a critical role in the 
creation and development of public opinion. In some instances, moral weeklies and 
literary magazines functioned as political instruments, especially for women or members 
of the advancing middle class. The periodicals thus document a desire for social change 
in the eighteenth century. In the literary realm, magazines serve as important archives of 
eighteenth-century popular and professional literature because they excerpt passages 
from longer articles, combine popular and professional literature on a range of topics 
from different authors, provide a record of the evolution of a text from manuscript to 
periodical to book and record the different meanings at each stage. The journal articles 
reflect their socio-historical milieu and have their own significance even when they are 
readily available in a book version. 
Two sources provided initial guidance in the search for periodicals with 
anthropological themes. Joachim Kirchner's Das deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen and 
Bibliographie der Zeitschriften des deutschen Sprachgebiets bis 1900, Bd. 1 categorize 
periodicals and summarize their content in several keywords. Martens' Botschaft der 
Tugend (1968) provides a basis for the evaluation of the Halle Moral weeklies. In five 
sections, the study outlines (1) characteristics of the moral weekly form, (2) an overview 
of production and reception, (3) a survey of moral worldview, (4) the weeklies' 
representation of society, and (5) their relation to other literature. While Botschaft der 
Tugend characterizes the moral weekly form by citing hundreds of moral weeklies, this 
dissertation focuses on the weeklies' contributions to continuity in the development of 
anthropological theory. Martens discusses the evolution of the literary journals such as 
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Wieland's Teutscher Merkur from the perspective of the popular moral journals and 
thereby posits a continuity in the development of Enlightenment periodicals.  
 One of the newest and most informative sources for research into eighteenth-
century media is Von Almanach bis Zeitung: ein Handbuch der Medien in Deutschland 
1700-1800 , edited by Ernst Fischer, Wilhelm Haefs and York-Gothard Mix. In the 
introductory article "Aufklärung, Öffentlichkeit und Medienkultur in Deutschland im 18. 
Jahrhundert" editors Fischer, Haefs and Mix define the Enlightenment as an age of media 
revolution in Germany: for the first time there is a conscious recognition of the 
relationship between media's power and its potential for social change (Fischer et al., 9). 
This change is characterized by (i) the programmatic goals of the Enlightenment to 
disseminate knowledge, information and reason, (ii) the accelerated dispersion of 
information and news, especially through periodicals and (iii) the instrumentalization of 
knowledge transfer (Publizität) for social reform and the establishment of a sphere of 
public opinion (10). The journal has primary and secondary functions, the most 
significant being the transmission of practical knowledge and new information, the 
discussion and development of specialized knowledge and the definition of geographic 
and cultural space in the context of entertainment and empirical modes of knowledge (12-
13). According to Fischer et al., the Enlightenment media develops (a) in connection with 
political events (14), (b) an increasingly greater complexity, for example a heightened 
degree of reflexivity through self-analysis and self-criticism (15) and (c) a two-fold goal 
of national edification. Around 1800 this includes the development of a unified national 
German culture while simultaneously supporting the cultural and socio-political 
hetereogeneity of the German states (17). 
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 A primary medium of popular enlightenment through the middle of the eighteenth 
century was the moral weekly. In her article "Moralische Wochenschriften", Helga 
Brandes locates the Enlightenment goal of replacing prejudice with rational, moral and 
virtuous decision making in the theory of universal human equality promulgated in the 
philosophy of natural law (225). By relegating religious, political and scientific themes to 
a secondary role, the moral weeklies employ a fictitious editor and diverse forms such as 
letters, dreams, poems, fables, dialogs and narrative illustration (Beispielgeschichten) to 
develop a space for public discourse (228). In order to establish a self-image of 
moderation and virtue, the moral weeklies prescribe the separation of the bourgeoisie 
from the amoral nobility and uneducated lower-class farmers and day laborers (228). The 
critique aims to remedy social abuses, eliminate meaningless conventions (dueling) and 
abolish exaggerated social customs (extreme compliments) (230). The rationalist motif 
extends to literary critique, with a rejection of excessive baroque ornamentation in favor 
of rational exposition and the purity of the German language (Gottsched) or imagination 
and the preservation of a pluralism of dialects (Bodmer and Breitinger) (230-231). 
 In his article "Literarisch-kultureller Zeitschriften," John A. McCarthy situates the 
literary and cultural journal in the context of a combination of instruction and 
entertainment for the establishment of the public sphere. Christoph Martin Wieland 
propels the literary-cultural journal one step beyond this dictum claiming not only the 
periodical medium, but specifically the institution of literature should serve nation and 
humanity (McCarthy, "Literarisch-kulturelle Zeitschriften" 176-177). The establishment 
of the literary-cultural journals in the Enlightenment stems from the specific conception 
of community and a comprehensive understanding of social communication, so that 
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Thomasius defines humanity foremost on the basis of social engagement, not on its 
rational faculties (180). The journal plays multiple roles, first mediating between the 
collective authority of the state and individual desires and alternately promoting a moral 
standard in public life (181). Amid many literary journals Wieland's Teutscher Merkur 
stands apart for its metacritique based on principles of impartiality, empirical and 
anthropological epistemology and a common search for truth (186). Wieland's 
employment of an empirical-anthropological epistemology as a basis for cultural critique 
is a characteristic Enlightenment development and an interdisciplinary nexus of 
experimental psychology, medicine and literature. 
 Ernst Fischer's article "Psychologisch-anthropologische Zeitschriften" focuses on 
the developments in empirical psychology in the wake of Moritz's popular Magazin zur 
Erfahrungsseelenkunde. In the late Enlightenment, popular psychology magazines appeal 
to an educated bourgeois audience with varied qualifications and professional careers 
(Fischer 322). These periodicals demonstrate that the transformation of the space for 
literary public opinion occurs as a development with the educated middle classes. 
Empirical psychology develops out of the broad context of Enlightenment 
anthropocentrism, more specifically from Wolff's Psychologica empirica, the 
anthropological theories of Krüger and Platner, the reception of sensualism and 
materialism (Hume, Rousseau and Holbach), Pietism and Moritz's Anton Reiser and 
Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde (316-317). The Magazin is a paradigm for the 
establishment of popular psychology and the ability of media to solicit participation from 
readers and authors, creating a literary public sphere (321-322). In their cultural 
functions, the psychological and anthropological magazines assume a similar significance 
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to the moral weeklies in earlier decades, as Wolfgang Riedel avers: "Die psychologisch-
anthropologischen Zeitschriften dieser [1780er und 1790er] Jahrzehnte sind für die späte 
Aufklärung ebenso signifikant wie die Moralischen Wochenschriften für die frühere" (W. 
Riedel, "Anthropologie und Literatur in der deutschen Spätaufklärung.  Skizze einer 
Forschungslandschaft" 127). 
The moral weeklies selected for this dissertation develop in tandem with novels of 
sensibility. McCarthy's article "The Gallant Novel and the German Enlightenment (1670-
1750)" argues for the connection between Baroque and Enlightenment narrative, 
highlighting links between the moral weekly and the novel. The German Enlightenment 
novel develops in relation to the French, English, but especially the 17th century 
"'indigineous' [German narrative] tradition" (McCarthy, "Gallant Novel" 57). Similar to 
the French 17th century sentimental novel, the German gallant novel combines the gallant 
attitude with a psychological sensibility, as in Hunold's Satirischer Roman (1706) (56). 
While an exaggerated gallant style can contradict with a bourgeois code of ethics (76), 
when integrated into a socially acceptable moral framework, gallantry complements 
virtue (57). In narrative theme, the combination of pedagogical and entertaining elements 
in the gallant novel prefigures the ethical instruction of the moral novel (59-60). The 
normative qualities of a good novel are also strikingly similar across periods, as 
Thomasius' categories of balanced instruction and entertainment, practicality, plausibility, 
and instruction of critical thinking have a resonance similar to the narrative critique of 
Blanckenburg or Wieland (62). Moreover, there is a reciprocal relationship between 
different narrative forms as seen with the example of Thomasius' Monats-Gespräche. The 
journals idealize the combination of historical and fictional reality and simultaneously 
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advance readers' psychological, aesthetic and moral sensibility through narrative 
techniques adopted by the novel (73-74). In sum, McCarthy rediscovers the importance 
of continuity in the history of indigenous German narrative and identifies common 
elements in this heterogeneous tradition. 
 In the 1980's and 1990's, researchers in literary studies established the intersection 
of literature and anthropology as a field of stylistic, thematic and cultural-historical 
inquiry. The definition and integration of anthropology into interpretative modes is 
problematic, however. The difficulties and contradictions arise (1) in the attempt to 
separate Enlightenment anthropology from empirical psychology as well as (2) in the 
differentiation of medical, philosophical and theological anthropology (Ziche 75ff). (3) A 
further level of difficulty stems from the unique terminology for 'anthropology' in various 
Enlightenment European cultures (for example, "science de l'homme" in France). (4) 
Anthropology is a historicized discipline, so that the current meaning of anthropology 
differs from its meaning in the eighteenth century. Today the term 'anthropology' 
primarily refers to the ethnological direction of research institutionalized in universities 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In German, 'Volkskunde' most closely 
approximates the 21st-century meaning of 'anthropology' in English. Neither of these 
meanings equivocate the semantic content of 'Anthropologie' in the German-speaking 
Enlightenment. 'Anthropology' is thus the study of humanity that pursues questions of 
ethnology as well as the mind-body, spirit-materiality of individual existence developed 
in Descartes' Meditationes.  
 There is no definition of anthropology in the handbook Geshichtliche 
Grundbegriffe. For further differentiation of the meaning of anthropology, Odo 
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Marquard's article "Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs 'Anthropologie' seit dem 
Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts" (1973) and Mareta Linden's book Untersuchungen 
zum Anthropologiebegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts (1976) provide the most helpful 
introduction. Marquard locates the origin of philosophical anthropology in the sixteenth 
century and provides a panoramic review of the term and bibliography between 1770 and 
1970. By profiling the similarities and differences of anthropology in comparison to the 
philosophy of history, he defines philosophical anthropology as a uniquely modern 
epistemology that departs from traditional metaphysics and mathematical operations of 
natural science in favor of a turn to human life ("Lebenswelt"). A second defining 
characteristic is the change of philosophical anthropology from a philosophy of history to 
a philosophy of the nature of the human (Marquard, "Zur Geschichte des philosophischen 
Begriffs »Anthropologie« seit dem Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts" 124-125). 
 In addition to Marquard's definition of anthropology, the intensification of the 
investigation of melancholy fueled the development of anthropological approaches in 
literary studies. Wolf Lepenies' Melancholie und Gesellschaft  and Michel Foucault's 
Histoire de la folie a l'age classique  spurred academic interest in melancholy and the 
investigation of mind-body dualism and abnormal psychology from a literary perspective. 
In his Melancholie und Aufklärung (1977), Hans-Jürgen Schings combined primary 
source research with an interdisciplinary approach to produce one of the most innovative 
explorations of the connection of anthropology and literature. This monograph and the 
conference proceedings published as Der ganze Mensch (Der ganze Mensch: 
Anthropologie und Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert: DFG-Symposion 1992) provide two of 
the most diverse sources of information on the nexus of literature and anthropology in the 
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eighteenth century. Schings' student Wolfgang Riedel provided another significant step in 
the research of anthropology and literature in his Forschungsbericht "Anthropologie und 
Literatur in der deutschen Spätaufklärung." Riedel's article combines a historical 
framework for the study of anthropology, an acknowledgement of anthropology's 
inclusion of epistemological models based on physical being or irrationality in addition to 
the rational paradigm and a summary of themes for literary and anthropological 
investigation. The introduction to Jutta Heinz' book Wissen vom Menschen (Wissen vom 
Menschen) supplements Riedel's evaluation of research in literary anthropology with a 
one-hundred-page overview of anthropology in the eighteenth century. In preparation for 
a positive evaluation of the ideals of humanity and social dialogue in Enlightenment 
narration, Heinz outlines eighteenth century anthropological themes, such as 
'commercium', the emotions, imagination and the individual. She also recounts 
anthropology's evolution in conjunction with neighboring disciplines such as philosophy. 
 In the 1980's and 1990's, researchers of literary anthropology produced a number 
of studies on canonical authors, themes and individual literary forms. Among these are 
Riedel's Die Anthropologie des jungen Schiller, Wolfgang Pross' "Herder und die 
Anthropologie der Aufklärung," and Lothar Müller's study of Moritz, Die kranke Seele. 
Enlightenment themes are explored in Rudolf Behrens' and Roland Galle's Leib-Zeichen 
and Gabriele Dürbeck's Einbildungskraft und Aufklärung. The interdisciplinary study 
Self-Generation: Biology, Philosophy and Literature around 1800 by Helmut Müller-
Sievers combines a theory and a history of epigenesis in the late Enlightenment. In his 
Körperströme und Schriftverkehr , Albrecht Koschorke reinterprets the Empfindsamkeit 
as the nexus of shifts in human physiological knowledge and communication technology. 
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By linking the change from the Hippocratic theory of fluids to a physiological 
understanding of the human nervous system and the communication revolution of letter 
writing, he integrates the physiological and intellectual shifts that represent human 
psychological development at the dawn of the nineteenth century. Finally, critics have 
examined the role of anthropology in major literary forms, such as Helmut Pfotenhauer's 
study of autobiography in Literarische Anthropologie , Heinz' study of the 
anthropological novel titled Wissen vom Menschen), Alexander Kosesina's study of 
drama in Anthropologie und Schauspielkunst and Jörg Krämer's book Deutschsprachiges 
Musiktheater im späten 18. Jahrhundert . Little research has been done on anthropology 
in the German novel of sensibility or in the moral weekly (as an exception cf. Koschorke 
e.g. 29-30, 408). 
 
 This dissertation proposes that both the German novel of sensibility and the moral 
weeklies play key roles in the development of eighteenth-century anthropological 
discourses. Both the novels and the weeklies begin to deploy body/soul interaction in the 
1740's, decades before the current dating of the anthropological turn to the period 
between Christoph Martin Wieland's Geschichte des Agathon (1766/1767) and Ernst 
Platner's Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise (1772). Though they are not 
anthropological novels (cf. Heinz, Wissen vom Menschen 339-344), the novels of 
sensibility also employ anthropological discourses and archive their development in the 
genre. Similarly, the moral weeklies illustrate early use of the interaction between the 
material and the metaphysical in periodicals. Both the empfindsame Romane and the 
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moral weeklies include the body in defining the moral. And both forms popularize 
anthropology in the middle of the eighteenth century.  
 To argue this thesis, chapter one defines Enlightenment anthropology as an 
interdisciplinary science, as illustrated in lexicon definitions and three key 
anthropological monographs. Additionally, because of its interdisciplinarity, 
anthropology as the study of human nature never achieved significant institutional 
recognition in the university. In further defining anthropology, chapter two argues that 
Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon (11726) conceived of "Anthropologie" as the 
interrelation of body and soul, of the physical and the moral. Cross-references on topics 
of causation, temperament, and the emotions underscore this relation. 
 In chapter three, Richardson's Pamela (1740) and Johann Gottlob Krüger's 
Naturlehre (1740-1750, 3v.) figure prominently in pushing back the date of the 
anthropological turn to 1740. Loën's Der redliche Mann am Hofe (1740) is also cited as 
an example of an early German novel of sensibility. Chapter four traces how body/soul 
discourses in the moral novel evolves into an anthropological sub-genre. During the 
period from 1747 to 1767, this development occurs in Christian Fürchtegott Gellert's 
Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** (1747/1748), Johann Timotheus Hermes' Miß 
Fanny Wilkes (1766), and Wieland's Geschichte des Agathon. 
 Marking a shift from novels to theoretical treatises, chapter five argues critiques 
on the nature of intersubstantial causation shapes early German anthropological 
discourse. Debates between Georg Ernst Stahl and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, between 
Joachim Lange and Christian Wolff, and between Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann 
August Unzer illustrate the contentiousness of explaining if and how body and soul 
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interact. Each of these writers, excepting Leibniz, works for a significant time in Halle. 
Thus Halle emerges as an Enlightenment center that significantly shapes anthropological 
discourses. Chapter six argues that Meier and Samuel Gotthold Lange popularize these 
discourses in moral weeklies. 
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PART 1: ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN THE  
EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT 
  16 
CHAPTER I 
 
ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
Differentiating Terminology: Contemporary Versus Historical Usage 
As it was understood in eighteenth-century Germany, the term anthropology 
poses lexicographical problems for scholars writing in English. This chapter 
differentiates German-language use of anthropology in the Age of Enlightenment from 
current English usage. Existing research on the term in the German context has favored 
primary sources written in Latin and German (Linden; Marquard, "Zur Geschichte"). This 
combination coincided with a gradual shift in academic publishing during the eighteenth 
century, which saw a move from the international academic language of Latin at the 
beginning of the century to the vernacular.1 An early Enlightener, Christian Thomasius, 
exemplified this trend, for he lectured and published in German in a conscious effort to 
reach out to a broader public.2 Despite the gradual change to a national language for 
education and academic publishing, eighteenth-century students, academics, and 
members of the educated class retained an international view of their fields (Schindling, 
                                                 
1 Notker Hammerstein notes that during the Enlightenment, the use of Latin for academic publications in 
German lands shrank to 20 percent of all academic publications ("Aufklärung und Universitäten" 204). 
According to Reinhard Wittmann, the percentage of all new publications in Latin at the semi-annual 
German book markets declined from 27.7% in 1740 to 14.25% in 1770 and 3.97% in 1800 (Geschichte 
122).  
2 In 1687, Thomasius offered a German-language lecture titled "Collegium über des Gratians Grund-
Reguln [sic] Vernünfftig [sic], klug und artig zu leben" at the University of Leipzig. He was thereby one of 
the first professors from any German-speaking territory to lecture in the vernacular (Ueding 1984, 615). 
Thomasius subsequently published a number of his philosophical works in German such as Einleitung zur 
Vernunftlehre (1691), Ausübung der Vernunftlehre (1691), Einleitung zur Sittenlehre (1692), Ausübung der 
Sittenlehre (1696). Other titles were also translated into German, such as Grundlehren des Natur- und 
Völkerrechts (1709, Lat. 1705). Hammerstein identifies Thomasius as the first successful professor to 
lecture in the German language, but not the first overall ("Aufklärung und Universitäten" 203).  
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Bildung 89). Educated Germans also spoke or read Latin, French and other classical and 
national languages and oriented themselves to knowledge from Italy, the Netherlands, 
France and England (Bildung 89). From an early date, French and British writers had 
engaged anthropology (Zammito 221). Accordingly, in this chapter I supplement standard 
sources for defining anthropology in a German context with a selection of definitions 
from English and French encyclopedias. "Anthropology" appeared in various written 
forms through the middle of the eighteenth century, yet it did not have the institutional 
status as a discipline at this time. I make the case that anthropology existed on the 
margins of several eighteenth-century disciplines. In the final section of this chapter, I 
cite representative anthropological monographs to argue that authors at the end of the 
century worked from their own disciplines in creating interdisciplinary type of 
anthropology. 
According to popular use in English, the science of anthropology, investigates the 
origins, the physical and social development, common biological and social attributes, 
social practices, and beliefs of humanity ("anthropos" is Greek for man). Anthropologists 
study the languages and cultures of other peoples as well as those of one’s native 
population. This focus is paradigmatically represented by Franz Boas’ studies of Native 
American populations or Margaret Mead’s investigations of Pacific island cultures. But 
the scientific description of individual cultures (ethnography) represents only one aspect 
of anthropology. This concept can also include research in comparative zoology, or a 
philosophical investigation of human nature (Grammercy Books 63). Current use in 
English favors the first definition. 
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The Early Modern Period and the Study of Human Nature 
These concerns of ethnology, comparative anatomy, and anthropology in defining 
human nature are not new. Indeed, since antiquity academics speculated about the origin 
and purpose of humanity. For example, Herodotus’ Histories described the contact of 
Greek civilization with other peoples of the Mediterranean and the Near East, while 
Homer’s Illiad and Odyssey explored individual codes of honor (Mühlmann 25-26). 
Sophocles penetrated human psychology in his drama Oedipus Rex. In the treatise de 
Anima, Aristotle contemplated the nature of the soul and its relation to the body. In a 
broad sense, these fields of inquiry represent ideas omnipresent in the western tradition.  
 In the early modern period, new scientific discoveries gradually altered 
philosophical speculation about humans and their purpose. In the process, traditional 
religious views were challenged. Using detailed experiments and measurements, Nicolas 
Copernicus (1473-1543) identified the sun as the center of our solar system (Davies 507). 
Expanded by Johann Kepler’s (1571-1630) theory of elliptical planetary orbit and 
confirmed by Galileo Galilei’s (1564-1642) observations with a telescope, this 
heliocentric theory questioned the longstanding Ptolemaic cosmology and removed earth 
and humankind from center stage (508). The methodology for the Copernican hypothesis 
helped initiate an epistemological challenge to truth based on Scholastic metaphysics by 
recognizing science as a legitimate partner in the quest for knowledge (Alt 25-28). 
 People explored their environment in new ways, redefining the ends of the earth 
and the interactions of forces on its surface. European explorers expanded geographical 
horizons, mercantilist goals, and colonial visions beyond the Atlantic Ocean: Vasco de 
Gama charted ship passage around the Cape of Good Hope (1498) and Ferdinand 
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Magellan sailed beyond Cape Horn (1520) (Palmer and Colton 105-106, 108). Isaac 
Newton (1642-1727) used experimental data and calculus to propose uniform 
mathematical theories of movement in his Mathematical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy (1687) (286). In the desire to integrate new breakthroughs in natural science 
and to classify knowledge within a framework compatible with divine order, writers such 
as scientist John Ray explained the wisdom of God through the completeness of creation 
in his Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of the Creation (1691). 
 Similarly, artistic production confronted human modes of being. In his Essais 
(1580), Michel de Montaigne pursued self-knowledge through writing about his personal 
experiences, yet producing universal observations on human nature available in the 
accessible, new form of the personal essay. Self-reflexivity also motivated the 
melancholic and speculative inwardness of one of Shakespeare’s signature evaluations of 
the human character, Hamlet (1601).  
Like the arts, anatomy and philosophy also probed the nature of human existence. 
After studying neo-Aristotelian medicine in Padua, William Harvey proposed a model of 
the human circulatory system. His treatise Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et 
sanguiis in animalibus [An Anatomical Essay Concerning the Movement of the Heart 
and the Blood in Animals] (1628) replaced existing theories about the origin and 
circulation of the blood (Porter, Greatest Benefit 212-214). In the initially anonymously 
published Discourse on Method (1637), René Descartes located the verification for 
human existence not in Scripture or God’s creation, but in the thinking individual.  
In the early modern period, human knowledge and human aptitudes evolved 
significantly. These representative examples of changes in human perception of the 
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universe, human environments, and the self motivated renewed attempts to define the 
nature of humanity. The answers to this philosophical question correlated at times with 
science, at other times with theology, and occasionally with both. This intermingling will 
be quite obvious in the ensuing chapters. Such theories were the purview of a developing 
field called anthropology or the science of humanity.  
This concept of a science of humanity should be differentiated historically and 
culturally. Eighteenth-century versions of the science of humanity anticipated the three 
discourses on human nature mentioned above (ethnology, comparative anatomy, 
philosophy of human nature). Carsten Zelle identified three similar semantic fields for 
anthropology in eighteenth-century Germany. Cultural anthropology analyzed peoples 
and cultures, past and present. Physical or biological anthropology compared the 
similarities and differences between human beings and other animals. Philosophical 
anthropology investigated the problematic relations of body and soul, as well as the 
relationship of the human organism to other living things in the great chain of being 
(Zelle, "Sinnlichkeit und Therapie" 5n1). Additionally, a theological anthropology traced 
the telos of humankind from birth through baptism and a life of Christian faith to earthly 
death and eternal life (Porter, "Anthropology" 28). Within the area of philosophical 
anthropology, I will analyze the contribution of the historical discourse of body and soul 
to the creation of the moral individual. 
 
The European Context of Anthropology: Lexica and Encyclopedias 
 Mareta Linden's Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts 
(1976) offers the best overview of German-language texts published before 1800 that 
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attempt to define anthropology. As an investigation of philosophical anthropology, the 
study traces the interrelationship of mind and body. The author provides international 
representatives for the early history of the term: from German-speaking lands, we find 
texts by Magnus Hundt (1501) and Otto Casmann (1594); from England, by Francis 
Bacon (1623); and from France, by René Descartes (1649). Each thinker approached 
anthropology from an alternate disciplinary perspective. While Hundt as an anatomist, 
Casmann as a psychologically oriented philosopher, and Bacon as an epistemologist 
characterized human nature as a union of body and soul, the philosopher Descartes 
viewed the essence of the individual dualistically (Linden 1-9). The publishing of 
individual writers on this topic represented a personal interest, but not a profession or a 
field of study. Within existing systems of knowledge and the institutional structure of the 
university, anthropology had no established home. From 1500 to 1700, the science of 
humanity as anthropology was predominantly heterogeneous, uninstitutionalized, and 
international in scope. Hence, it is a challenge to achieve absolute prescision in assessing 
its essence.  
 Eighteenth-century lexica and encyclopedias highlighted the debate about 
humanity's double nature. According to Linden, Stephan Chauvin provided one of the 
first detailed descriptions of scientific anthropology in the Lexicon philosophicum (1713) 
(15). Within the definition of anthropology, Chauvin uses the theory of spirits to define 
the interrelationship of body and soul. The spirits function as an "inner band" to connect 
physical and spiritual nature. The definition for anthropology addresses other 
paradigmatic problems such as the location of the soul in the body and the faculties of 
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dualistic human nature. These faculties include physical and moral feeling, the will, 
desire, voluntary motion, and irritability (17). 
 Johann Georg Walch’s Philosophisches Lexicon (11726, 41775) defines 
anthropology according to the Greek term designating the doctrine of human beings. 
Human life combines physical and moral nature, both of which body and soul depend on 
(Walch and Hennings 172-173). While many historians read this definition as presenting 
a dualistic anthropology, Linden questions this hypothesis. In the next chapter, I will 
further discuss Walch’s definition of anthropology and analyze both sides of the debate. 
But here I only want to introduce Walch's concept of humanity's double nature. The 
Philosophisches Lexicon is important as an early German-language source that counters 
the Cartesian separation of res cogitans and res extensa by positing that the metaphysical 
and the material are interrelated. 
 Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff provides a first orientation to mid-
eighteenth-century anthropology with greater detail on the second half of the century. 
The pre-1750 overview focuses on texts by writers from the German territories. Because 
Enlightenment scientists communicated, travelled, and studied internationally, a brief 
consideration of English and French definitions here provides a broader context for 
situating German anthropology. Similar to Walch, important English and French lexica 
conceived of anthropology in the context of a body/soul nexus. 
 Ephraim Chambers’ Cyclopædia or, an universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences 
(1728) identifies two meanings for anthropology. One definition refers to a theological 
discourse that anthropomorphizes God to make his actions comprehensible. The other 
describes anthropology as "a discourse, or treatise upon man, or human nature: 
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considered as in a found or healthy state" (Chambers 1:unpaginated). This doctrine 
acknowledges that bodily states depend on health and selects the healthy state as the 
normal one. By making this distinction, Chambers invokes a medical predisposition to 
the normal human functioning and excludes cases of mania, delirium, etc. Like Walch, 
the discourse of anthropology in this work refers to a dualistic image of humankind and 
the interrelationship of body and soul. Chambers circumscribes this field as follows: 
"Anthropology includes the consideration of the human body and soul, with the laws of 
their union, and the effects thereof, as sensation, motion &c. See BODY, SOUL, 
SENSATION, MOTION, &c" (Chambers 1:unpaginated). Through the union of body 
and soul, the discourse on human beings investigates human perception and movement. 
The Cyclepæadia provides evidence that the discourse of anthropology exists in Great 
Britain after Bacon, even if writers discuss the body-soul relationship less under the term 
of anthropology and more according to individual elements of body, soul, or sensation. 
Chambers’ extensive system of cross-references purposely extends the meanings of 
individual concepts by directly linking semantic fields. 
 In his study of the anthropological elements of eighteenth- and Nineteenth-
century autobiography, Literarische Anthropologie (1987), Helmut Pfotenhauer claims 
that encyclopedias by Walch and Johann Heinrich Zedler document the continual 
establishment of anthropological ideas to a level of self-evidence during the eighteenth 
century (4). Zedler’s Grosses vollständiges Universal=Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und 
Künste (1732-1750) describes anthropology as a discourse on humankind under the 
umbrella of physics. As in Chambers’ Cyclopædia, Zedler’s theory of humanity defines 
the human organism in a specified, normal state, i.e. healthy and with natural faculties. 
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Thus, the term refers primarily to physical existence. The author notes that a broader 
definition of the term would include a theory of human volition and reason, yet pauses 
with concern at the expansion of knowledge and the prospect of combining all three parts 
of human life, physical existence, willing and rationality, within one field. To tame such a 
leviathan as the description of humanity, the article advocates maintaining separate 
spheres for ethics and logic (Zedler 1:522). 
The Universal=Lexicon locates the theory of humanity in natural science, but also 
acknowledges that it has counterparts in philosophy and medicine. According to 
"Anthropologia," the natural scientists provide a fragmented rendering of human nature, 
one which medical doctors complete. The science of humanity organizes knowledge in 
two ways. Dividing human nature into the physical, the moral, and the rational, the 
Universal=Lexicon assigns moral human nature to ethical philosophy and rational human 
nature to the realm of logic. According to Zedler, disciplinary forces demarcate the 
semantic fields for anthropology; "Weltweisen" and "Medici" interpret them differently. 
On the one hand, disciplines categorize human nature according to constituent elements, 
including physical, natural, and moral characteristics. On the other, physicians and 
philosophers define human nature from the standpoint of their individual discipline. 
Enlightenment anthropology crosses disciplinary fields but has no theoretical or 
institutional home (1:522).  
 Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language (1755) similarly defines 
anthropology in physical terms. In a brief entry, Johnson describes the discourse on 
humankind as "The doctrine of anatomy; the doctrine of the form and structure of the 
body of man" (Johnson 1:unpaginated). While Chambers’ Cyclopædia addresses both 
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physical and moral nature, and Zedler’s Universal=Lexicon acknowledges a moral 
component to anthropology, Johnson’s Dictionary views anthropology from the 
perspective of material human nature. Even the sole cross-reference directs attention to 
the corporeal essence of humanity: "see body."  
 Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire 
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1751-1780), like Chambers’ Cyclopædia, 
characterizes anthropology in a theological and a philosophical sense. This term 
illustrates how Diderot and D’Alembert consulted Chambers’ work, in this instance 
adopting two similar meanings, but rewrote the texts with abridgments and corrections.3 
The philosophical entry defines the term "anthropology in the animal economy; it is a 
treatise about man. This word comes from the Greek anthropos, man, and from logos, 
treatise" (Diderot and D'Alembert 1:497).4 Two brief bibliographical entries supplement 
the definition, introducing Teichmeyer’s Anthropologia (1719) and Drake’s 
Anthropology (1707) (cf. Linden 23-27).5 The brevity of the philosophical entry belies 
the significance of the cross-references. With the link to oeconomie animale, the 
Encyclopédie locates anthropology within a physiological context. The term animal 
                                                 
3 In the Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot, D’Alembert acknowledged the 
Cyclopædia’s popularity and the competence of Chambers’ plan, design, and organization. He nevertheless 
judged Chambers’ copying of some entries from other books as below the standards of the French scholars 
and the French public. While the goal to include new, critical assessments provided a motivation for the 
scholarly cooperative that became the Encyclopédie, this entry illustrates how the Encyclopédie based its 
categories of classification on existing scholarship. 109-114. 
4 "Anthropologie. Anthropologie, dans l'oeconomie animale; c'est un traité de l'homme. Ce mot vient du 
Grec ANTHROPOS, homme , & de LOGO , traité . Teichmeyer nous a donné un traité de l'oeconomie 
animale, qu'il a intitulé Anthropologia , in - 4°. imprimé à Genes en 1739. Drake nous a aussi laissé une 
Anthropologie en Anglois, in - 8°. 3 vol. imprimée à Londres en 1707 & 1727. Voyez Antropograhie." 
"Anthropologie."  
5 Diderot and D’Alembert referred to the second edition of the Teichmeier anthropology (1739), but 
excluded reference to a particular edition of Drake's text. The Anthropologia nova was reprinted numerous 
times by W. Innys, in 1717, 1727, and 1750, who also printed the appendix with 51 plates in 1726 and 
1728. 
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economy "prise dans le sens le plus exact & le plus usité ne regarde que l'ordre, le 
méchanisme, l'ensemble des fonctions & des mouvemens qui entretiennent la vie des 
animaux, dont l'exercice parfait, universel, fait avec constance, alacrité & facilité, 
constitue l'état le plus florissant de santé" (Diderot and D'Alembert 11:360).6 The opening 
paragraph of this article thus emphasizes the physical component of human nature, here 
addressed from the viewpoint of anatomy and physiology. By citing English and German 
works, the Encyclopédie provides evidence of anthropology's international scope. 
In a later paragraph, the author elaborates on the role of mind and soul in shaping 
the animal economy. In the spirit of the age, the author cites a defining phrase of 
Enlightenment psychology: connois toi toi-même; this is the same phrase Karl Philipp 
Moritz writes thirty years later on the title page epigraph of the Magazin zur 
Erfahrungsseelenkunde (1783-1793), gnothi sauton, know thyself. The entry detailing the 
animal economy thus presents a dualistic view of humanity. Human nature includes body, 
but also soul:  
L' oeconomie animale considérée dans l'homme ouvre un vaste champ aux recherches les plus 
intéressantes; elle est de tous les mysteres de la nature celui dont la connoissance touche l'homme 
de plus pres, l'affecte plus intimement, le plus propre à attirer & à satisfaire sa curiosité; c'est 
l'homme qui s'approfondit lui - même, qui pénetre dans son intérieur; il ôte le bandeau qui le 
cachoit à lui - même, & porte des yeux éclairés du flambeau de la Philosophie sur les sources de sa 
vie, sur le méchanisme de son existence; il accomplit exactement ce beau précepte qui servoit 
                                                 
6 Cited text translated: "in the more exact and the more common sense only the order, the mechanism, and 
the collection of functions and movements which sustain the life of animals, which the perfect and 
universal exercise, done with constancy, alacrity, and facility constitutes the state of more flourishing 
health." Original: "OEconomie animale, ( Médec .) le mot oeconomie signifie littéralement lois de la 
maison; il est formé des deux mots grecs OIKOS2, maison , & NOMOS2, loi; quelques auteurs ont 
employé improprement le nom d' oeconomie animale , pour désigner l'animal lui - même; c'est de cette idée 
que sont venues ces façons de parler abusives, mouvemens, fonctions de l'oeconomie animale ; mais cette 
dénomination prise dans le sens le plus exact & le plus usité ne regarde que l'ordre, le méchanisme, 
l'ensemble des fonctions & des mouvemens qui entretiennent la vie des animaux, dont l'exercice parfait, 
universel, fait avec constance, alacrité & facilité, constitue l'état le plus florissant de santé , dont le moindre 
dérangement est par lui - même maladie , & dont l'entiere cessation est l'extrème diamétralement opposé à 
la vie , c'est - à - dire la mort."  
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d'inscription au plus célebre temple de l'antiquité, GNOTHI SAUTON, connois toi toi - même. 
(Diderot and D'Alembert 11:360)7  
 
This part of the entry reveals the movement or action of the soul, including the search for 
knowledge, limitation according to societal norms, and the deliberate pursuit and 
discovery of the self. Using a characteristic Enlightenment metaphor of unmasking, and 
linking light with critical thought, the passage idealizes the prospect of human knowledge 
and human potential. 
 To fully and precisely understand the animal economy, the reader must recognize 
the interaction of the two spheres of physiological and spiritual function. Through 
engagement with the emotions and moral action, the animal economy highlights the 
anthropological foundations of human nature.  
La connoissance exacte de l' oeconomie animale répand aussi un tres - grand jour sur le physique 
des actions morales: les idées lumineuses que fournit l'ingénieux systeme que nous exposerons 
plus bas, pour expliquer la maniere d'agir, & les effets des passions sur le corps humain, donnent 
de fortes raisons de présumer que c'est au défaut de ces connoissances qu'on doit attribuer 
l'inexactitude & l'inutilité de tous les ouvrages qu'il y a sur cette partie, & l'extreme difficulté 
d'appliquer fructueusement les principes qu'on y établit: peut - être est - il vrai que pour être bon 
moraliste, il faut être excellent médecin. (11:360)8  
 
The animal economy functions especially to further understanding of moral behavior and 
the effect of the passions on the body. It provides strategies to read the corporeal signs 
produced in everyday human interaction. In coordination with the demand to know 
                                                 
7 "Considered from the [perspective] of man, the animal economy opens a vast [collection?] of particularly 
interesting research. It is, of all the mysteries of nature, that in which knowledge meets man more closely, 
which affects him more intimately, which tells him how to dress properly and satisfy his curiosity; it is man 
who examines himself, who penetrates into his interior; he removes the blindfold which he hides from 
himself and has eyes sparkling from the torch of philosophy over the well-springs of his life, over the 
means of his existence. It fulfills exactly the beautiful principle that serves as an inscription of the 
celebrated temple from antiquity: Gnothi Sauton, know thyself." 
8 "The precise understanding of the animal economy also responds to a very large gap/daylight/facility on 
the appearance/constitution of moral action: the luminous ideas that furnish the ingenious system which we 
reveal at the most basic level for explaining the function [manner of action] and the effects of the passions 
on the human body give a strong reason to presume that it is the imperfection of this knowledge to which 
one must attribute the inexactitude and uselessness of all the works that there are on this subject and the 
extreme difficulty of fruitfully applying the principles that it establishes. Perhaps it is true that to be a good 
moralist, it is necessary to be an excellent doctor." 
  28 
oneself, this semiotics of the soul asserts the imperative of trained observational 
technique and interpretative skills that transcend the social regulation of mores, limited 
knowledge, or poor scholarship. The author appeals to the empirical methods and 
diagnostic training of the medical doctor as goals for the writer describing human nature. 
In this sense, he acknowledges the positive predisposition of Enlightenment culture 
toward the philosophical doctor: he is an educated intellectual, who combines 
physiological and moral knowledge to describe, diagnose, and shape physical and moral 
human nature. 
 The editors Diderot and D’Alembert assigned the article "oeconomie animale" to 
the class of medical knowledge within the Encyclopédie. The functions of the material 
body, the author argues, define human nature. The body does not only perform vital 
functions necessary to sustain life (such as respiration) and natural functions (such as 
digestion or blood production); it also includes "animal functions": "Enfin, les fonctions 
animales forment la troisième classe; elles sont ainsi appellées, parce qu’elles sont 
censées résulter du commerce de l’âme avec le corps" (11:362).9 Thus from the 
perspective of medicine, the body-soul interaction represents one of three key functions 
of corporeal existence. One could define this relation as anthropology. From the 
perspective of this author in the Encyclopédie, the interaction is a mere extension of the 
materialist component of human nature and is therefore subsumed under the animal 
economy.  
While the Paris Encyclopédie classifies the anthropological knowledge of the 
animal economy according to medicine, Fortunato Bartolomeo de Felice, editor of the 
                                                 
9 "The animal functions form the third class. They are called this because they are reputed to result from 
the exchange of the soul with the body."  
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Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire universel raisonné des connoissances humaines (1770-
1776), classifies the term "anthropologie" philosophically. The author acutely identifies 
the differences in approach to this science: the naturalist tends to view humans physically 
and materially in terms of organic function, whereas the psychologist views humans as 
pure spirit. Based on two arguments, divine wisdom and common personal experience, 
the writer argues for the interdependence of soma and psyche, of the physical and 
spiritual spheres of human existence.  
Il en est peu qui se soient souvenus, en parlant de l’homme, qu’il n’étoit pas un certain corps 
organisé de telle maniere, ni une certaine substance intelligente, qui a par elle–même telle 
capacité; mais que l’homme étoit l’ouvrage d’une sagesse infinie, qui n’a jamais rien fait que pour 
le plus grand bien, & qui a fait de l’homme, un être mixte, composé d’un corps organisé & d’une 
âme raisonnable, unis ensemble si intimement que ces deux substances ne forment qu’un seul 
individu, que nous ne connoissons que sous cettet composition, sans avoir aucune idée de la 
maniere don pourroient exister séparément ces deux substances. Nous ne saurions en effet 
imaginer quelles idées, quelles sensations, quelles connoissances nous aurions sans le secours de 
nos sens, de nos organes, qui sont notre corps; ni quelles actions nous serions capables de faire 
sans ce principe immatériel d’intelligence & d’activité qui est notre âme. (de Felice 3:23A)10 
 
De Felice’s Yverdon Encyclopédie replaces the physiological approach to human nature 
with a theological, philosophical model. In proposing a union of the two spheres, the oft-
segregated physical side with the spiritual side, the article posits a similar position to that 
in the "animal economy" article of the Paris Encyclopédie. But the context is clearly 
different: the "anthropologie" article by de Felice articulates more verbosely, yet in a 
general fashion how the spheres interact, while the article "oeconomie animale" in 
                                                 
10 "Man [is] the work of an infinite wisdom, which has never made anything except for the greater good 
and which has made man, a composite being, composed of an organized body and a rational soul so 
intimately united that these two substances can only form a single individual, which we only know in this 
composition, without having any idea of the manner in which these two substances might exist separately. 
As a matter of fact, we could not imagine what ideas, what sensations, what knowledge we would have 
without the assistance of our senses, of our organs, which are our body; nor [would we be able to know] 
what actions we would be capable of doing without this immaterial principle of intelligence and of activity, 
which is our soul."  
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Diderot and D’Alembert’s work matter-of-factly notes the interaction as one of the 
functional strategies of the human organism.11 
 The entries in the two French encyclopedias capture the role of disparate, 
disciplinary knowledge in shaping the diverse field that is the study of human nature. The 
German sources cited above offer a similar paradigm: Walch argues from a philosophical 
perspective for a holistic view of the human being’s two spheres. By comparison, Zedler 
situates anthropology among existing disciplines. As a result, Zedler divides human 
nature into three fields and appropriates logic for the study of human reasoning, ethics for 
the study of volition, and anthropology for the study of physical human nature. Like 
Walch and Chambers, the Yverdon Encyclopédie develops a philosophical explanation 
for the interrelatedness of body and soul. Akin to Zedler, the physiological analysis of 
human beings predominates in the Paris Encyclopédie. Certainly, each of the sources here 
uses a heterogeneous base of evidence and arguments to define anthropology. 
Nevertheless, in each source, I argue, either a functional explanation of the human 
organism or a rational account prevails.  
 The reference works published by Chambers and Johnson in England, by Walch 
and Zedler in German-speaking states, by Diderot and D’Alembert in France and de 
Felice in Switzerland demonstrate a European engagement with questions of 
philosophical anthropology. Despite some differences in terminology, these sources 
explore, for example, the function of bodily sensation and movement, the effect of 
passions on the body, and the possible avenues to gain self-knowledge, i.e. the nature of 
                                                 
11 For further uses of the term anthropologie in Enlightenment France see Michèle Duchet, Anthropologie 
et histoire au siècle des lumières: Buffon, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvétius, Diderot (Paris: F. Maspero, 1971). 
See also Claude Blanckaert, "L'Anthropologie en France: Le mot et l'histoire (XVI-XIX siècle)," Bulletins 
et mémoires de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris 1 (1989). 
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interaction between body and soul. In each encyclopedia, authors analyzed and 
transmitted anthropological knowledge based on their intellectual specialties and 
interests. Thus instead of a philosophical anthropology, there were anthropologies. For 
the articles above, Walch, Chambers and de Felice approached the science of humanity 
from philosophy, while Zedler included the natural sciences and medicine, and Johnson 
and Diderot/D’Alembert focused on physiology. Knowledge from diverse fields shaped 
interdisciplinary Enlightenment anthropology.  
 The heterogeneous approach to the study of humankind encouraged interaction 
between the disciplines. According to some idealistic descriptions of anthropology, the 
science of humanity held promise as a nexus of late eighteenth-century science. De Felice 
represents this idealism in a characteristic fashion:  
Toutes les sciences que l’homme cultive ou pourra cultiver, tiendront toujours par quelque endroit 
à l’anthropologie, qui est la plus importante des sciences, la plus digne d’occuper l’homme: sans 
cette connoissance de nous-mêmes, quelle perfection, quelle félicité pourrons-nous atteindre? 
Toutes les sciences servent â perfectionner l’anthropologie, & celle-ci ne sera parfaite, qu’autant 
que les autres seront parvenues à leur perfection, & elles ne seront utiles qu’autant que nous les 
rapporterons à la science de l’homme telle que nous venons de la décrire. (de Felice 3:22B)12 
 
The science of humanity, de Felice claims, represents the most significant human 
occupation. As a source of self-knowledge and a wellspring to achieve happiness, 
anthropology depends upon knowledge from other disciplines. This relationship implies a 
teleology: for humankind to achieve its potential in the study of human nature, it must 
perfect other sciences. Anthropology had to draw knowledge from anatomy, physiology, 
neurology, chemistry, physics, psychology, even natural history and philosophy to best 
                                                 
12 "All of the sciences man cultivates or will be able to cultivate will always have some connection with 
anthropology, which is the most important of the sciences, the most worthy to occupy man. Without this 
knowledge of ourselves, what perfection, what felicity can we attain? All of the sciences serve to perfect 
anthropology and the latter will only be perfect to the extent that the others have reached their perfection. 
They [the other sciences] will only be useful to the extent that we relate them to the science of man as we 
have just described it."  
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develop a science of humankind. Despite the enthusiasm and idealistic vision expressed 
in this excerpt, it reflects the true heterogeneity of research approaches to the common 
interest in human nature during the eighteenth century. From the unique perspective of 
each of these disciplines, writers contributed to a complex image of anthropological 
inquiry. 
 
Institutional Frameworks and Interdisciplinarity 
In eighteenth-century German-speaking lands, anthropology lacked an 
institutional home. The traditional four divisions of study, theology, law, medicine, and 
philosophy (with a possible fifth faculty for music), structured German university 
education in the eighteenth century (Hammerstein, "Aufklärung und Universitäten" 191; 
on music cf. Davies 361). In addition to the longstanding goal of humanistic education, 
universities understood themselves as institutions to educate theologians for pastoral 
work and to train civil servants for administration (Hammerstein, "Aufklärung und 
Universitäten" 197). In some cases, this meant that specialized academies for fields such 
as medicine or mining more successfully achieved goals of original scientific research, 
progress in knowledge, and sharing newly won scholarship with students and colleagues 
than scholastic, tradition-bound universities (Hammerstein, "Aufklärung und 
Universitäten" 198; Porter, "Scientific Revolution" 560).13 Many philosophical and 
theological faculties held fast to Aristotelian scholasticism at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century and limited innovation in thought through the challenges of fields like 
psychology or anthropology (Schindling, Bildung 52). Though the field of jurisprudence 
                                                 
13 Porter notes other instutions that shaped Enlightenment science included courtly academies, voluntary 
societies, and specialized research centers such as observatories.  
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surpassed theology as the primary discipline at reform universities such as Halle and 
Göttingen, the theological faculty only gradually relinquished power at the university. 
Theology’s power hinged on cultural values and institutions that extended beyond the 
university: the discipline shaped the epistemological worldview of a large percentage of 
the populace and it trained men to serve God as pastors and priests, as shepherds of the 
church.14 Additionally, theology enjoyed the tradition of being a primary field of study at 
the university.15 
 Anthropological questions challenged the authority of Christian theology, for 
example from the fields of natural history and philosophy. The field of natural history 
raised questions for Christian theology through its classification of human beings with 
living and non-living things according to what we now call physical anthropology. The 
discovery of fossils with the million-year-old remains of plants and animals challenged 
Biblical accounts of history, namely the theological dogma that dated the world to only 
six or seven thousand years from the point of creation. Similarly, in philosophy the theory 
of physical influence, i.e. that the body influenced the soul, and the soul the body, 
whether in physical motion, sensation, or as a result of emotions, challenged the 
theological view that God was the first cause of motion in the universe. In this case, 
theorists of reciprocal influence distanced themselves from existing theories that 
maintained God as the original cause of all actions. The incongruent nature of 
                                                 
14 Jurisprudence assumed key importance at universities in coordination with doctrines of natural law. In 
Halle, however, the theological faculty subsequently paralyzed some of the university’s initial reforms and 
reinstated some restrictive tendencies. See Notker Hammerstein, "Die deutschen Universitäten im Zeitalter 
der Aufklärung," Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 10 (1983): 73-89, here 76, 79-80. 
15 From a European perspective, theology achieved the pinnacle of its power in the university during the 
sixteenth century. See Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, "New Structures of Knowledge," Universities in 
Early Modern Europe (1500-1800), ed. Hilde de Ridder-Symoens, A History of the University in Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 500-509. 
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anthropological theory in comparison to theology challenged theological power at the 
university.  
German universities gradually reformed the structure of higher education, 
however, with newly founded universities in Halle and Göttingen leading the way. 
Founded in 1694, the University of Halle quickly ascended to the role of the leading 
university in the German lands through the scholarship and guidance of Christian 
Thomasius in law and philosophy, August Hermann Francke in theology, and Christian 
Wolff in philosophy and natural law (Wehler 1:294-295; Schindling, Bildung 39). With 
Thomasius and Francke, Halle replaced Lutheran orthodoxy prevalent at the neighboring 
Universities in Wittenberg and Leipzig with philosophy and Pietist theology focused on 
practical moral behavior (Schindling, Bildung 38). By emphasizing the study of history 
for law and administration, Thomasius effected a reform of knowledge that had 
consequences for the organization of the university.16 Around 1750, the University of 
Göttingen eclipsed Halle as a center for research (Hammerstein, "Deutsche 
Universitäten" 78-79). Instead of choosing theology as the leading discipline of the new 
institution, university founders in Göttingen, such as Gerlach Adolph von Münchhausen, 
granted history a leading role in organizing knowledge (Schindling, Bildung 27-28; 
Wehler 1:295-296). While history and the natural sciences gradually gained prominence 
                                                 
16 Schindling also credits Samuel Stryk, Thomasius’ mentor from the University of Frankfurt/Oder and his 
colleague in Halle beginning in 1691, for reform of the study of law. They emphasized the study of law 
based on reference to primary sources and imperial history. This empirical method characterized the spirit 
of reform in other disciplines as well: complete and unbiased study of the Bible in theology, open 
acknowledgement by Christians of their born again faith through trials and practice in daily life, the role of 
reason in establishing higher standards of behavior and equity when weighing the needs of society and the 
individual through natural law, and clinical practice in medicine. Anton Schindling, Bildung und 
Wissenschaft in der frühen Neuzeit, Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte 30, ed. Lothar Gall, 2 ed. (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1999) 39. See also Hammerstein: "Die deutschen Universitäten" 73-89, here 74-78. 
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as valid fields of study, it took longer to establish empirical psychology and 
anthropology. 
 Despite gradual inclusion of new fields at German universities during the 
eighteenth century, anthropology remained an endeavor characterized by other 
disciplines. It lacked institutional autonomy. Isolated examples illustrate professors’ 
efforts to separate anthropology from related disciplines, or to subordinate it to existing 
fields. Linden cites the Leipzig University Professor for Rhetoric and Poetry Gottfried 
Polycarp Müller (1685-1747), who in a lecture announcement from 1719 posited that 
anthropology should be established as a field separated from the other philosophical 
disciplines (Linden 18). By contrast, writers more commonly approached anthropology 
from the perspective of their own field or another existing discipline such as natural 
science, medicine, or philosophy. In his Elementa anthropologiae sive theoria corporis 
humani (1719), Jena University Professor Hermann Friedrich Teichmeyer (1685-1746) 
subordinated the representation of the physical human being to the new empirical, 
experimental study of physics (Linden 24-25).  
 Research originating from the University of Halle around 1740 further typifies 
how academics pursued anthropological themes from within existing disciplines of 
medicine and philosophy. During his study of medicine, natural sciences, and 
mathematics, and from 1743 as an instructor in medicine, Johann Gottlob Krüger (1715-
1759) published his Naturlehre (1740-1749), a three-volume natural history. The second 
volume, Physiologie (1743), not only describes the function of the human body, but 
investigates the interaction of body and soul in chapters on sensation and inner sense 
(Krüger, Physiologie 536-637, 763-781). Combining knowledge from his training as a 
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doctor with his interest in philosophy, Krüger develops an interdisciplinary investigative 
method combining medical and philosophical approaches that he presents in a more 
developed form in the Experimental-Seelenlehre (1756). In philosophy, Georg Friedrich 
Meier (1718-1777) published a philosophical account of the relationship of the soul and 
the body in his monograph Theoretische Lehre von den Gemüthsbewegungen überhaupt 
(1744). Future studies should investigate the constellations of different fields that define 
anthropology at a given university or intellectual center to enable a better analysis of 
anthropology’s disciplinary roots during the eighteenth century.17 
 
Anthropologies: Key Monographs of the Late Enlightenment Anthropological Turn 
 The study of anthropology in the German states continued to develop from 1750 
until the end of the century from the perspective of individual disciplines. In his 
Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise (1772), Ernst Platner argued as a physician and 
philosopher that interactions of body and soul shape human reason, memory, creativity, 
and health. Deriding the emphasis on physiology in the study of humanity, Immanuel 
Kant’s philosophical approach in the Anthropologie von pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798) 
redefined the proper subject of anthropology as the rational choice to pursue moral 
character.18 In his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-1791) 
Johann Gottfried Herder created a historical account of human nature through the 
                                                 
17 An initial example of this type of instutional history includes an investigation into anthropology and 
empirical psychology in Jena around 1800. Though the editors provide an overview of the establishment of 
the discipline through summaries and quantitative history, further detailed readings would be required to 
interpret their sources. See Georg Eckardt, Matthias John, Temilo van Zantwijk and Paul Ziche, eds., 
Anthropologie und empirische Psychologie um 1800: Ansätze einer Entwicklung zur Wissenschaft (Köln: 
Böhlau, 2001). 
18 The 1798 version of the anthropology represents a snapshot in the development of a lecture Kant gave 
regularly starting in 1772. For a record of its development through notes on 9 different versions of the 
lecture, see Immanuel Kant, Vorlesungen über Anthropologie,29 vols., Gesammelte Schriften,vol. 25 
(Berlin: G. Reimer, 1997). 
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combination of ethnography, natural history, physiology, and philosophy. Indeed, the 
period around 1772 marked a point of crystalization of anthropological theory. While 
Platner published his anthropology in that year, it also marked Kant's first reading of the 
anthropological lectures, which he repeated regularly thereafter. Herder's Ideen are a 
significantly redeveloped version of the essay "Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte der 
Menschheit" from 1773, printed in 1774. Thus the anthropological interests of Platner, 
Kant, and Herder achieved a significant expression around the same period, 1772-1773. 
This should not discount, however, the complex genesis and subsequent development of 
each of the author’s works. Moreover, each thinker anchored his interdisciplinary 
interpretation of the anthropological enterprise in a different discipline, Platner in 
medicine, Kant in philosophy, and Herder in history.19 Their monographs represented 
epistemological differences and at the same time formed anthropological knowledge in a 
ways comparable to earlier scholars, including those writing definitions of anthropology 
for encyclopedias. 
 Ernst Platner's Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise approaches the science of 
humanity as an intersection of philosophy and medicine. Though not the first book in the 
German Enlightenment to theorize human life from this perspective, the work represents 
a school of development in science and has recently gained notoriety as the first German 
                                                 
19Pfotenhauer makes this distinction in a similar manner in the introduction to Literarische Anthropologie, 
for example differentiating a physiological science of humanity, a charge Kant makes against Platner, from 
the psychological approach to humanity by Georg Ernst Stahl or Marcus Herz. Pfotenhauer compellingly 
notes that most writers on anthropology chose a heterogeneous approach and that distinctions between their 
views nevertheless remain. Claiming that each author’s presuppositions are shaped by a combination of 
their professional training and interests, This dissertation attributes the differences to the epistemological 
basis used for each text. See Helmut Pfotenhauer, Literarische Anthropologie: Selbstbiographien und ihre 
Geschichte – am Leitfaden des Leibes, Germanistische Abhandlungen 62 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1987) 4-5. 
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monograph to use the German term Anthropologie in the title.20 In the programmatic and 
oft-cited foreword, Platner claims that the separation of the field of medicine from 
philosophy after the time of Hippocrates provided more disadvantages than advantages 
and the author therefore recommends the study of these fields together. Assessing the 
integration of medical and philosophical skills in his own age, Platner argues that 
between doctors and philosophers, doctors have learned the least about their 
complementary discipline. Yet recognition of their interrelation is essential. Philosophy, 
defined broadly as "die Wissenschaft des Menschen und anderer Körper und Geister, 
welche zu seiner Natur ein Verhältnis und auf seine Glückseligkeit eine Beziehung 
haben" can even include the field of medicine (Platner iii-iv). Thus the proper care of 
humankind, especially given its dualistic nature, requires philosophy and medicine (iv). 
By uniting etchings of Hippocrates and Plato, the title page reinforces this rhetoric ( ):(1). 
 The foreword of the Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise diagnoses the 
organization of scientific disciplines and envisions a reorganization of natural science. In 
order to understand human beings, Platner argues, one must evaluate all aspects of human 
nature, physical and spiritual. In point of fact, various problems restrict the productive 
integration of medicine and philosophy. Political motivations may combine disciplines 
without consideration of their substantive integration (v). The combination of medicine 
with related fields thus suffers under whimsical organization, for example the 
combination of botany with the study of human health while excluding psychology (vi). 
                                                 
20 Mareta Linden, Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts, Studien zur 
Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts, Bd. 1 (Bern, Frankfurt/M.: Herbert, Lang, 1976) 42. Alexander Kosenina 
notes the exception of Johannes Praetorius, Collegium curiosum privatissimum physiognom-, chiromant-, 
metoposcop-, anthropologicum (Frankfurt, Leipzig: Philipp Wilhelm Stock, 1704). Due to the breadth of 
subjects, however, Kosenina doesn’t regard the Collegium curiosum as a pure anthropology, see Alexander 
Kosenina, "Afterword," Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise, ed. Alexander Kosenina (Leipzig: 
Dyckischen Buchhandlung, 1772) 308. 
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Prejudices–whether initiated in the medical profession or by the public–shape the 
qualifications and duties of medical doctors and philosophers and hinder the integration 
of these fields (vii). Popular opinion and traditional division of expertise necessitate that 
doctors provide for the physical health of human beings, philosophers (and theologians) 
for their intellectual and emotional being–despite the fact that physical and spiritual 
natures influence each other. Finally, Platner believes that physicians schooled to think in 
casuistic terms and to use empirical evidence distance themselves from the soul based on 
its concealment and unintelligibility (ix-x). Perhaps these perceptions stem from publicly 
ingrained interpretations of the responsibilities of the doctor and the philosopher; perhaps 
they derive from the self-limitation of doctors who feel unprepared to address the 
complexities of psychology. As a beginning academic, Platner took risks to identify real 
obstacles to the perception of the human organism as an interdependent relationship of 
body and soul and to the inclusion of philosophy in the field of medicine.21 
 Addressing the debates of materialists and vitalists on the relationship of body and 
soul, the Anthropologie of 1772 divides the science of humanity into three subfields. This 
division clarifies the specific focus of anthropology, which for Platner was not 
synonymous but a subfield of the science of humanity. The first science explores the 
parts and activities of the human being as a machine through anatomy and physiology 
and thereby focuses on the body alone. The second science, which explores the faculties 
of the soul without consideration of the body, integrates psychology, logic, aesthetics and 
                                                 
21 In an anonymously-published, undated leaflet Alexander Kosenina attributes to Platner, Der Professor, 
its author criticizes the lack of application for university learning and promotes a practical knowledge of 
humanity through a combination of medicine and philosophy. See Alexander Kosenina, Ernst Platners 
Anthropologie und Philosophie: der philosophische Arzt und seine Wirkung auf Johann Karl Wezel und 
Jean Paul, Epistemata: Würzburger wissenschaftliche Schriften, Reihe Literaturwissenschaft, Bd. 35 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1989) 24-25. Kosenina dates Der Professor to 1774, see Kosenina, 
"Afterword," 307. 
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the greater part of moral philosophy. For the philosophical physician, the knowledge of 
humanity exists in the harmony of body and soul, in the study of "der ganze Mensch." 
Anthropology, the third science, investigates the reciprocal relationships and restrictions 
of body and soul: "Endlich kann man Körper und Seele in ihren gegenseitigen 
Verhältnissen, Einschränkungen und Beziehungen zusammen betrachten, und das ist es, 
was ich Anthropologie nenne" (Platner xv-xvii). Though fields such as psychology and 
anthropology approach each other, anthropology differs, according to Platner, in that it 
studies the effect of the body on the soul or the soul on the body. 
 Evidence from everyday life supports this claim. Triggered by things in the world, 
sensory perception can stimulate ideas in the soul. But ideas in the soul, with or without 
an outside impetus, can produce motion in the body (xii). With these simple examples, 
Platner illustrates the complementary nature of the body-soul relationship and emphasizes 
the importance of the exchange between physical and spiritual natures. Whether a divine 
or natural cause spurs the communication, the relation between the two spheres provides 
insight into the dualistic nature of human existence. Though the preface does not name 
Malebranche's occasionalism, it does identify the other theory of divine communication, 
Leibniz's preestablished harmony rooted in Divine Providence, and the multiplicity of 
theories of natural communication between body and soul known as physical influence. 
 The Anthropologie discusses the interrelation of the material body and the 
metaphysical soul in general psychological categories similar to those in Enlightenment 
psychological texts. This despite the fact that the author explicitly states his intention not 
to write a psychological work (xv). The book's aim is to identify how psychology 
together with physiology defines complete human nature. Nevertheless, psychological 
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themes predominate an organizing principle in chapters II to VII, with the first chapter 
devoted to an introduction of anthropology. While the chapter headings don't directly 
reflect any one psychological work, they indicate an organization based on mental 
faculties: 
I.  Vorerkenntnisse und Grundlehren der Anthropologie  
II.  Von der Erzeugung der Ideen 
III.  Von dem Gedächtnis 
IV.  Von der Phantasie 
V.  Von der Vernunft und ihren verschiedenen Aeußerungen 
VI.  Theorie der Krankheiten, welche aus der Anstrengung des Geistes entstehen 
VII.  Vom Genie 
 
The creation of ideas (II), their storage (III), the power of invention (IV), the order of 
logic (V), and aberrations from the normal human state of equilibrium, spiritual illness 
(VI), and genius (VII) represent common categories in works of Enlightenment 
psychology such as John Locke's An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689) and 
David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740). Platner's Anthropologie uses the 
framework of rational terminology and topics as a template to investigate the corporeal 
engagement with rational functions. Exemplifying the kind of research called for in the 
preface, the author demonstrates his willingness to think beyond the structures of his own 
field of medicine and underscores the commitment to have physicians engage with 
philosophy. 
 According to Platner, the body engages the rational faculties on the level of 
perception and of reason. In the chapter on the formulation of ideas, one section questions 
the idea of innate ideas and claims: "Alle Ideen entstehen zuerst durch die sinnliche 
Empfindung" (50). Thus anthropology engages the powers of reason on multiple levels: 
the lower rational faculties and aesthetics (the study of the improvement of sensory 
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perception) and that of the higher rational faculties and logic (the study of the 
improvement of cognition). The will plays a peripheral role, receiving a brief mention in 
the body/soul connection (xi, §109-111, 31, §122, 33). Compared with Enlightenment 
psychologies by Locke or Wolff, however, the anthropology of 1772 lacks any significant 
treatment of the powers of the will. It incorporates neither ethics nor the will’s 
mechanical response to the emotions (cf. Locke book 2, chapter 21, §5-6, 236, §15, 240-
241, §29-30, 249-250; C. Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken von Gott §404-497, 247-302). 
Though Platner planned to discuss volition's role in a second volume of the anthropology 
(which was completed in manuscript form according to the preface to the first volume), it 
was never published (Platner xxvii).  
 By investigating the interdependence of psychological and physiological aspects 
of human nature, Platner differentiated his Anthropologie from psychology and 
physiology alone. Instead of employing speculative metaphysics to understand the 
connection of soul and body, the Leipzig doctor called for an empirical process of 
making observations and recording them in protocols (xi). Throughout his text, however, 
speculation in combination with observation formed an interdisciplinary description of 
the interaction between body and soul (Wöbkemeier 162). The doctor Platner explained 
this connection through physiology, identifying the neurological system as the interface 
for communication between substances (Platner 39-44). In reality, human thought and 
action presuppose such a functional union (34). The brain, a physical structure and 
initiator and archive of neural signals, serves as a nexus of the author’s theory of physical 
influence (44-49). Platner used the analogy of Harvey’s circulatory system to understand 
brain functions. According to the Leipzig professor’s theory, the brain is a system of 
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tubes served by circulating blood and neural fluid ("Lebensgeister"). Through this 
network, the soul receives impressions and directs motion (39-40).  
 Physiology plays a significant role in describing the interaction of body and soul 
throughout Platner’s anthropology. In the formation of ideas, the neural fluid carries an 
external sensation into the body, where the attentive soul re-presents them (64, 70). For 
memory to function, the interdependent soul and brain (spirit and body) require activation 
(105-106). Certain physiological conditions, such as actuated neural tubes, physically 
promote memory (117). Fantasy, or imagination, similarly hinges on the unhindered flow 
of neural fluid for proper function, i.e. the individual depends on bodily function for 
imaginative creation (173-175). By continually returning to physiological explanations of 
psychological or psychosomatic functions, Platner anchors his interpretation of the 
body/soul interaction in medical science. 
 In the preface to his Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Kant places 
humanity at the center of human reflection. Echoing Alexander Pope's declaration that 
"the proper study of mankind is man," the Anthropologie of 1798 reiterates a sentiment 
widely held by scientists, academics and readers at the close of the eighteenth century. 
All developments in culture, says Kant, including knowledge and skills, have their 
purpose through application in the world, and by world he refers to the human sphere 
(Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 399-400). Knowledge of humanity 
represents information of utmost significance and encapsulates a learned amalgamation 
of the nature of human knowledge and skills as part of a historical process. For each 
individual, the faculty of reason shapes this development through socialization, the 
engagement with arts and sciences, increased civilization, and moral training (Kant, 
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Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 678). This teleology focuses the reader on the 
study of individual potential and is one of the characteristic gestures of the work. 
 Knowledge represents a recurring focus in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View. In order for individuals to promote the pragmatic side of what they know, 
they must narrow their focus to promote the understanding of human beings as world 
citizens (Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 400; Brandt, Kritischer 
Kommentar 67). Encounters with residents from the local city or region provides valuable 
exposure to various languages and manners and thereby practical experience in the 
evaluation and understanding of human character. Travel or travel diaries, especially in 
conjunction with meeting local individuals, broaden an individual's knowledge of 
humanity (Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 400). For Kant, as long as the 
reflection focuses on moral constitution, it provides valuable information for one's 
personal development.  
 The preface definitively differentiates the scope of the Anthropologie from similar 
writings by other authors. Highlighting the main theme of the work, the author 
simultaneously defines pragmatic anthropology and distinguishes it from the 
physiological approach of medical doctors. Accentuating the human potential, the 
Anthropologie separates fields of inquiry: "Die physiologische Menschenkenntnis geht 
auf die Erforschung dessen, was die N a t u r aus dem Menschen macht, die pragmatische 
auf das, was e r, als freihandelndes Wesen, aus sich selber macht, oder machen kann und 
soll" (399). Though the work necessarily incorporates an evaluation of knowledge and 
defines it from a human perspective, Kant ultimately wants to identify what the human 
can and should achieve. With a focus on what humans can know and what they should 
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do, the text approaches anthropology from a moral-philosophical position and minimizes 
empirical investigation. The book shifts anthropology, a science of humanity, from the 
investigative and empirical method of physiologists, doctors and natural scientists to the 
theoretical method of philosophers and promotes greater delineation between their modes 
of inquiry. In emphasizing the role of reflection on the constitution of the science of 
humanity, the work views anthropology through a philosophical lens. 
 The introduction outlines a system for the science of humanity. For Kant, 
anthropology, though classed outside the system of philosophy, uses philosophical 
methods: it defines terms, analyzes relationships of categories, and illustrates the 
theoretical relationships with real-world examples. It is an application of the practice of 
reason to the question of what the human should become. The author maintains 
classification provides the necessary means to understand human characteristics. Kant 
sketches the goals of the work as follows: 
Eine systematisch entworfene und doch populär (durch Beziehung auf Beispiele, die sich dazu von 
jedem Leser auffinden lassen) in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßte Anthropologie führt den 
Vorteil für das lesende Publikum bei sich: daß durch die Vollständigkeit der Titel, unter welche 
diese oder jene menschliche, ins Praktische einschlagende beobachtete Eigenschaft gebracht 
werden kann, so viel Veranlassungen und Auffoderungen demselben hiemit gegeben werden, jede 
besondere zu einem eigenen Thema zu machen, um sie in das ihr zugehörende Fach zu stellen; 
wodurch die Arbeiten in derselben sich von selbst unter die Liebhaber dieses Studiums verteilen 
und durch die Einheit des Plans nach gerade zu einem Ganzen vereinigt werden. (402) 
 
Through an appeal to the reader’s capacity to differentiate and group its topic, the 
Kantian Anthropology promises to function as a tool to that end.  
In his Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie (1999) Reinhard Brandt identifies three 
levels of investigation that proceed from the preface and provide the skeleton of Kant's 
work. First, the text explores the psychological motivation of human action (Brandt, 
Kritischer Kommentar 9-10). A large section of the work records how senses influence 
the creation, organization, and possibility of knowledge. Second, in the tradition of 
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Balthasar Gracian's Handorakel und Kunst der Weltklugheit (1647) and Christian 
Thomasius' Ausuebung der Sittenlehre (1696), the psychology and phenomenology of 
anthropology provide practical guidance for human action (Kritischer Kommentar 9-11). 
Third, guided by reason, the investigation of the nature of humanity culminates in a 
vision of a goal for the human race (9, 11-12).  
Kantian anthropology has a metaphysical heritage and a philosophical focus. 
Kant's program for anthropology developed in response to the empirical psychology 
within the system of metaphysics devised by Christian Wolff and Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten (Kritischer Kommentar 49). According to Reinhard Brandt, the Königsberg 
philosopher separated psychology from metaphysics in an initial lecture on empirical 
psychology in the winter semester of 1772-1773, and as a result of this course decided to 
pursue the study of humanity "not psychologically or speculatively," but pragmatically 
(49). In his essay "Kant and the Problem of Human Nature," Allen Wood illuminates this 
differentiation in four ways: (1) as an alternative to the physiological approach of Ernst 
Platner; (2) as knowledge of the world based on personal experience in contrast to 
scholastic theories developed from observation of others; (3) as a vehicle to shape human 
action; and (4) as a means to achieve happiness (Wood 40-42). By summarizing his 
theory of cognition in part one, book one of the Anthropologie, Kant provides an 
epistemological groundwork to theorize how desire and volition influence human action 
in part one, books two and three. 
 As in the preface, the opening of the second part of the book, "Die 
anthropologische Charakteristik," includes a turn from an empirical to a theoretical 
perspective and provides the framework for Kant's teleology. According to his vision for 
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humanity, the study of human character supercedes the investigation of temperament 
(Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 634). Both temperament and character 
represent systems to evaluate human action. Humoral pathology or temperament, a theory 
of the interaction of body and soul through a series of fluids or through the nerves, 
focuses on human physiology and its effect on human psychology. This dualistic theory 
defines humanity in naturalistic terms and evaluates reason in its relation to instinct, a 
view Kant criticizes because it subordinates human nature too much to the drives. 
Character, in the sense of "diejenige Eigenschaft des Willens, nach welcher das Subjekt 
sich selbst an bestimmte praktische Prinzipien bindet, die er sich durch seine eigene 
Vernunft unabänderlich vorgeschrieben hat" represents the predisposition to define 
humanity according to reason rather than nature (633). To accomplish its task of 
achieving greater humanity, the author eschews the import of the natural, physical being 
and focuses on reason as a source for the ethical improvement of society. For Kant, the 
gift of rational thought, the essence of the difference between human beings and their 
animal cousins, necessitates a responsibility to improve the conditions of all people. 
"Improvement" includes socializing others to a productively moral and civil life and an 
active, creative existence in spite of the attraction of human material existence, i.e. of 
physical perception and biological drives.  
This goal of instilling dignity also necessitates a kind of social control, a 
normalization of the production of individuality to achieve a vision of humanity within 
communities. For Kant, the formation of the individual represents simultaneously the 
development of a moral self and the role of that individual in shaping civilization. In the 
Anthropologie, the teleology of human existence, a standardizing force on the formation 
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of identity, begins in nature and progresses through culture to morality (682). According 
to this excerpt, human ontogenesis evolves through sequential phases like the life cycle of 
a butterfly. In a following excerpt, the individual progresses through the antagonism of 
multiple formative powers, good and evil (683). Kant evaluates human striving for 
happiness in this context. While nature drives the individual to aim for happiness, which 
he describes as the pursuit of physical pleasure, reason limits individuals through mores 
so that they can achieve their psychological and physiological determination (680). 
Human identity develops in the ever-shifting realm of the pursuit of physical desire and 
the civilizing patterns of thought that make the achievement of human potential and 
dignity possible.  
 For Kant, human beings as a group achieve rational self-determination through a 
process of civilization. In his essay "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?" 
(1783), Kant takes a position similar to that in the Anthropologie: reading enlightened 
texts and conversation with other members of society–i.e., sociability–trains individuals 
to use reason and enables them to pursue Enlightenment (Kant, "Was ist Aufklärung?" 
53-54). He contrasts mature individuals to the unenlightened, the mündig to the 
unmündig, who are each at different stages in the process of attaining reason. While Kant 
takes interest in the development of individual minds, his focus in the essay on 
Enlightenment and in the Anthropologie includes the pursuit of a greater moral and social 
responsibility of the human species (Brandt, "Guiding Idea" 93-99, esp. 98). 
 In his text Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-1791), 
Herder considers anthropology to encompass different questions. In place of Kant's moral 
trajectory, Herder's work builds on the broad base of his previous writings with 
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anthropological themes, among them Über den Ursprung der Sprache (1772), Vom 
Erkennen und Empfinden (1778), and Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung 
der Menschheit (1774). Through four parts, the Ideen from 1784 incorporates insights on 
the formative role of language for human experience from the language essay. It draws 
on the interdependence of knowledge and perception and on the significance of empirical 
knowledge from the essay Vom Erkennen und Empfinden. Revisiting philosophical and 
historiographical problems introduced in Auch eine Philosophie, the text of the Ideen 
references empirical studies to analyze humanity in combination with the more rational 
approach of Kant's Anthropologie. Though both authors use travel reports in their 
writings, Herder cites findings from natural science experiments more readily than his 
fellow philosopher.  
 The Ideen focuses on the relationship of the human being to nature in general and 
climate in particular. As individuals, as mere fragments of the larger world, humans exist 
in an interdependent relationship with all elements of their environment. Describing the 
place of the individual in the world, Herder avers: "Der Bau des Weltgebäudes sichert 
also den Kern meines Daseins, mein inneres Leben, auf Ewigkeiten hin. Wo und wer ich 
sein werde, werde ich sein der ich jetzt bin, eine Kraft im System aller Kräfte, ein Wesen 
in der unabsehlichen Harmonie einer Welt Gottes" (Herder, Ideen 3,1:20). The history of 
humanity is a circular hermeneutic, a uniting and encompassing discipline that includes 
the unity and diversity of human forms among the eternally renewing forms of the earth.  
The concentration on sense of place pervades this work. Human beings coexist 
and evolve in competition and in concert with other living things, but also under the 
influence or duress of other elemental factors. Physical characteristics such as 
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temperature, electricity and atmospheric pressure determine the human habitability of any 
given region and represent uncontrollable influences on human existence. Though the 
citations only hint at the author's understanding of climatological factors, he implies 
comprehension of current empirical research in a list of influential scientists, including 
Boyle, Boerhaave, Hales, Gravesant, Franklin, Priestley, Black, Crawford, and Achard 
(3,1:34). Physical geography, the location of water and land, influence the character of 
human civilization from its origins to its methods of survival. Mountains represent for the 
author a kind of original climate for humankind as well as a natural dividing element 
between peoples. By shaping the distribution, dispersal, and technical development of 
civilization, they represent a key element that shaped the survival and variation of the 
human species. In consideration of environmental factors on human civilization and the 
development of the species, history plays a more traditional role and marks human 
change in a cause and effect chronology. 
 One of the most clear differences between the views of Herder and Kant stems 
from their thoughts on the source of reason. While Kant believes a process of civilization 
elicits rational self-determination from individuals in society, Herder proposes human 
beings possess the faculty of reason from birth through nature. For the author of the 
Ideen, the human being exists in its relationship with the chain of being, with organisms 
from the worm to the monkey, and stands alone at the pinnacle of creation. The Ideen, 
through the integration and evaluation of research by other writers, compares the family 
of monkeys to humans and acknowledges the existence of similar instincts and emotions 
in each species. The two species remain separated, however, because the apes appear 
unable to generate thought or combine external thoughts with their own. Demonstrating 
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the difficulty of identifying distinctive physiological factors in Haller's Physiologie that 
determine the ability to use reason, Herder continues the search for an anatomical sign of 
the application of reason. Brain mass, an inconclusive measure in the judgment of the 
rational abilities of an organism, plays a subordinate role to the physiological structure of 
the organism's brain. In this way, Herder finds a means to maintain an empirical basis for 
his evaluation. He isolates the structure of the head and the upright stature of the body as 
unique characteristics of the reasoning animal and infers that these characteristics 
separate the human being from other species. Nature instills each species with instincts 
and a nervous system or brain, but humans have the unique combination of perfected 
brain structure and upright posture to take advantage of this position (Ideen 3,1:117). The 
biological evolution of the human being to an upright posture and of the skull makes the 
refined human reason possible. 
 Though he devotes a large portion of his investigation of the sources of reason in 
the Ideen to physiological factors, Herder also identifies other sources. In a characteristic 
manner, Herder develops a theory of networked causes of the sources of reason. The 
essay "Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache" (1772), the prizewinning entry in the 
1771 contest organized by the Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, combined six 
sources of the origin of language into a web of factors that contribute to the formation of 
human language. The search for the sources of human reason also includes theological 
and philosophical factors. In addition to physiological causes, Herder names language as 
a source of reason. While Kant might see language as a product of social interaction, and 
thereby intertwined in the development of human reason, Herder discusses another 
possible source of human speech. Words and sentences—the linguistic equations that 
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help make rationality not only communicable, but in some sense possible—derive also 
from divine breath. If language is of divine origin, and reason is linked to language, then 
reason also comes from God (Herder, "Ursprung der Sprache" 260). Just like the sources 
of language in the origin of language essay, there are multiple sources of reason. By 
combining physiological, linguistic and theological sources of reason, Herder illustrates 
the complex network of physical, psychological, social and self-reflective factors that 
shape human beings and their purposes. 
 Kant followed the periodic publication of the Ideen and in 1785 reviewed the first 
two parts in the Allgemeinen Literatur-Zeitung. In the evaluation of part one, the 
Königsberg mentor questions the work's method and several of its conclusions. His 
critique claims that two components of a key analogy, the elevation of the individual to a 
more complete existence in another life and the human station on the chain of being, have 
no similarity with one another (Kant, "Rezension zu Herder" 791). The review questions 
the validity of Herder's comparative anatomy, relegating the unity of energy [Kraft] in 
nature to speculative philosophy instead of empirical science 792). Kant finds the 
conclusions of Herder's empirical study, including the idea that the source of reason lies 
in erect human posture, unproven and therefore mere creative fictions (793). For Kant, 
Herder's conclusions are all too speculative and lack a substantive foundation in logic. To 
conclude his review, the mentor calls for future parts of the work to define terms instead 
of alluding to them, to observe laws instead of anticipating them, and to use reason 
instead of fantasy in thinking (793-794). The thrust of the argument calls for a more 
consistent use of logical thought. 
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 The Ideen certainly use a different methodological model than Kant's 
Anthropologie. Through the introduction, each author situates the work in a manner that 
typifies the entire text. Kant defines, classifies, and creates a rational structure for the 
interpretation of the science of humanity. The introduction of Herder’s Ideen defines a 
different reading experience, one based on a calculation of common experiences by the 
writer with the reader. The shared perceptions provide an "invisible exchange of spirits 
and hearts" through an estimation of audience, a joyous awakening to knowledge through 
reading, a communication of an inner being, and a trusted exchange of ideas with a true 
friend (Herder, Ideen 3,1:11). Creating an intimate link driven by emotion, this book 
personally engages the reader to follow an emotive look at the structure of nature. 
According to Herder, humans intuitively seek to order their experience, for example 
using the faculties of memory and recollection (storage and recall) in narrative. Humans 
also order their knowledge according to place (3,1:13). The categories of organization 
therefore derive from human interaction with nature, time, and place. In a deist gesture, 
these unities provide evidence of divine order in the natural world; observation in the 
world represents reading the book of nature as God's creation (3,1:12). Anticipating the 
critique that he argues too broadly with too much information, Herder says the work 
should not be judged on its first part, but as a whole. The author argues that he uses the 
best approach to understanding humanity because people can only comprehend human 
fate in the world on an individual level. The reader gleans knowledge of humanity 
through experience in the world and through analogies of nature, not through rational 
systems such as Kant's anthropology:  
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Gnug, ich suchte nach einer Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, wo ich suchen konnte. 
Ob ich sie gefunden habe? Darüber mag dieses Werk, aber noch nicht sein erster Teil entscheiden. 
Dieser enthält nur die Grundlage, teils im allgemeinen Überblick unsrer Wohnstätte, teils im 
Durchgange der Organisationen, die unter und mit uns das Licht dieser Sonne genießen. 
Niemanden, hoffe ich, wird dieser Gang zu fern hergeholt und zu lang dünken: denn da, um das 
Schicksal der Menschheit aus dem Buch der Schöpfung zu lesen, es keinen andern als ihn gibt, so 
kann man ihn nicht sorgsam, nicht vielbetrachtend gnug gehen. Wer bloß metaphysische 
Spekulationen will, hat sie auf kürzerem Wege; ich glaube aber, daß sie, abgetrennt von 
Erfahrungen und Analogien der Natur, eine Luftfahrt sind, die selten zum Ziel führet. (Herder, 
Ideen 3,1:14) 
 
 The epistemology in Kant's Anthropologie therefore differs from Herder's Ideen 
on a foundational level. Focused on the future, Kant theorizes the integration of human 
faculties and their role in the realization of the potential of human dignity. The Ideen 
combine three theoretical alternatives to the Königsberger's primacy of reason. 
Comparing and contrasting the "analogies" of nature, the text situates the human being in 
the natural history of plants and animals (Part I). The analogical method, a humanistic 
approach to argument, draws distinctions, highlights similarities, and creates organization 
by valuing words and rhetoric in addition to logic. Using empirical tools, the work 
anticipates modern ethnography by comparing peoples according to geographic regions 
and climate. The environment, along with organic drives and social forces, shapes the 
particular configuration of civilization. Despite different geographical realities and 
experiences, Herder thinks humans possess the same drives and faculties (Part II). 
Surveying civilizations from ancient and medieval periods according to their location, the 
work combines geography with historical method to argue for the constancy of the 
human race in the pursuit of humanity through reason (Parts III and IV).  
 Several structural similarities separate the Platner and Kant texts from Herder's 
work. Platner and Kant begin their anthropological texts in similar ways, starting with the 
explanations of how humans achieve knowledge and proceeding to the role of the will. 
These texts also use a common philosophical vernacular to develop their theses about the 
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nature of humanity, even though Platner's writing employs a comparatively more Spartan 
narrative style. The similarities are only partial, however. Kant's Anthropologie 
culminates in the anthropological characteristic of the second book and thereby takes a 
moral turn not present in the extant Platner text. In the introduction from 1798, Kant 
explicitly discounts the physiological approach and the empirical methodology in 
anthropology that plays a central role in Platner's work. Dismissing the influence of 
nature on humankind, the Königsberg philosopher strives instead to illuminate 
individuals' agency in their development to the role of moral world citizens. While Kant 
bases his Anthropologie on the human drive to develop moral consciousness through the 
application of reason, Platner grounds his text in the nearly universal human faculties of 
observation and experience (Platner, xxiv). Herder conjoins these empirical approaches 
with the numerous methodologies in his Ideen. 
 These three selected works provide an initial overview of several key texts for 
twenty-first-century readers and researchers of eighteenth-century anthropology. The 
selection is necessarily subjective and limited, yet it provides insight into the kinds of 
methods and themes Enlightenment academics discussed in the developing science of 
humanity.22 As the variety of approaches used by Platner, Kant, and Herder indicate, 
anthropology was not a monolithic field of research, but an uninstitutionalized, dynamic 
one. Scholars from diverse disciplines–as illustrated by the medically-trained Platner, 
theologically-educated Herder, and philosophically-schooled Kant–promoted and 
                                                 
22 Tanja van Hoorn suggests grouping eighteenth-century anthropologies into six divisions that 
differentiate the study of the individual from the study of the species. See Tanja van Hoorn, "Das 
anthropologische Feld der Aufklärung. Ein heuristisches Modell und ein exemplarischer 
Situierungsversuch," Natur – Mensch – Kultur. Georg Forster im Wissenschaftsfeld seiner Zeit, eds. Jörn 
Garber and Tanja van Hoorn (Hannover-Laatzen: Wehrhahn, 2006) 125-141.  
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exchanged new thought on the essence of being human (Pfotenhauer, 4, 12). Drawing on 
varied sources of knowledge made their argumentation truly interdisciplinary (5). 
 Anthropology connected representatives of specific disciplines and their unique 
questions about humanity. Platner's Anthropologie (1772), asks "What is the individual?" 
surveying the reciprocal relation of body and soul. Herder's Ideen, which developed a 
theory of human nature through a philosophy of human history, raises the question "What 
shapes the human being in history?" Addressing the body as site of individual and social 
moral self-determination, Kant's Anthropologie seeks a confirmation of his vision of 
humanity through the question "What should the individual become?" As a mediator 
between different approaches to the nature of humanity, anthropology's disparate interests 
continually push it to the point of dissolving its sense of common interest. 
 Writing on anthropology was diverse. Many of the philosophers, historians, 
physicians, scientists and theologians who addressed anthropological themes wrote 
monographs, usually from the perspective of their discipline. Books that developed 
theories or histories of humanity according to human physical and spiritual nature, e.g. 
that constructed an anthropology, often did not use "anthropology" in the title. Instead, 
the titles connected a discipline to humanity, for example philosophy to humanity in 
Johann Nicolas Teten's Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre 
Entwicklung (1777). Using a popular alternative, Johann Karl Wezel's Versuch über die 
Kenntnis des Menschen (1784-1785) substituted the word(s) "Menschenkenntnis" or 
"Kenntnis des Menschen" for "anthropology". Though anthropology only gained a small 
institutional presence within the established fields of philosophy, theology and medicine 
at universities through the middle of the eighteenth century, printers and booksellers 
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distributed an increasing amount of material on human nature. Authors penned more than 
monographs on the topic; they also published lexical entries, novels, essays, and short 
narratives. Thereby, they distributed their ideas in varied ways to a broader reading 
public. 
 In the following three chapters, I demonstrate how writers developed a discourse 
of anthropological thought in lexica and magazines. Johann Georg Walch's 
Philosophisches Lexicon is the focus of the next chapter. This philosophical compendium 
not only defined anthropology, but described its permeation of philosophy from the 
doctrine of natural law to neurology. It presents anthropological knowledge for readers 
who are not specialists in the field. Chapters three and four analyze a similar dispersion 
of anthropological discourse to the novel through examples in Samuel Richardson's 
Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded, Christian Fürchtegott Gellert's Leben der schwedischen 
Gräfin von G***, and Christoph Martin Wieland's Agathon. This approach provides the 
framework for the innovative thrust of my dissertation: an investigation into the role of 
anthropology as a constitutive discourse for Enlightenment moral identity as viewed in 
periodicals around 1750.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
ANTHROPOLOGY IN LEXICA 
 
Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon: Taking a Second Look 
 Our fuller understanding of eighteenth-century philosophical anthropology 
demands taking a closer look at how the term was defined. Historians of the 
Enlightenment have rediscovered significant elements of the eighteenth-century 
anthropological discourses. Whereas Odo Marquard and Mareta Linden have 
reconstructed anthropology's philosophical history, others have traced its development as 
a literary theme, for example Helmut Pfotenhauer in autobiography (1987), Alexander 
Kosenina in drama (1995), and Jutta Heinz in the novel (1996). For an initial definition of 
the term, these authors readily turn to historical lexica, particularly Johann Georg Walch's 
(1693-1775) Philosophisches Lexikon (11726, 41775) and Johann Heinrich Zedler's 
Universal=Lexicon (1731-1750).23 Walch and Zedler's definitions of anthropology have 
become standard reference points for tracing later developments. 
 Historians disagree about how to read the anthropology article in Walch. In 
Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff (1976), Mareta Linden emphasizes that one of 
several statements about humankind's dualistic nature is made using the subjunctive: 
                                                 
23 This chapter references the fourth edition of Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon. Walch prepared the first 
editions released in 1726, 1733, and 1740. Hennings edited the 1775 fourth edition and demarcated his 
additions with []. The Walch definitions provide an important record of philosophical knowledge between 
1726 and 1740, the chronological starting point of this dissertation. Hennings's addenda take into account 
later anthropological works such as Ernst Platner's Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise (1772) and 
Isaac Iselin's Geschichte der Menschheit (1768), updating the definitions, bibliographies, and cross-
references with more diverse medical and philosophical knowledge. His additions only support the theses 
of this chapter. But because this chapter serves as a starting point for discussing eighteenth-century 
anthropology ca. 1740, Henning's updates will be excluded until the close of the chapter. 
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Auf diese Weise haben beyde Naturen [die physische und die moralische] den Leib und die Seele 
zum Grunde, von deren beydereseits sowohl ihrer Beschaffenheit nach an sich selbst; als auch in 
Ansehung ihrer Vereinigung unter einander kann gehandelt, und bey dieser Abhandlung dieser 
beyden Theile Gebrauch und Verrichtungen, wie sie sich entweder in einem natürlichen; oder 
aussernatürlichen Stande befänden gezeiget werden. Dieses alles könnte man unter dem Worte 
Anthropologie fassen (Walch and Hennings I:172-173). (emphasis added according to Linden's 
reading) 
 
Alleging that the syntax only suggests that body and soul interrelate in anthropology, 
Linden argues that this interdependence remained hypothetical. Scientific anthropology 
had, Linden claims, refocused on the physical nature of humanity. She additionally 
supports her argument by noting that Walch created a taxonomy for physical 
anthropology, but not for moral anthropology (Linden 19-20n62). Therefore, Linden 
reads Walch as conceiving anthropology merely in physical terms. These arguments are 
inconclusive. While most Walch articles achieve an overall logical coherence, Linden's 
reading of "Anthropologie" diverges from the article's opening declarative sentences, 
which state human nature is double yet interrelated. Such an interpretation renders the 
article self-contradictory. Moreover, the subjunctive passage in Walch allows alternative 
readings. For example, it might be read as expressing the possibility of excluding 
individual characteristics of body and soul to focus only on their interaction. In contrast 
to Linden, literary historians Pfotenhauer and Kosenina have interpreted Walch's 
"Anthropologie" as layered (Pfotenhauer 4; Kosenina, Anthropologie und 
Schauspielkunst 9-10). 
 
Re-reading "Anthropologie," (Re-)Discovering a System of Knowledge 
 This chapter argues, then, for a new reading of "Anthropologie" as defined in 
Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon. My intent is to flesh out the meaning of eighteenth-
century anthropology in general and to specify how Walch links the branches of 
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knowledge. I propose that the common reading practice of this lexicon, i.e. the choice of 
an article based on the heading title, be expanded to include second and third terms 
related to the first word. In this case, the modern reader would study the definition of 
"Anthropologie," follow the author's cross-reference to "Mensch," and integrate the 
related bits of knowledge. By the same token, the cross-references in "Mensch" and 
articles on other terms further expand understanding of anthropology. Similarly, when an 
entry defines "Anthropologie" as the relationship between body and soul, the reader 
could search under "body" and "soul" and include information that further describes the 
anthropological relationship. By linking related terms, the reader can better imagine what 
constituted anthropology in this Enlightenment lexicon and gain a broader sense of the 
Enlightenment discourse on the topic. 
 To better comprehend historical meanings of anthropology, I advocate an 
intensive reading practice that requires the reader's creative and active participation. 
During the age of Enlightenment, reading creatively meant rereading and discussing what 
one had read to gain greater understanding (McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries 107-109). In 
the Philosophisches Lexicon, the imaginative review of articles included other aspects as 
well. Like a dictionary, the Philosophisches Lexicon alphabetizes articles and provides 
some cross-references to related topics. The editors explicitly name relatively few links 
between terms in comparison to the network of terms implicitly connected in the body of 
keyword entries related to anthropology. For example, the "Anthropologie" entry in 
Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon presents no cross-references to the articles titled 
"Körper," "Seele," or "Seelenvereinigung mit dem Körper," each of which contributes to 
the anthropological knowledge in the anthropology article.  
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 In the introduction to the first edition, Walch suggests this kind of intensive 
reading practice. The lexicon was designed to define and differentiate terms, thereby 
providing convenient reference and illuminating sciences in their interrelationships. As 
such it supplemented the systematic exposition of a single science with information 
necessary to learn a science in its "völligen und richtigen Zusammenhang" to other 
disciplines (Walch a3v).24 Placing a science in context was part of a larger project to 
replace scholastic knowledge with practical knowledge, and to situate the handbook as a 
vehicle for the process of enlightenment (a6r, a8r). Walch intended to engage readers in a 
hermeneutic process of creating links between terms, and thereby in enacting 
enlightenment. It was an expectation fully commensurate with emergent essay writing in 
the eighteenth century. 
 Because we define many terms differently today, this kind of cross-reference 
provides a network of similar concepts that may increase our understanding of the source, 
its authors, and of the culture of the period. By reading the Walch article "Anthropologie" 
in the context of other articles on the relationship of the physical and moral nature of 
human beings, it may be possible to better grasp Walch's understanding of the science of 
humanity. Before demonstrating how this reading strategy could work, revisiting key 
ideas in Walch's entry "Anthropologie" is in order. 
 According to Walch, "Anthropologie" is the theory of human beings in their 
hybrid nature, the physical and the moral. The body and its appetites are designed for the 
                                                 
24 In the fourth edition, Hennings’s introduction reaffirmed the lexicon’s original purpose: to define 
philosophical terminology and philosophical problems for a broad public of students and educated readers 
(b1r). By cross-referencing articles, readers could supplement the meaining of one term with its opposite: 
"Weil ich auch oft bey Erklärung einer Materie, zugleich das Gegenteil nach der Regel opposita iuxta se 
posita magis elucescunt mitgenommen habe, so hat der Leser zu bemercken, daß er jederzeit mit einem 
Artikel dessen Gegenteil lesen und aufschlagen muß, wenn er die Lehre vollständig übersehen will" (b1v). 
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self-preservation of the organism. On the other hand, as the manifestation of human 
moral nature, the soul maintains discretionary control of thought and the appetites, directs 
its natural reciprocal relationship with the body, and coordinates its actions with the 
divine plan for felicity. Thus, the moral nature functions individually and reciprocally 
with the physical essence. Each nature draws on the material and the spiritual being. 
Natural drives, on the one hand, and reflection and volition, on the other, necessitate a 
subdivision of the theory of humanity into physical and moral anthropology. In its 
investigation of material human nature, physical anthropology includes the general 
category of historical anatomy, a part of what scholars called "Physik" or the study of the 
natural sciences. As a complement to the general category, the particular physical 
anthropology incorporates the health and wellness of the individual, and thereby enters 
the field of medicine. Moral anthropology, a counterpart to physical anthropology, 
emphasizes the nature of the soul and moral action, what we call ethics (Walch and 
Hennings 1:172-173).  
 Definition and classification, the key foundations of philosophical reflection, are 
the main goals of "Anthropologie." Walch's taxonomy identifies the 
compartmentalization of knowledge about human nature, yet simultaneously accentuates 
the interplay between body and soul in defining what it means to be human. Even with 
the duplexity of the physical and moral natures, body and soul together interpenetrate 
each other. The investigation of physical nature thus explains human anatomy and 
appetites by examining the body's makeup and its areas of interaction with the soul. The 
inquiry into moral nature elucidates the volitional relationship of the soul to the 
regulation of bodily functions and drives. Though these two faculties can be isolated, to 
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be human means living with them inexorably intertwined: body and soul act out their 
being in and through their interdependency.  
 Ignoring the cross-reference to the article "Mensch," critics have summed up early 
eighteenth-century science of humanity based solely on the entry for "Anthropologie." 
Reading Walch with an eye toward the late Enlightenment, historians such as 
Pfotenhauer have noted the similarity between the conception of anthropology in the 
Philosophisches Lexicon and in Platner's Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise (1772) 
(Pfotenhauer 4). But Walch elaborates on anthropology in other articles as well. To 
disregard his networking of knowledge excludes significant anthropological debates not 
present in the entry, "Anthropologie," for not only does it provide a reference to 
"Mensch," but the latter cross-references "Seele" and leads to a string of other directly 
related terms. Schematically, the references function as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Cross-references on anthropology in Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon (1726) 
  
Hence, reading the Philosophisches Lexicon in the eighteenth century involved heeding 
the cross-references. Curiosity, which was a product of extensive reading (McCarthy, 
Crossing Boundaries 108), likely sent readers to the lexicon for additional information. 
Uniting a variety of insights, Walch's reference work informed readers and quelled their 
curiosity through definitions, surveys of academic books, annotated bibliographies, and 
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editorial opinions. Linking terms to each other also served this function, as a review of 
the following cross-references indicates. 
 
Active Reading: Acknowledging References 
 In the first section of the article "Mensch", Walch postulates the contentious 
relationship of the individual's physical and moral being. The entry categorizes 
definitions of human nature into four main positions on the relation of the material and 
immaterial being: (1) the body defines human nature; (2) the soul constitutes the human 
being; (3) human nature consists of three essential parts: body, soul and spirit; and (4) 
human beings have a dual nature of body and soul. The examples of thinkers who define 
human nature through the body, including Cicero in the Tusculan Disputations, Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679) in the Leviathan, and the English physician William Coward (1656-
1725), demonstrate the breadth of Walch's sources from ancient philosophy to early-
modern anatomy (Walch and Hennings 2:89-90). The immaterialists (group 2) include 
Platonists, Pythagoreans, Stoics, Henry More, and Rene Descartes. Like the materialists 
(group 1), they are discussed in less than one column each. By contrast, theories of 
human nature based on three parts – body, soul, and spirit – occupy eight columns and 
those based on dualistic human nature two-and-a-half columns. Through the allocation of 
more space and a greater number of examples to the third and fourth groups, the author 
de-emphasizes the body-only and soul-only theories in favor of models that postulate 
their interaction.   
 Thinkers in the third category, who argue that human nature comprises three 
parts, illustrate diverse and complex ways to define the human. The essence of human 
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individuals differs according to the philosophical, theological, mystical, or medical 
viewpoint of the author, as the following examples illustrate. For Plato, human nature lay 
in the interplay of the wrathful, willing and rational souls (2:91). By contrast, the 
theologian Martin Luther (1483-1546) separated the body and soul from the spirit, which 
functioned as the center of belief and a storehouse of God's word (2:96). In his work The 
Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft (1610, German tr. 1719), John Webster used 
Paracelsus' model of elementary matter to differentiate the mortal body and the 
perceptive/bodily soul (astral spirit) from the immortal and immaterial soul that returns to 
God after death. The physician Thomas Willis (1621-1675), a founder of neurology, 
argued that human nature is comprised of a body, a material/perceptive soul, and a 
rational soul (2:95). This section summarizes the relations of the three parts of body and 
soul through the beginning of the eighteenth century. Instead of viewing the relation of 
the corporal and the spiritual in only one way, scholars actively debated the complex 
nature of their interaction. Drawing on the traditions and innovations of various 
disciplines, academics in the eighteenth century constantly negotiated the relation of 
man's physical and moral natures. 
 Throughout the era, academics increasingly explained the body/soul interaction 
with theories theories of the human as hybrid. The article "Mensch" uses a twofold 
concept of human nature to situate humanity within an Enlightenment cosmology. On the 
chain of being, humankind occupies a level between animals and angels as "animal 
rationale," or "vernünftiges Thier" (2:102). Human beings represent unique mental and 
physical refinement among other living organisms: people possess the capability for 
abstract reasoning, carry their heads upright, and possess hands with great dexterity and 
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adaptability (2:103). The faculty of reason and the upright physical stance complement 
each other. Upright posture makes it easier to "look heavenward"; i.e., to live one's life in 
accordance with the divine will, while at the same time applying reason to shape the self 
and the surrounding world (2:104-105). In its physical and moral nature, humanity 
connects beast and divine being, incorporating them into a hybrid whole. 
 The entry on "Mensch" shares a similar view of human nature with the article on 
"Anthropologie": 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both entries define humankind bifocally. As a whole, "Mensch" emphasizes the 
inconstancy of human virtue and the frailty of human volition/emotions. It identifies how 
physical and mental unease are heightened by desires and thoughts shaped in memory 
and imagination (2:104). According to this entry, body and soul figure equally in human 
unhappiness. 
 The article "Seele" underscores the hybridity of human nature insofar as the 
"Vereinigung der Seele und des Körpers" accounts for "das völlige Wesen des 
Menschen" (2:761). This entry amounts to being an apology for the existence of the soul. 
Anthropologie...[bedeutet] die Lehre 
von dem Menschen. Es bestehet 
derselbige aus einer gedoppelten Natur, 
einer physischen und einer moralischen. 
Jene beruhet in dem natürlich belebten 
Leibe, und dessen Verknüpfung mit der 
körperlichen Natur in Ansehung seiner 
Erhaltung; diese aber in dem Gemüthe, 
welches theils sich selbsten, theils auch 
den natürlich belebten Leib durch 
willkührliche Bewegungen regieret, und 
dessen natürlichen Gegenverhältnisse 
sowohl mit dem Leibe, als auch mit der 
von Gott intendierten wahren 
Glückseligkeit (1:172). 
Mensch...Es hat also der Mensch eine 
zweyfache Natur, eine physische und 
eine moralische: jene ist das Wesen des 
natürlich=belebten Leibes und die 
Connexion desselben mit der 
körperlichen Natur in Ansehung seiner 
Erhaltung; diese aber ist das Wesen der 
vernünftigen Seele in Absicht auf die 
menschliche Glückseligkeit (2:103). 
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Arguing that the body can neither think nor desire on its own, "Vereinigung" pleads 
against materialism. Willing and thinking originate in the soul alone (2:762-763). In 
weighing a neurological (i.e. physical) explanation for delirium, mania, and melancholy, 
the author of the article on "Seele" dismisses the idea because it bypasses the soul's will 
and negates human freedom (2:767-770). The article contributes to the anthropology 
discourse by denying bodily forces the power to influence the soul. 
 But how do body and soul relate? Walch's article "Anthropologie" does not 
explain this relationship; neither do the articles on "Mensch" or "Seele." In the chain of 
cross-references, "Seele" then directs readers to the entry on "Seelenvereinigung mit dem 
Körper." The latter addends "Anthropologie" by citing this interface according to the 
western religious and philosophical tradition as well as the newly privileged mode of 
empirical investigation. The author argues that the different modes of thought—theology, 
law, science—already operate on the assumption that body and soul directly influence 
each other. Despite the contentious nature of how that influence functions, examples 
indicate that thinkers had already accepted the complex reality of the human organism. In 
theology, the Christian crucifixion—the destruction of the body for the preservation of 
the soul—could only occur with a subordination of the body to the soul. Similarly, 
corporal punishment of moral crimes, like murder, robbery, or blasphemy, implied a 
connection between the two spheres (2:808). To a theologian, a lawyer, or to an average 
educated member of society, the interrelationship of body and soul was a common and a 
necessary presupposition for understanding scientific change in the seventeenth- and 
early-eighteenth centuries. The details of the relationship were contested. 
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 Walch's dictionary entry on "Seelenvereinigung mit dem Körper" offers three 
alternatives. At the beginning of the text, the author defines the exchange between body 
and soul as a relationship instead of a union. Based on the empirical sources of 
experience and perception, readers and scientists observe that the body promotes patterns 
of responses from the soul and the soul directs changes in the body (2:806, 2:808). Three 
theories –– physical influence, occasionalism, and preestablished harmony –– outline 
how body and soul relate. To describe how the soul affects the body, the proponent of 
physical influx claims that the soul's faculties of imagination and willing activate and 
move the body. Similarly, the body influences the soul by transmitting perception from 
the exterior to the interior of the organism. Sensation, says Walch, involves the 
transmission of bodily motion as vibration from the extremities via the Geisterchen [little 
spirits] to the soul (2:807). The theoretical explanation of this influence assumes a 
healthy, normal functioning body (2:808). The idea of influence between physical and 
moral spheres received a mixed reception, yet represented the ascendancy of 
physiological explanations of perception, such as Albrecht von Haller's research on 
irritability, over earlier theories. Leibniz's critique that the theory of physical influence 
contradicted some laws of nature could not halt the success of the theory of physical 
influence as developed by philosophers and researchers in the natural sciences (2:809-
810). 
 The other two theories argued that such movement cannot originate from the 
closed system of body and soul, but instead stems from God. For the occasionalist, God 
intervenes as necessary to negotiate between body and soul but is not continually 
interacting. Descartes provided the inspiration for this theory and followers such as 
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Malebranche perpetuated the idea (2:815-816). The harmonists represent preestablished 
harmony and supported a deistic approach, one in which God set the universe in balance 
like a clockwork. Following Divine Providence, the physical and the moral spheres 
function in parallel, yet separately as "preestablished". Subsequently, the two spheres act 
without divine intervention.  
 In the article, "Seelenvereinigung mit dem Körper," the analysis of twofold nature 
details anthropological interaction in several ways. Examining the causation hypotheses 
of occasionalism, preestablished harmony, and physical influx helps to explain specific 
physical and psychological actions. In turn, comparing these theories increases overall 
understanding of how the body and soul function in unison (2:820). Evaluating these 
three options, the article proposes two variations. One-sided physical influence of the 
soul on the body is possible. In a second option, the soul stimulates changes in a divinely-
regulated body (2:821). For the body to direct the soul, even temporarily, opens the 
possibility of mechanistic determinism and places human dignity in question. Instead, the 
soul retains control of human action based on the assumption that free will is a necessary 
element of human experience. In this scenario, anthropology involves the predominance 
of the soul. 
 The next entry, "Harmonie zwischen Leib und Seele," critically revisits the three 
explanations of intersubstantial causation and emphasizes the theory of preestablished 
harmony. Beginning with Leibniz and continuing with Wolff, the article calls into 
question the key anthropological experience of the body/soul influence in regards to 
motion or sensation. Wolff's Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und die Seele des 
Menschen (1719, hereafter Deutsche Metaphysik) claims experience does not prove a 
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causal link between changes in the material and metaphysical spheres (1:1878, 1880). If 
the two spheres could influence each other, one could assume, for instance, that the soul 
wills movement. Yet the article cites how the soul's initiation of bodily movement would 
involve creating a new force and thereby be incongruent with the law of the conservation 
of energy. According to physics and to the Cartesian division of substances, such an 
influence would be inexplicable and therefore impossible (1:1879). Instead, the two 
spheres are coordinated according to the theory of preestablished harmony. The 
remainder of the entry surveys twelve writers who oppose Wolff's preestablished 
harmony, primarily because it limits human freedom. It thus provides an introduction to 
the anthropological debate over intersubstantial causation, a key point of philosophical 
discussions during the early Enlightenment. 
 Wolff played a pivotal role in shaping debates on anthropology through his 
system of philosophy. In his Deutsche Metaphysik, Wolff argued that the interaction of 
body and soul had to cohere to a system of metaphysical laws. Based on the printing of 
this text that ran to twelve editions between 1720 and 1752, his metaphysics were 
extremely influential. Many German thinkers choose his system as the best available 
option to explain intersubstantial causation and the world. Walch's focus on Wolff and 
the controversies surrounding his philosophy generally affirm the philosopher's 
importance during the 1720's and 1730's. Furthermore, researchers applying his 
philosophy to new projects frequently pursued particularly novel research (Watkins, Kant 
and Metaphysics 44-45). Innovators included Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten who 
expanded the ideas to aesthetics, Sigmund Jacob Baumgarten who used them to rethink 
theology, and Johann Gottlob Krüger who adapted Wolffian philosophy to physiology.  
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Associative Reading: Implied Connections to Body 
 The trail of direct cross-references in the Philosophisches Lexicon that originates 
with the anthropology entry ends here. But where is the body, the other part of the 
anthropological equation? Many of the Walch entries discussed thus far share a common 
reference to soul, as evidenced in their terminology: "Seele," "Seelenbeschaffenheit," 
"Seelenvereinigung mit dem Körper," and "Harmonie zwischen Leib und Seele." But 
they also refer to body as do the entries "Anthropologie" and "Mensch." Discourse on the 
soul invokes the body, and vice versa, as "Seele" makes clear: "Nach der gewöhnlichen 
Bedeutung dieses Worts ist die Seele diejenige geistliche Substanz, welche mit dem 
menschlichen Körper vereiniget, so daß durch diese Vereinigung der Seele und des 
Körpers das völlige Wesen des Menschen entstehet" (Walch and Hennings 2:761). 
Despite the fact that the system of cross-references proceeding from anthropology does 
not directly refer to body, the prominently implied references to body warrant further 
consideration of the term for anthropology. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2-2: Implied references to body in Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon (1726) 
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 Individual articles on the body and the soul similarly emphasize the necessity of 
interaction between these two spheres and their subordinate systems. Of the two terms 
used to describe the body, "Cörper" (Körper) and "Leib",  the first is more general and 
refers to something with physical presence (1:646; uses "ausgedehnte Materie" to 
translate the Cartesian "extension").25 "Leib", on the other hand, refers to this physical 
being, specifically in its relationship with the soul. The capabilities of the body ("Leib") 
include sensation and motion in coordination with the soul: "Leib ist ein aus gewissen 
Theilen zusammen geseßtes und nach einer besondern Art gestaltetes Wesen, welches zu 
empfinden und sich zu bewegen tüchtig ist. Bey dem menschlichen Leibe kommt dieses 
noch ins besondere hinzu, daß derselbige zur Vereinigung mit der Seele von dem 
Schöpfer eingerichtet werden" (1:2243). Body and soul necessarily belong together from 
this theological point of view and from the view of the comparative anatomist. This 
scientist recognizes the uniqueness of the human soul among similar human and animal 
bodies, as well as the essential role of body and soul in making the human being whole. 
Viewing the body as a liability, in the manner of Plato, the Stoics (or by extension like 
seventeenth-century writers) was strongly criticized (1:2245). 
 Beyond sensation and motion, the body contributes to the anthropological 
dynamic in coordination with morality. Living well means properly regulating the body. 
On the most basic level, this "Diät" involves a regiment for eating, drinking, exercise, and 
sleep to maintain health (2:389; "Pflichten gegen sich"). Through constitution and 
                                                 
25 A study of the use of "Cörper" or "Körper" and Leib in the early modern period is of interest but beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. See "Körper" and "Leib" in Friedrich Kluge and Elmar Seebold, eds., 
Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, 23 ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995) 478, 511.Whereas 
"Leib" dates to the eighth century, the introduction of the Latin term "corpus" as "Körper" dates to the 
thirteenth century. Johann Georg Walch and Justus Christian Hennings, Philosophisches Lexicon, 4 ed. 
(Leipzig: Gleditschens Buchhandlung, 1775) 1:654. In his 1775 additions to "Cörper," Hennings designates 
human body as a secondary meaning for the term. 
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temperament, the body shapes an individual's desires and customs (1:2248). "Leib" thus 
implies that the physical being influences the will.  
 The article "Temperament des Leibes" details how the material/metaphysical 
nexus functions. Developed in antiquity by Hippocrates (ca. 460 BCE-ca. 377 BCE) and 
adapted by Aristotle (384-322 BCE) and Galen (129-ca. 216 CE), the theory of 
temperament hypothesized that the mixture of blood and other bodily fluids caused 
physical and moral effects. This was prime anthropological territory. In accordance with 
the received doctrine, the article summarized four main mixtures of fluids: the choleric, 
the melancholic, the sanguine, and the phlegmatic temperaments (Walch and Hennings 
2:1093-94). Individual personality developed from an infinite variation of the four 
primary types (2:1094). 
 In contrast with the philosophical exposition of the theories of causation in 
"Harmonie zwischen Leib und Seele" and the skeptical view of experience, temperament 
theory emphasized the validity of empirical observation and experience in analyzing the 
human organism. Everyday life experiences provided evidence of a body/soul 
congruence any reader could identify – whether in terms of causes (physical influx) or 
coordination (preestablished harmony). Because effects of a given temperament could be 
observed based on signs in the body as well as the soul, the theory encouraged 
development of its own semiotics. The blood could arouse detectable alterations in the 
body as well as the soul, as summarized in the following table: 
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Table 2-1: Characteristics of Temperament as outlined in the article "Temperament 
des Leibes" in Johann Georg Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon (4th ed., 1775). 
 
Temperament 
–––––––––––– 
Merkmal 
(Spalte) 
Cholericus Melancholiker Sanguiniker Phlegmatiker 
Wortbedeutung Galle schwarze Galle  Entzündung 
Eigenschaften 
nach 
Naturstoffen 
(1094)  
warm und 
trocken 
kalt und trocken warm und 
feucht 
kalt und feucht 
Zeichen des 
Leibes 
    
Gesicht 
(1094) 
schwärzlich, 
rötlich 
schwarz, blass weiß, rot weiß, blass 
Sprache 
(1095) 
männlich, 
hell, 
geschwind 
männlich, rau, 
langsam 
weiblich, hell, 
geschwind 
weiblich, rau, 
langsam 
Augen 
(1095) 
ernsthaft, 
munter 
mürrisch, matt freundlich, 
munter 
freundlich, matt 
Leibesgestalt 
(1095) 
hager hager mittelmäßig fett 
u. wohl 
gewachsen 
sehr fett, 
schwülstig 
Gang 
(1095) 
steif, 
gravitätisch 
langsam, 
negligent 
lustig, hurtig verdrossen, 
negligent 
Zeichen in der 
Seele 
    
Verstand 
(1095) 
gutes 
Judicium 
treffliches 
Gedächtnis 
gutes Ingenium lernt auswendig 
u. vergisst 
Wille 
(1095) 
hochmütig geizig wollüstig zu Völlerey 
geneigt 
  
 
 "Temperament des Leibes" evaluated temperament theory with a healthy dose of 
skepticism. It argued that observed correlations of physical and mental states may be 
certain, but that their causes could not be known. It especially cautioned against 
interpreting the body as the sole cause of psychological actions. Viewing temperament 
categories as fixed and decisive was discouraged because other factors, such as 
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environment and habits, could also shape individual behavior and constitution. Warning 
against careless classification of people into types, the caveats aimed to preserve human 
individuality (Walch and Hennings 2:1103). There was nonetheless a certain impetus to 
apply these principles to life, as books like Christian Thomasius's Ausübung der 
Sittenlehre (1696) and Georg Ernst Stahl's Disputatio inauguralis de passionibus animi 
corpus humanum varie alterantibus (1695) ["On the Influence of the Passions on the 
Human Body"] attest. 
 As a further extension of "Anthropologie," the article "Temperament des Leibes" 
implied a reference to "Affect," the emotions. In the extensive bibliographical essay on 
texts from antiquity and the early modern period, the authors diverged in their opinions as 
to whether the body or the soul caused emotions. "Affect" named both as sources. It 
defined the emotions as extraordinary desires and aversions accompanied by 
extraordinary movement of the blood. Of the five sources of the emotions, at least two 
involve anthropological interaction: sensation and movement. The theory of affect shows 
that the body played a role in the agitation of the soul (1:89-90). 
 The theories of causation, temperament, and emotion underscore the 
interdependence of the material and the metaphysical in anthropology. If the concise 
anthropology article in Walch neglected to explain all aspects of body/soul interaction, 
the cross-references supplemented this definition. It must be underscored that the 
comparison and networking of terms suggested here is merely the enactment of reading 
strategies explicitly outlined by Walch and Hennings in their introductions. Eighteenth-
century lexica and encyclopedias frequently made use of cross-references; Zedler's 
Universal=Lexicon and Diderot and d'Alembert's Encyclopédie were the most prominent 
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examples of this practice (cf. Vila 52-65; Anderson 91-124). Given this structural 
characteristic of the lexicon/encyclopedia, comprehending anthropology (or any other 
term for that matter) required the engaged reader to connect related terms. In using the 
Philosophisches Lexicon, critical thought meant participation in the text's production by 
actively engaging explicit references and by associating implicitly linked terms. A visual 
representation of concepts that shape knowledge of anthropology thus forms a web: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Cross-references (solid arrows) and implied references (dotted arrows) encourage reading 
Anthropologie in the Philosophisches Lexicon as a semantic network. 
 
 
 Using Walch's philosophical dictionary to determine what anthropology meant 
between 1726 and 1740 necessitates creating a semantic network. Combining the direct 
references and implied connections noted here provides a useful start. Other terms not 
cited here by direct references from anthropology also play a role in determining its 
meaning. These might include: "Nerve," "Empfindung," "Sinne," "Leidenschaft," 
"Physiognomie," "Diät," "Idee," "Moral," "Erziehung der Kinder," "Sitten," 
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"Verbesserung der Seele," "Freyheit," and "Geilheit." Further research could mine these 
sources for signs of even more complex interactions. 
 
Creative Reading: Comparing Lexicon Editions 
 At the opening of this chapter, I indicated I would focus on Walch's 1740 edition. 
In the 1775 update, Hennings clearly denoted what text he had added. In some cases, he 
significantly expanded selected articles. Taking the article on "Harmonie zwischen Leib 
und Seele" as an example, Hennings added six-and-one-half columns to the existing ten, 
increasing the article length by a good sixty percent. More importantly, however, within 
an article originally focused on preestablished harmony, the additions argued for the 
theory of physical influx using neurology. In previous editions, the developments in 
neurology since Thomas Willis's Cerebri anatome [1664, The Anatomy of the Brain] had 
received little treatment. Describing how the nerves coordinated the material and the 
metaphysical, Hennings cited Ernst Platners Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise 
(1772), Moses Mendelssohn's "Briefe über die Empfindungen" (1755), Albrecht von 
Hallers Elementa physiologiae corporis humani (1757-1766), Johann August Unzer's 
Erste Gründe einer Physiologie der eigentlichen thierischen Natur thierischen Körper 
(1771), Johann Gottlob Krügers Naturlehre (1740-1750) and Versuch einer 
Experimental=Seelenlehre (1756), and Georg Friedrich Meier's Anfangsgründen aller 
schönen Wissenschaften (1748-1750). Evaluating German texts in the context of writers 
such as Charles Bonnet, George-Louis Leclerc Comte de Buffon, David Hartley, and 
Claude-Adrien Helvétius, Henning's expansion of the Philosophisches Lexicon in the 
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context of the new European philosophy, medicine, and natural science points to growing 
interest in the study of human nature between 1740 and 1775.  
 Like other texts of its age, it reveals paradigm shifts in the conception of human 
nature, especially in the shift from temperament theory's circulatory model to a 
neurological paradigm (cf. Koschorke). By supplementing the Philosophisches Lexicon 
with offset text, Hennings makes the historical evolution of ideas readable. As a resource 
created for a broad audience, it provides one account of that development. Moreover, by 
defining terms around 1740 and around 1775, it frames the beginning and the ending 
dates of material investigated in this dissertation. Therefore, the Philosophisches Lexicon 
provides a context to survey the history of anthropological discourses in novels, moral 
weeklies, and Enlightenment magazines in the following chapters. 
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PART 2: PUSHING BACK THE DATE: ANTHROPOLOGICAL DISCOURSE 
AS LITERARY MODEL – THE EUROPEAN AND GERMAN 
EMPFINDSAMER ROMAN
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CHAPTER III 
 
FEELING MORALITY: EARLY CONFLUENCE OF BODY/SOUL 
DISCOURSE AND SENSIBILITY 
 
 
 In the previous two chapters, the coexistant eighteenth-century discourses of 
cultural, theological, physical, and philosophical anthropology stood front and center. I 
chose to concentrate on philosophical anthropology, the focus of paradigmatic essays in 
works by Johann Georg Walch and Ernst Platner. Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon 
(1726, 41775) defines anthropology as the study of man in his physical and moral nature 
("Anthropologie" 1:172), a description that Platner refines as "Körper und Seele in ihren 
gegenseitigen Verhältnissen, Einschränkungen und Beziehungen zusammen betrachtet" 
(Platner xvi-xvii).26 A comprehensive rendering of philosophical anthropology could 
additionally include developmental models of the individual or the species. Revising 
Walch's and Platner's definitions of anthropology, I investigated philosophical 
anthropology as the study of the interaction of body and soul revealed especially in the 
emotions and the multiple capacities of reasoning, willing, and sensation. German-
language secondary literature on the Enlightenment refers to the influence of the body on 
the soul and vice versa in the passions, in judging, in desiring, and in perceiving as the 
commercium problem. In the wake of Descartes's dualism of body and soul, research on 
philosophical anthropology in the Enlightenment recovered historical debates about 
conceptions of the human. 
                                                 
26 The original orthography and punctuation is maintained throughout.  
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 In the second half of the eighteenth century, writers created "den ganzen 
Menschen" in literary characters while scientists experimented to discover the 
foundations that make human nature whole. Both groups develop exemplary dichotomies 
– such as nature/spirit, feeling/reason, heart/head, or body/soul – for their representational 
and empirical purposes of defining what it means to be human. German literary scholars 
have developed a tradition of critique that analyzes these classical themes from the 
middle of the eighteenth century.27 Research into the anthropological nature of this 
literature proposes to trace not only the body/soul theme, but also the interdependent 
causation of psychology and physiology as perceived at the middle of the Enlightenment. 
Literary and intellectual history asks questions such as: How does a physical sign 
(shaking, fainting, etc.) represent a psychological response? Or, how do people develop 
ideas, when all knowledge is created from a basis of sensation? The general purpose of 
this investigation is to ask why and illustrate how the theme of body and soul shapes the 
moral individual.  
This chapter investigates the development of the body/soul discourse in the 
eighteenth-century European novel to offer an important context for the analysis of the 
moral individual in German periodicals around 1750. The focus here is on the evolution 
of writing about body and soul between 1730 and the early 1740’s, while chapter four 
follows the unfolding of this context between 1747 and 1767. In the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth century, the moral weeklies denounced the adventure novel due to its 
                                                 
27 Hans Matthias Wolff, Die Weltanschauung der deutschen Aufklärung in geschichtlicher Entwicklung 
(Bern: A. Francke, 1949). See Ch. 5 & 8. Paul Mog, Ratio und Gefühlskultur: Studien zu Psychogenese und 
Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert, Studien zur deutschen Literatur, Bd. 48, 1. Aufl. ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
1976), Gabriele Jilg, Die Kollision von Gefühl und Verstand: vom gesellschaftlichen Charakter des 
Selbstbewusstseins und der Formen seiner literarischen Dokumentation (Bern: Peter Lang, 1983). 
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underdeveloped form and immoral themes,28 But the gallant novel and the moral 
weeklies developed interdependently between 1690 and 1740 (McCarthy, "Gallant 
Novel"). Moral weeklies helped transition the reading public from intensive reading 
(repeated apprehending of the same text) of the Bible and devotional literature, to 
extensive reading (a single progression through a text or pursuit of breadth) of moral 
periodicals and moral novels (Engelsing 113; McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries 108). 
After 1740, novels such as Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** (1747-
1748) or Ernst Tröltsch's Geschichte eines Kandidaten oder die Sitten und Schicksale 
junger Gelehrten (1753), rework themes from the moral weeklies (Grimminger 685-686). 
Gellert's and Troeltsch's novels also develop a language of sensibility, a capability which 
Janet Todd defines as "the faculty of feeling, the capacity for extremely refined emotion 
and a quickness to display compassion for suffering" (7). With the advent of positive 
moral characters in novels, several moral weeklies recommend, in particular, the works 
of Gellert and Richardson to their readers because of their value for moral education.29 
These two authors' sentimental, i.e. morally reflective novels discuss feeling in an 
                                                 
28 Wolfgang Martens summarizes common moral complaints against the novel genre: "(1) Die Romane 
geben sich mit Liebessachen ab und verführen zur Wollust; (2) Sie verwirren den Kopf mit Chimären und 
absonderlichen Fabelwerk; (3) Sie sind eine Schule der Eitelkeit; (4) Sie sind die Beschäftigung von 
Müßigängern; und (5) Sie verderben den guten Geschmack." The protest against the novel's "Eitelkeit" and 
seduction to "Wollust" represent a form of class critique against affectations of a largely French-inspired 
gallantry by the wealthy – nobles or monied middle class – and may include a nationalist critique of 
foreign-inspired behavior. Wolfgang Martens, Die Botschaft der Tugend. Die Aufklärung im Spiegel der 
deutschen moralischen Wochenschriften (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1968) 494, 499. 
29 "Der Roman wird zum Erziehungsmittel, wie es die gereinigte Schaubühne oder auch Moralische 
Wochenschriften selbst nicht wirksamer sein könnten. Die bislang verachtete und verfolgte Gattung rückt 
in den Rang einer Schule der Tugend."  512-518, here 514-515. Albrecht von Haller similarly places the 
novels of Gellert and Richardson in a distinguished group of "good novels" with Fenelon's Telemach, Die 
Reisen des Cyrus, Lafayette's Princess de Clèves, Faitte's Zaide, Marivaux's La vie de Marianne, and 
Prevost's novels. See Albrecht von Haller, "[Introduction]," Felicia oder Natur und Sitten in der Geschichte 
eines adeligen Frauenzimmers auf dem Lande. Aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Haller (Hamburg, 
Leipzig: Georg Christian Grund, Adam Heinrich Holle, 1753). Cited in Lawrence Marsden Price, English 
Literature in Germany, University of California Publications in Modern Philology, vol. 37 (Berkeley: 
Univeristy of California Press, 1953) 165-166. 
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increasingly detailed manner that reveals a language of mind/body interconnection 
around 1750. This is neither a full-fledged anthropology, nor it is merely a psychology, 
but a demonstration of the increasing importance of the interdependent causation of mind 
and body in shaping the moral individual.  
 
The Anthropological Turn of the Eighteenth Century: Pushing Back the Date 
 Research on the anthropological novel of the German Enlightenment has focused 
on the last four decades of the eighteenth century. In a foundational article titled "Der 
anthropologische Roman: Seine Entstehung und Krise im Zeitalter der Spätaufklärung" 
(1980) Hans-Jürgen Schings locates the birth of the anthropological novel in Christoph 
Martin Wieland's Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerei, oder die Abenteuer des Don 
Sylvio von Rosalva (1764) and Die Geschichte des Agathon (1766/67) and sketches the 
development of this subgenre with particular reference to later novels by Jean Paul 
("Anthropologische Roman" 255-256). Wieland's early writings, Schings rightly claims, 
provide a paradigm for the anthropological interests of the late Enlightenment in their 
analysis of enthusiasm. In a second claim, Schings reads key passages in Friedrich von 
Blanckenburg's Versuch über den Roman (1774), including the genre's definition of 
humanity via a connection of inner and outer worlds (body and soul) and the creation of a 
chain of life events by cause and effect, as a theory of the anthropological novel 
("Anthropologische Roman" 256-257). By contrast, Jean Paul's Vorschule der Aesthetik 
(1804) tries to re-establish the significance of the soul in a world shaped by materialism 
("Anthropologische Roman" 260-262). The aesthetic program in the Vorschule essay and 
Jean Paul's novels argues for an anthropology based in the soul, not the dualism of Walch 
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and Platner, and is one form of a late Enlightenment self-critique of anthropological 
theory. While highlighting key moments in the creation and radicalization of the 
anthropological novel, Schings does not define the subgenre or explain why it begins 
with Wieland. The examples create a partial profile of an implied definition of the 
anthropological novel: the subgenre may address enthusiasm (Wieland), may deal with 
the interdependence of body and soul and a narrative logic of cause and effect 
(Blanckenburg), and may challenge a dualistic anthropology with an emphasis on the 
aesthetic, rational component of human nature (Jean Paul). This list of possible 
characteristics of the anthropological novel remains fragmentary. With Wieland and Jean 
Paul, Schings plots the origin and crisis of the anthropological novel. Jutta Heinz 
connects these coordinates by outlining the development of the form between Wieland's 
Agathon (1766-1767) and Jean Paul's Vorschule der Ästhetik (1804).  
In her study Wissen vom Menschen und Erzählen vom Einzelfall: Untersuchungen 
zum anthropologischen Roman der Spätaufklärung Heinz also locates Wieland's Don 
Sylvio and Agathon at the beginning of a tradition of the anthropological novel (Wissen 
vom Menschen 172). Like Schings, Heinz offers little explanation for why Wieland's 
novels mark the beginning of the form, citing only their combination of 
Schwärmerthematik and narrative through dialogue.30  Researchers have a tradition of 
regarding Wieland's novels as the beginning of the modern novel in Germany 
(cf.McCarthy, Christoph Martin Wieland 58, 83), and this may contribute to their 
placement by Schings and Heinz at the beginning of the anthropological tradition. 
                                                 
30 This may be an unintended oversight. See also Jutta Heinz, "Die Figur des Schwärmers in den späten 
Romanen Christoph Martin Wielands," Master's Thesis, University of Erlangen, 1991. Further, Jutta Heinz, 
"Von der Schwärmerkur zur Gesprächstherapie – Symptomatik und Darstellung des Schwärmens in 
Wielands »Don Sylvio« und »Peregrinus Proteus«," Wieland-Studien 2 (1994): 33-53. 
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Lieselotte Kurth-Voigt has shown, however, that modern forms of the novel exist prior to 
Wieland's novels (Kurth). It is an objective of chapters three and four in this dissertation 
to provide a clearer identification of the beginnings of the anthropological novel. 
Heinz focuses on the development of the form in the three decades following 
Agathon. The selected texts laudably extend beyond major works of the current late 
Enlightenment canon by Wieland, Goethe, Moritz, and Jean Paul. The study includes 
novels by the once again popular Wezel and the now neglected writers Meißner, 
Thümmel, Jacobi, Engel, Hase, Klinger, and Hippel.31 Based on this examination, Heinz 
groups the works in three intervals of roughly a decade each and applies an empirical 
method to develop a composite definition of the form.  
Wissen vom Menschen identifies obligatory and optional characteristics according 
to themes and form for the late Enlightenment anthropological novel. The obligatory 
thematic content includes a concentration on the commercium problem as represented in 
everyday experience and a frequent focus on the emotions or the conflict between 
individual moral systems and social expectations for behavior (Heinz, Wissen vom 
Menschen 339). Optional themes may therefore include a characterization of problematic 
identity, and it may paint the setting close to the author in terms of place and historical 
time. In terms of form, the anthropological novel must narrate from multiple perspectives 
                                                 
31 The discussed texts include: Johann Karl Wezel, Wilhelmine Arend, oder die Gefahren der 
Empfindsamkeit (Dessau, Leipzig: 1782), August Gottlieb Meißner, Alcibiades, 4 vols. (Leipzig: 1781-
1788). Moritz August von Thümmel, Reise in die mittäglichen Provinzen von Frankreich [1794-1805], 
Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 1-7, (Leipzig: 1856). Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Woldemar, Reprint, 1779 ed. 
(Stuttgart: 1969). Johann Jacob Engel, Herr Lorenz Stark, Kleines Archiv des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts 13, 
First pub. in Die Horen, Vol. 4 (1795), Issue 10; Vol. 5 (1796), Issue 2; complete: Berlin: 1801 ed. (St. 
Ingbert: 1991). Friedrich Traugott Hase, Gustav Aldermann: Ein dramatischer Roman [1779], Deutsche 
Neudrucke, Reihe Texte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: 1964). Friedrich Traugott Hase, Friedrich Maler. 
Ein Beytrag zur Menschenkunde. Ein dramatischer Roman (Leipzig: 1781). Friedrich Maximilian Klinger, 
Der Weltmann und der Dichter, Friedrich Maximilian Klinger Werke: Historisch-Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, ed. Thomas Salumets et al., vol. XVIII (Tübingen: 1985). Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel, 
Lebensläufe nach aufsteigender Linie nebst Beilagen A, B, C [1778-1781] (Leipzig: 1859). 
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that reveal the uniqueness of individual perception; Heinz calls this polyperspectival 
narration (340).32 The anthropological novel's form may additionally exhibit various 
combinations of 
• an autobiographical or personal narrative;  
• a panorama of characters;  
• forms such as a Dialogroman, epistolary novel, or hybrid form;  
• a compensation of the absence of the author through diverse paratexts (prefaces, 
figurative expressions);  
• an underdeveloped pictoral or symbolic level of meaning;  
• and more common connections to other types of discourse than to the system of 
literature (342). 
Numerous other studies on the nexus of anthropology and the novel have focused 
on authors such as Goethe, Wezel, Jean Paul, and Moritz, i.e. on works published after 
Wieland's Agathon, from ca. 1770 to ca. 1800.33 Novels selected as examples of the 
                                                 
32 John A. McCarthy and Lieselotte E. Kurth-Voigt have investigated this perspectivity in Wieland's novels 
in detail. See John A. McCarthy, Fantasy and Reality: An Epistemological Approach to Wieland (Bern: 
Herbert Lang, 1974) 49, 76, 80-81, 86-87. Also Lieselotte E. Kurth-Voigt, Perspectives and Points of 
View: The Early Works of Wieland and Their Background (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1974) 115-135. 
33 On Goethe: Hans-Jürgen Schings, "'Agathon,' 'Anton Reiser,' 'Wilhelm Meister': Zur Pathologie des 
modernen Subjekts im Roman," Goethe im Kontext: Kunst und Humanität, Naturwissenschaft und Politik 
von der Aufklärung bis zur Restauration, Ein Symposium, ed. Wolfgang (ed.) Wittkowski (Tübingen: 
Niemeyer, 1984). Robert Deam Tobin, Doctor's Orders: Goethe and Enlightenment Thought (Lewisburg, 
Pennsylvania, London, United Kingdom, and Cranbury, New Jersey: Bucknell University Press, 2001). 
Wolfgang Riedel, "Influxus physicus und Seelenstärke. Empirische Psychologie und moralische Erzählung 
in der deutschen Spätaufklärung und bei Jacob Friedrich Abel," Anthropologie und Literatur um 1800, eds. 
Jürgen Barkhoff and Eda Sagarra (München: 1992) 24-52. On Wezel: Hans-Peter Nowitzki, Der 
wohltemperierte Mensch: Aufklärungsanthropologien im Widerstreit, Quellen und Forschungen zur 
Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte, 25 (259) (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 2003). On Jean Paul: Wilhelm 
Schmidt-Biggemann, Maschine und Teufel : Jean Pauls Jugendsatiren nach ihrer Modellgeschichte, 
Symposion, philosophische Schriftenreihe, 49 (München: K. Alber, 1975). Rita Wöbkemeier, Erzählte 
Krankheit: Medizinische und literarische Phantasien um 1800 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1990) 183-231. On 
Moritz: Raimund Bezold, Popularphilosophie und Erfahrungsseelenkunde im Werk von Karl Philipp 
Moritz, Epistemata. Reihe Literaturwissenschaft Bd. 14 (Würzburg: Königshausen + Neumann, 1984). 
Lothar Müller, Die kranke Seele und das Licht der Erkenntnis : Karl Philipp Moritz' Anton Reiser 
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anthropological subgenre by German literary historians were published at the time of or 
after Platner's Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise (1772). They have therefore helped 
solidify the placement of the so-called anthropological turn around 1770.34 But the 
themes that Heinz identifies as representative of the anthropological novel – Schwärmer, 
Hypochonder, Empfindler and their critique; the conflict between individual moral 
systems and social regulation; corporeality and the fear of death – begin to appear in a 
preliminary form prior to Platner's famous text. 
 In other genres, researchers of German Enlightenment anthropology have located 
this shift at an increasingly earlier date. Surveying the cultural history of eighteenth-
century German literature, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann and Ralph Häfner claim that the 
anthropological turn in the fifth and sixth decades of the eighteenth century (1740-1760) 
must be regarded as "the most significant historical discovery" of the German 
Enlightenment (168). At mid century, writers conceptualize the physical and 
psychological natures of humankind (it's anthropological essence) in diverse texts and 
contexts. Representative examples of the development of anthropological knowledge 
during the period preceding 1760 include philosophical texts by Lessing, Mendelssohn, 
and Nicolai that investigate the nexus of psychology and morality.35 Lessing extends their 
debate on the anthropological nature of sympathy to his dramatic oeuvre with Miss Sara 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1987). On Wezel, Moritz, and Jean Paul: Catherine J. Minter, The Mind-
Body Problem in German Literature 1770-1830, Oxford Modern Languages and Literature Monographs 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
34 Ernst Platner, Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise (Leipzig: Dyckischen Buchhandlung, 1772). 
35 Johanna Geyer-Kordesch, "Die Psychologie des moralischen Handelns. Psychologie, Medizin, und 
Dramentheorie bei Lessing, Mendelssohn und Friedrich Nicolai," Doctoral Thesis (unpublished), 
University of Massachusetts, 1977. 
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Sampson (1755).36 In philosophy, the investigation of the interconnectedness of body and 
soul is focused on the sources of causation, including the influence between body and 
soul. Gottsched and Crusius provide early answers to this question, and the nature of this 
influence is later developed by Kant and Herder.37 Poetry, the most-prized genre of the 
early Enlightenment in Germany, also develops a theme of anthropology. Brockes in his 
poem "Bewährtes Mittel, Gemüths=Bewegungen zu stillen" from the collection Irdisches 
Vergnügen in Gott (21730), Haller in Über den Ursprung des Übels (1734), Wieland in 
Die Ordnung der Dinge (1751), and Uz in Versuch über die Kunst, stets fröhlich zu seyn 
(1760) each represents one facet of this body/soul nexus.38 Lutheran preacher and Pietist 
autobiographer Adam Bernd probes the human fascination with the problem of faith in 
relation to one's material and spiritual being in his Eigene Lebensbeschreibung (1738).39 
In light of the prevalence of anthropology in other genres before the 1760's, one must 
                                                 
36 Alexander Kosenina, Anthropologie und Schauspielkunst: Studien zur "eloquentia corporis" im 18. 
Jahrhundert, Theatron, Bd. 11 (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1995). 
37 On early eighteenth-century notions of the body/soul nexus in Germany see Eric Watkins, "The 
Development of Physical Influx in Early Eighteenth-Century Germany: Gottsched, Knutzen, and Crusius," 
Review of Metaphysics 49 December (1995): 295-339. For Kant's early engagement with the topic see Eric 
Watkins, "Kant's Theory of Physical Influx," Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie 77 (1995): 285-
324. Also see Eric Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). John H. Zammito shows the common origin of Kant and Herder's anthropological 
interests in the 1760's and the different results of their thought in the 1770's in John H. Zammito, Kant, 
Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
38 On Brockes and Uz, see Wolfram Mauser, "Glückseligkeit und Melancholie: Zur Anthropologie der 
Frühaufklärung," Konzepte aufgeklärter Lebensführung: Literarische Kultur im frühmodernen 
Deutschland, ed. Wolfram Mauser (Würzburg: Königshausen + Neumann, 2000) 211-243. On Haller, see 
Adalbert Elschenbroich, "Nachwort," Die Alpen und andere Gedichte, ed. Adalbert Elschenbroich 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1965) 106-107. On Wieland, see Hans-Jürgen Schings, "Der anthropologische Roman. 
Seine Entstehung und Krise im Zeitalter der Spätaufklärung," Deutschlands kulterelle Entfaltung: Die 
Neubestimmung des Menschen, eds. Bernhard Fabian, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann and Rudolf Vierhaus, 
Studien zum achtzehnten Jahrhundert, 2/3 (München: Kraus, 1980) 247-251. 
39 For describing the interdisciplinary context that shapes the emerging anthropological discourse traced 
here, see Hans-Jürgen Schings, Melancholie und Aufklärung: Melancholiker und ihre Kritiker in 
Erfahrungsseelenkunde und Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1977) 97-126. Pfotenhauer, 
55-76. 
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ask: Did it play a role in the novel before Wieland's Don Sylvio (1764) and Agathon 
(1766-1767)? 
 In the essay "Glückseligkeit und Melancholie: Zur Anthropologie der 
Frühaufklärung" Wolfram Mauser argues that anthropology draws an image of life 
between the spheres of desire and virtue for Albert Julius, the grandfather, primary 
settler, and archive of tradition for the Robinson-like tale of Johann Gottfried Schnabel's 
Insel Felsenburg (1731-1743). To be clear, this is not an anthropological novel, but one 
that includes a discourse of body and soul, i.e. a discussion of the balance and interaction 
of physical and moral being and how they make us human. For Mauser, this occurs as 
Albert Julius finally achieves stability in his subsistence on a South Seas island with 
Concordia, but feels torn between his promise to refrain from expressions and advances 
of erotic love toward her and his conflicting natural desire for her. Albert recalls this 
tension as an impetus to an existential dilemma: "Ich fiel fast gantz von neuen in meine 
angewöhnte Melancholey" (Schnabel 230). Initially, Albert believes himself without a 
solution to this quandary and withdraws from Concordia and his work farming to bemoan 
the dilemma in a song that describes his love. Albert sings: 
  ACh hätt' ich nur kein Schiff erblickt,  
 So wär ich länger ruhig blieben 
  Mein Unglück hat es her geschickt, 
 Und mir zur Quaal zurück getrieben, 
Verhängnis wilstu dich denn eines reichen Armen 
Und freyen Sclavens nicht zu rechter Zeit erbarmen? 
 
  Soll meiner Jugend beste Krafft 
 In dieser Einsamkeit ersterben? 
  Ist das der Keuschheit Eigenschafft? 
 Will mich die Tugend selbst verderben? 
So weiß ich nicht wie man die lasterhafften Seelen 
Mit größrer Grausamkeit und Marter solte quälen. 
 
  Ich liebe und sag' es nicht,  
 Denn Eid und Tugend heist mich schweigen, 
  Mein gantz verdecktes Liebes-Licht 
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 Darf seine Flamme gar nicht zeigen, 
Dem Himmel selbsten ist mein Lieben nicht zuwieder, 
Doch Schwur und Treue schlägt den Hofnungs-Bau darnieder. […] (231) 
The ship represents civilization and awakens Albert's hope for marital community. If he 
were to successfully signal to the ship, he could create new social networks and marry a 
woman from beyond the island. Following the shipwreck on Insel Felsenburg, however, 
both Albert and Concordia simultaneously appreciate the simple subsistence living as a 
haven from the moral corruption of European society. Because Albert values virtue, he 
acknowledges the necessity to subordinate his desire to reason and his promise of only 
platonic friendship to Concordia. But he considers the sacrifice of his youthful virility an 
unprecedented punishment. This dilemma represents the essence of his being. It marks a 
human quandary: many people confront this conflict of balancing physical being, 
including sexual fulfillment in a committed relationship, with thinking being, which 
requires respect for principled living as a step toward defining subjectivity and achieving 
freedom. Albert and Concordia, Mauser argues, conceive of themselves in terms of 
rational virtue and physical desire, and it is the duality of this nature that makes them 
"ganzen Menschen" ("Glückseligkeit und Melancholie: Zur Anthropologie der 
Frühaufklärung" 218). By showing their attempts to harmonize their dualistic nature, 
Schnabel dramatizes the interdependence of body and soul. 
Mauser maintains that body/soul dualism and the concept of the whole person are 
examples of key formative schemata in Insel Felsenburg for the formation of the 
eighteenth-century subject. And there are other paradigms. Through their own 
dissatisfaction, Albert Julius and Concordia show how one's own ideas can make the 
pursuit of happiness impossibly difficult, and thereby point toward the inconsolable 
ruminations of Karl Philipp Moritz' Anton Reiser (1785-1790). In the tradition of 
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Montaigne's Essais (1580-1588), eighteenth-century German writers, including Schnabel, 
develop a new language to pursue self-knowledge and to directly iterate their internal 
conflicts in their pursuit of Glückseligkeit ("Glückseligkeit und Melancholie: Zur 
Anthropologie der Frühaufklärung" 216-217). The pursuit of self-knowledge implies the 
development of the correlative skill of self-observation. Each of these themes – the whole 
individual, the difficulties in the pursuit of happiness, and the search for self-knowledge 
through a new language and self-observation – highlights key elements of the body and 
soul discourse found in the moral periodicals.  
 Mauser's critique of Insel Felsenburg (1731-1743) challenges us to seek a 
discourse of body and soul in the eighteenth-century novel prior to the publication of 
Wieland's Agathon (1766-1767). In Germany, this discourse developed in part through a 
reception of English sentimentality, especially in the novels of Samuel Richardson. As a 
fan of Richardson, Christian Fürchtegott Gellert modernized forms from the German 
adventure novel into a sentimental epic that succeeded in gaining broad public support 
for the novel genre. In the novels of Richardson, Gellert, Hermes, and Wieland, moral 
action is represented in combination with a body/soul link. Two spheres, virtue and 
neurological sensibility, develop an interdependent and new way to describe human 
nature. An investigation of the rise of the discourse of body and soul in Germany through 
a sample of novels, including works by Richardson, Gellert, and Hermes promises a 
reassessment of Agathon as one of the first anthropological novels. Furthermore, the 
body/soul discourse of moral life in the novel provides a context for essays and narratives 
in the moral periodical of the 1750's and 1760's.  
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The analysis of body/soul discourse and neurological sensibility as anthropology 
necessitates specific kinds of interpretive practices. Literary historians have often 
lamented the lack of a theoretical framework to analyze anthropological contributions to 
intellectual history and the function of the text (Pross). In Melancholie und Aufklärung 
(1977), Hans-Jürgen Schings argues for an interdisciplinary and historical investigation 
of a theme because of the interdependence of literary texts and philosophical, theological, 
and medical concepts prevalent at their genesis. For his study of melancholy, he notes 
that literary texts aid in the description of the psychological and medical condition of this 
affliction, while the scientific texts provide inspiration for literary creations (Melancholie 
und Aufklärung 7). Melancholie und Aufklärung implies that cultural historians should 
research these connections to develop a history of ideas, yet without trying to compete 
with historians of individual disciplines (6). Schings keeps his methodology broad, and 
rightly points to the productive interdependence of these fields as a focus of further 
investigation. While his stated purpose of not trying to compete with historians of 
individual disciplines may accurately reflect the difficulty of doing good interdisciplinary 
work, it seems the goal should remain to engage, instruct, and inspire researchers through 
analysis applicable to multiple related fields.  
Horst Thomé proposes a more concrete methodology in Roman und 
Naturwissenschaft (1978). This study seeks to supplement the investigation of influences 
between the thought of natural science and literature with the identification of their 
homologous structures (Thomé 61). For example, the empirical method of observation 
and causal evaluation in Zimmermann's Von der Erfahrung in der Arzneykunst (1763-
1764), garners Wieland's attention as a theoretical model. The Biberach author 
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subsequently plans a heroic poem about Alexander the Great to uncover idealized 
representations through observation and causal analysis of his life (125-126). Roman und 
Naturwissenschaft also aims to identify the unique contribution of literature in scientific 
controversies (129). Whereas a scientific investigation of the nature of the soul would 
deduce, or observe and describe its essence, Wieland's literary oeuvre emphasizes the 
scientific process in language, amplifies it through metaphor, and criticizes it by 
commenting on its place in relation to society (205-208, 232). 
In her article „Literarische oder historische Anthropologie? Zur Möglichkeit 
interdisziplinären Arbeitens am Beispiel von Literatur und Anthropologie im 18. 
Jahrhundert“ (2004) Jutta Heinz develops a more nuanced, three-level method to examine 
the relationship between literature and anthropology.  
• The first level of a reading attempts to directly verify influences. It asks how readers 
and writers circulated anthropological knowledge and then transferred it to literature, 
or how writers circulated literary styles and adapted these forms in scientific writing. 
This transfer is easiest to prove if one person produces texts as poet and scientist, or 
as writer and patient (Heinz, "Literarische oder historische Anthropologie?" 202).  
• A second, thematic reading investigates the transfer of themes. This includes the 
adaptation of anthropological themes in literature, as well as how science consults 
literature as an archive of scientific discourse, which enables reconstruction of past 
theories. This interpretation also identifies how writers use literature as a secondary 
reference for scientific theses (202-205).  
• A third reading evaluates the transfer of structural modes. On this level, one must 
ask how scientific paradigms influence literary representation of time or causality, 
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i.e., the organization of the plot. Similarly, one must identify how anthropological 
prose integrates poetic tools, ranging from images and metaphors to rhetorical 
flourish (205-206).  
These reading strategies acknowledge the impact of biography on writing, while looking 
beyond the intricacies of author and text to see how the texts function in their historical 
setting. Heinz's model analysis provides a useful starting point for the identification and 
critique of anthropological and moral themes in novels available to the eighteenth-
century German readership.  
This chapter and the following one analyze texts primarily using Heinz's first 
level of reading. Each chapter aims to identify influences on the construction of the 
body/soul discourse in works of exemplary authors such as Richardson, Gellert, Hermes, 
and Wieland. In a simplified sense, the attempt to verify influences involves a re-
evaluation of the relationship between biography and literary production. The analysis 
draws on the biographical as well as literary texts to help identify each author's take on 
the body/soul discourse. While biographical details about Richardson's or Gellert's health, 
for example, do not allow us to make definite (or indisputable) assertions about their 
position on the body/soul nexus, they do enlighten readers about the author's attitude 
regarding this discourse. Recovering the evolution of this discourse in Germany from 
Pamela (1740/1741) to Agathon (1766-1767) allows the reader to trace the beginnings of 
the anthropological novel. Outlining the history of body/soul discourse from Pamela to 
Agathon also provides a context for the evolution of a German anthropological discourse 
in periodicals as discussed in chapters six to eight of this dissertation.  
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The Richardsonian Model of the Sentimental Novel in Germany 
 English and French novels served as models for the development of a new 
German counterpart from the 1740's. The sentimental novels in French, such as Prevost's 
Manon Lescaut (1731, first translation 1732 as part seven of Mémoires d'un homme de 
qualité under the title Miraculoso Florisonti) and Marivaux's La vie de Marianne (1731-
1742, first trans. 1737) proved popular among German readers, both in the original 
language, and in German translations issued shortly following the original publication. 
On the basis of its depiction of obsessive passion in adventurous episodes, Manon 
Lescaut emphasized a feeling heart. Its influence paralleled Pietism and helped open 
German literature to Empfindsamkeit in the novel, which was eventually succeeded by 
Richardson (Friedrich 84-86). Marivaux gained an audience through the French and 
German performances of his comedies, which proved very successful on German stages 
(Kramer 94). La vie de Marianne was published eighteen times in German translation 
during the eighteenth century (42-44). German critics frequently praised its psychological 
introspection, as in the 1739 review in the Franckfurtischen gelehrten Zeitungen: "Der 
Herr von Marivaux beschreibt uns hier die Geschichte des menschlichen Herzens, und er 
dringt bis in das Innerste, um alle seine geheime Bewegungen, seine Ausflüchte, seine 
Fehler und seine Vorzüge zu entdecken" (610, col. 2, cited in Kramer 175). German 
readers also gained increased appreciation for the moral lessons in the novels of Prèvost 
and Marivaux after reading Pamela (Friedrich 18-19; Martens, Die Botschaft der Tugend 
513). 
Texts from England increasingly gained attention, particularly Defoe's Robinson 
Crusoe (1719-1720, first trans. 1720), which generated multiple German translations and 
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imitations, from Schnabel's Insel Felsenburg (1731-1743) to Johann Heinrich Campe's 
Robinson der Jüngere (1779) (Fohrmann). German readers also gained access to German 
translations of Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels (1726, trans. 1728), Henry Fielding's 
Joseph Andrews (1742, trans. 1745), and Tom Jones (1749, trans. 1749-1751) (Blackall 
197). Though not as popular as Robinson Crusoe, Richardson's three sentimental novels 
spread rapidly through Europe and Germany. Pamela (1740-1741), Clarissa (1747-
1748), and Sir Charles Grandison (1753) achieved broad approval in Germany through 
recommendations in the German moral weeklies, in literary-cultural magazines, and from 
individual readers. The positive reception in the periodicals continued from the 1740's to 
at least 1770: "Gottsched, Bodmer and the 'Bremer Beiträger' in their organs all urged the 
reading of Richardson," as did von Murr in Der Zufriedene (1764) and Friedrich Schmit 
in Das Wochenblatt ohne Titel (1770) (Price 170). The Zeitvertreiber from Leipzig 
(1745) and Der Gesellige (1750) from Halle both recommend Pamela for its education of 
the reader to virtue and appropriate emotion through what the Gesellige terms 
Menschenkenntnis (Martens, Die Botschaft der Tugend 512-515). Der Mensch (1752), 
the successor to Der Gesellige and a later focus of this dissertation, similarly 
recommends reading Pamela, particularly to an audience to test another person's 
humanity and capacity for empathy through the physical sign of crying (S. G. Lange and 
Meier, Der Mensch III:110, no. 100). Peter Uwe Hohendahl notes that because moral 
weeklies schooled eighteenth-century German readers and critics on the educational 
function and realistic nature of literature, the German audience openly welcomed 
Richardson's moralizing realism (44-45).  
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Extant sources provide only scant evidence regarding the response of the popular 
audience to Richardson's novels in Germany. Lending records before the middle of the 
eighteenth century are difficult to come by and the extant sources provide only 
incomplete data on actual reading practices (McCarthy, "Lektüre" 47, esp. footnote 47). 
Nonetheless, the lending records (1714-1799) of one of the early princely lending 
libraries, the Herzog August Bibliothek (HAB) in Wolfenbüttel, show that readers in this 
ducal residence regularly lent Pamela (M. Raabe 3:365). In French. This was the third 
most popular language for all books lent (3:594, table 18), conceivable in a court town 
where the court, students, and academics could learn French. It seems also problematic, 
however, that the lending records for this French translation begin in 1763, twenty years 
after the German translations by Mattheson (vols. 1-2) and Jacob Schuster (Leipzig: 
1743).40 The German translations go unmentioned in the lending records, indicating that 
the HAB likely had no German translation of Pamela available at this time. Richardson's 
other novels, Clarissa (1747-1748, trans. 1749-1753) and Sir Charles Grandison (1753, 
trans. 1754-1755), as well as those of Sterne, Goldsmith, Wieland, Goethe, and the 
anthropological novels studied by Heinz (see note 6 above) also do not appear in the 
HAB circulation records. One would hypothesize that if readers regularly read Pamela in 
French twenty years after its German publication, some readers may have bought or lent 
the German translation from another source. As conceived in the Eighteenth century, the 
collection of the HAB functioned as a scientific library and therefore may have not 
collected Richardson's works because of their popular status. Further, access to the 
library was limited largely to the court until 1753, and may have influenced the number 
                                                 
40 I have been unable to verify the existence of the Schuster translation beyond Price, 164.  
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of readers and what was read (Martino 13). The fact that the HAB annexed significant 
numbers of books (including novels from the ducal collection) after the middle of the 
eighteenth century might explain why readers lent Pamela beginning twenty years after 
its publication (McCarthy, "Lektüre" 56). There are significant gaps in the HAB 
readership data, and additional archival material would be required to reconstruct further 
details about Pamela's empirical readership in Germany. This is not my purpose here. 
The HAB lending records provide evidence that Pamela remained popular among 
German readers in the 1760's and 1770's. 
 Critics in German-speaking lands gave Richardson's novels mixed reviews. This 
included alternately praise and disdain for the morals depicted in his novels, praise for his 
knowledge of humanity, and general admiration – evaluation focused more on content 
than on form (Price 165-174). Richardson's depiction of morality and an excess of feeling 
became the target of satire by Nicolai in Sebaldus Nothanker (1773) and Musäus in 
Grandison der Zweyte (1760-1762). Writers such as Hermes, La Roche, Goethe, 
Wieland, Müller, and Wagner modeled scenes of seduction, death, madness, and 
declarations of love on Richardson's texts (175-176). Richardson's first epistolary novel 
also likely influenced Gellert's writing of the Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** 
(173, cf. Meyer-Krentler 1974).  
 Many aspects of Richardson's epic texts appealed to contemporary readers. 
Written in a series of letters, the novels reproduced language in a form similar to that 
which readers spoke. Richardson used this language to explore and represent common 
concerns such as the relationship within the family, the interaction between the sexes, and 
the confrontation with representatives of power – all perfect venues for the exploration of 
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human psychology (Doody). These social relationships were governed partially by 
religious doctrine (Richardson's novels are written from a decidedly Christian 
perspective) and partially by the pragmatics of an individual situation. The original 
purpose of Pamela, to provide a conduct book, spawned the confrontation of the 
individual with society and morality that characterizes each of the novels. In their 
depiction of social confrontation, Richardson's novels dramatized moral dilemmas by 
describing the physical effects of emotional stress as well as the emotional effects of 
physical struggles. The novels provide a veritable store of the linguistic representation of 
melancholia, hysteria, hypochondria, and the vapours. 
 
George Cheyne: Richardson's Empathetic Hypochondriac 
 Already in Richardson's debut novel Pamela (1740), his characters demonstrate 
an intimate knowledge of human motivations and reactions to psychological and somatic 
stress. The author's awareness of the body/soul connection and psychosomatic problems 
came first-hand. In the 1730's he developed a degree of moodiness and had problems 
with headaches, temperament, and nerves. A series of letters from Doctor George Cheyne 
to Richardson about the printing of Cheyne's latest manuscripts as books provides 
important insight into Richardson's temperament. This exchange, which runs from 1734 
to Cheyne's death in 1743, represents one of the few pieces of surviving evidence that 
describes the London printer's psychological state during this period. In all but three of 
the surviving letters Cheyne addresses Richardson, so the reader must cull information 
about the printer from the second-hand evidence of Cheyne's responses. Beginning in 
December 1734, the Bath physician acknowledges the printer's low spirits and prescribes 
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medicine for this condition and poor appetite (Mullett 31-32). The doctor's advice to 
Richardson on his health complaints on 4 September 1737 recommends exercise, a light 
diet, limited alcohol consumption, and varied medicinal regimens (34-35). On 22 June 
1738 the physician adds purgation and bloodletting to the treatment, emphasizing the 
attempt to alter a psychological state with physical remedies. He offers a kind of warning: 
"I hope your case is more Hypochondraical than Apoplectic", (i.e. caused by a nervous 
disorder rather than the rupture of a blood vessel) (37-38). Cheyne offers consolation and 
repeated variations of the same treatment on 30 September 1738, 4 February 1739, and 
13 May 1739. On 4 June 1739 the diagnosis leans decidedly to a nervous disorder: "Your 
Noise in your Ears is a common Symptom of nervous Hyp and of no possible 
Consequence. I have had it often, and much Exercise and abstemious Living always 
cured it; 'tis Hypochondriac Wind on the Drum" (50). A subsequent complaint about 
wind confirms the doctor's finding on 20 April 1740: 
Your present Complaint, as you very accurately describe it, is entirely nervous from Wind in the 
Primae Viae and Membranes of the Muscles and is no Manner of dangerous consequence. If it 
comes to any Height so as to produce Terror or Confusion or inattention to Business your only 
present Relief is Tea Spoonful or two of the Tincture of Soot, and Assa Foetida made on Peony 
Water in a cold Infusion drunk any Time in a Glass of Peper Mint Water Simple. This will make 
you break Wind plentifully and so relieve you. I have had that Complaint now and these Twenty 
Years, and thought and thought the Walls and Floor of the House playing up and down with me, 
but the solid Cure is a Vomit every now and then; especially when very bad about new Moon, but 
when tolerable twice a Year, Michelmas and Lady-day. In short, your total Case is Scurbutico 
Nervose from a sedentary studious Life. (59)  
 
Cheyne attributes the printer's nervous disorder to diet, digestion, and lack of exercise. 
While Richardson eventually took up riding the chamber horse according to Dr. 
Cheyne's' prescription in the same letter, it seems that his complaints had multiple causes. 
According to the physician's responses, Richardson's condition seems to have 
deteriorated in the later half of the 1730's. In a letter to Lady Bradshaigh from 15 
December 1748, the printer referred to a much earlier period of time during which he 
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experienced more acute version of his anxiety, intensified by the deaths of eleven 
relatives and friends in two years (Barbauld IV:217-238; Carroll 103-116). Though 
Richardson doesn't definitively date this period, it may have occurred around 1737, about 
the same time as his descriptions of his illness and appeals to the Bath physician for an 
effective therapy intensified (Eaves and Kimpel 84). From 1748 looking back, the printer 
identifies his main problem as psychological stress. Cheyne, however, identified physical 
sources of the nervous illness, hypothesizing obstructions to the glands and capillaries, 
excessive weight, nerve damage, and weak digestion as the causes of his patient's 
discomfort (Mullett 76 [12 December 1741]). On 7 December 1741, the physician warns 
Richardson to change his diet or risk apoplexy or a hypochondriac palsy: to achieve a 
better balance of his mental state, the printer must alter his physical program to avoid 
physical debilitation (74-75). Cheyne responds to repeated "Tremblings", "Startings and 
Twitches", "Startings and Cramps", and "Fits, Paroxisms, and Plunges" with 
encouragement toward the routine and perseverance (86-93 [9 March, 14 March, 2 April, 
26 April 1742] ). This symptom of shaking was likely in part caused by the onset of 
Parkinson's Disease (Eaves and Kimpel 84). 
 A third reason may have additionally prompted Richardson's nervous 
temperament. In addition to his worrying about his physical state (a nervous, 
psychological cause) and the possibility of Parkinson's disease (a physical cause) there 
may have been a social motivation that sparked his nervousness as well. In an insightful 
article titled "Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres: Toward Defining the Origins of Sensibility," 
George S. Rousseau uses a letter to Richardson to illustrate how the cult of sensibility 
increased the desirability of the social demonstration of feeling. The letter from Mrs. 
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Donnellan essentially argues that the more an individual demonstrates personal 
sensibility, the more that person is capable of writing with feeling (Rousseau 152). The 
expression of feeling begets the expression of feeling to a unique degree. In The English 
Malady (1733), a work Richardson printed for Cheyne, the doctor similarly created a 
feeling elite. Cheyne stratified society based on class, claiming that nervous illness more 
readily afflicted the upper classes who possessed greater intelligence and sensibility than 
the working class (Guerrini 281). Richardson may have desired to perform his own 
sensibility, something Cheyne inculcated with repeated demands to have regular written 
updates on the printer's condition. Richardson's protocols may have provided personal 
confirmation of his nobility of feeling. More significantly, this rehearsal may have 
contributed to his inward meditation so that he could recall his own experience when 
imagining the representation of feeling appropriate for his characters' trials. According to 
John Mullan, the London printer would not have been alone in viewing sensibility from 
opposing points of view. Writers and readers of the eighteenth century viewed sensibility 
with ambivalence: as a debilitating affliction and an exclusive capacity (Mullan 141, 144-
146). 
 "Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres" makes a larger point that requires additional 
consideration. The article argues that the origin of the sensibility demonstrated by 
Richardson lies not in his correspondence with Dr. Cheyne, that is, not with a particular 
person's ideas historians can now link to the printer's life, but to an earlier revolution in 
thought about the human being. This is especially contentious because it would appear to 
contrast with the methodology of Heinz detailed above. Using a model based on Thomas 
Kuhn's paradigms, Rousseau locates the change in thought about humankind in the 
  103 
seventeenth century. As a challenge to existing theories of the soul that located it 
throughout the body, Thomas Willis argued in Cerebri anatome (1664) that soul was 
located in the brain,41 with the cerebrum controlling voluntary movements and the 
cerebellum controlling involuntary motion (Rousseau 149). Because this implied a 
neurological control center, it necessitated an integrated physiological doctrine of the 
brain and nerves, that was at that time uncharted, to enable the development of a theory 
of sensory perception. Willis in physiology and Locke in philosophy provoked a change 
in the conception of human nature, even on the popular level, to a body directed by a 
neurological soul. Even though Willis made some errors in his theory, Rousseau argues, 
he and Locke spurred the Enlightenment conception of neurological human nature that 
included sensibility (150). The fact that a lay correspondent of Richardson's demonstrated 
this knowledge provides an example of its popularization and mitigates, according to 
Rousseau, the singular importance of Cheyne's scientific knowledge to Richardson (152-
153).  
The author of Pamela demonstrates the literary application of physiological and 
psychological knowledge much after Willis's Cerebri anatome (1664) and his subsequent 
physiological publications, or even Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(1690). Rousseau argues that because writers needed a physiological theory of perception 
to adequately motivate character's complex feelings psychologically, there was a delay in 
the literary integration of the new neurological knowledge (154). And in the broadest 
sense, Richardson's goal in writing a sentimental novel, to instill virtue, depended on 
                                                 
41 Rousseau actually states that Willis argued the brain was located in the soul, but this must be an error, 
because the location of the soul is in question among scientists in the seventeenth century, not the site of 
the brain. See Thomas Willis and William Feindel, The Anatomy of the Brain and Nerves (Birmingham, 
Alabama: Classics of Medicine Library, 1978) ch. XIX. 
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advanced physiological knowledge in accordance with the theory of moral feeling. This 
necessitated a material grounding, definition, and determination of moral crises (155). 
The article "Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres" makes a strong case for an origin of sensibility 
with the investigators of brain function and the nature of the soul.  
Rousseau's theory of the rise of sensibility focuses on its beginnings. Richardson's 
knowledge of the interaction of body and soul need not have been only formed by a 
tradition widely available in the eighteenth century. This sensibility that develops from 
Willis and Locke may, for Richardson, have been additionally shaped by Cheyne, who 
repeatedly links psychological afflictions to physical causes (diet, exercise, occupation). 
The doctor's correspondence spurs the reader to attain self-knowledge. The Bath 
physician regularly relates his own maladies in a gesture of empathy and as an instructive 
example (Mullett 57 [26 October 1739], 92 [19 April 1742]). He further encourages this 
mode of confession by making repeated calls for epistolary protocols of the valetudinary 
printer's self-observation (Mullett 50 [13 May 1739], 54 [1 July 1739], 94 [2 May 1742]). 
Ultimately, Richardson imaginatively combines elements of inwardness to create the 
unique searching individuals in his novels. Examples abound in Pamela. 
The Bath physician's prescriptions were written around the time of Pamela's 
composition, which the author dated to the brief period from 10 November 1739 to 10 
January 1740. The first two volumes of the novel appeared on 6 November 1740. Pamela 
(trans. 1742 and 1743) interests me as an early example of this kind of representation of 
sensible individuality, and as Richardson's first effort in the epic genre. 
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The Body as an Emotional Trigger in Pamela 
 The challenges to virtue accentuate the body/soul link in Pamela. These trials 
largely result from the narrator’s report of self-evaluation as an attempt to understand her 
experiences. Though a servant girl, Pamela is unusually well-prepared to document her 
experiences because she had parents who successfully taught her principles of virtue. Her 
mistress, Mr. B's mother, likewise inculcated this sense of moral responsibility and 
educated her in women's crafts, including singing, dancing, drawing, flowering, and 
sewing. As she anticipates a return to peasant life with her parents, Pamela laments these 
skills for their limited usefulness for a life on the land (Richardson 108, 112). For the 
reader, the young girl's greatest training lies in her abilities to read, write, and think using 
rational principles – skills that convey her blossoming subjectivity in confrontations with 
Mr. B and herself. 
 The heroine's life as a maidservant is one of learning, purpose, friendship, and 
order. As a young girl in the service of a wealthy woman, Pamela enjoys the Christian 
education and privileged access to her lady's company as if she were part of the wealthy 
woman's family (43, 108). Her future promises employment as a maidservant for the 
lady, by which she is to use her skills of sewing, conversation, and general cultured 
civility to earn a daily wage. Beyond the favor shown her by her mistress, Pamela enjoys 
the friendship and respect of the other servants, including Mrs. Jervis, Mr. Longman, and 
Jonathan, who form a kind of second family for her while she is away from her parents. 
In summary, her life promises years of service at the call of a generous lady and among 
affable fellow servants. Her circumstances forebode a kind of teleological individual 
order based on service in an aristocratic family.  
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When the wealthy woman becomes ill and faces death, she individually praises 
each servant, recommending every one to the service of her son. At his mother's death, 
Mr. B gives Pamela several coins from his mother's pocket change in recognition of work 
well done. The anticipated order of the lady's house is interrupted by her death, but Mr. 
B's generous gift of four guineas – Pamela genuinely believes this, despite it being a mere 
pittance for the young lord – provides hope for continuity of employment and recognition 
of good work. Pamela reveals her hope and doubt that her new master will be virtuous, 
foreshadowing a central conflict of the novel: "Indeed, he [Mr. B.] was once thought to 
be wildish; but he is now the best of gentlemen, I think!" (45). 
 Mr. B. appeals to the image of a reformed libertine. When he commands: "Be 
faithful and diligent; and do as you should do, and I like you the better for this," the son 
demands a continuation of her good work, and thereby a continuation of the order Pamela 
knows. For her industrious labor, she is promised the reward of further employment and 
of respect from her employer. Yet Mr. B.'s fancy for Pamela leads to his use of power to 
gain pleasure by her.  
Mr. B.'s attempts to seduce Pamela shake the rational basis of her worldview. As 
she is sewing in the summerhouse, Mr. B. enters and she is trembling and on guard. The 
lord begins an elusive conversation by making her an offer to continue working for him, 
instead of waiting on his sister, Lady Davers. For Pamela, such an offer is confusing 
because she would have no woman to serve; she politely declines. Frustrated by her 
choice and independence, Mr. B. spitefully calls her a fool, makes an empty promise to 
make her a gentlewoman, and hugs and kisses her. This transgresses the servant – master 
order Pamela knows, as she later states (55). The introduction of the rules a liaison 
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simultaneously challenges her virtue so that she is momentarily immobilized, physically 
trembling because of the terse denial of her hope to work for Lady Davers and, more 
importantly, the ethical transgression of her employer's embrace. Pamela recalls the scene 
for her parents: "I struggled and trembled, and was so benumbed with terror, that I sunk 
down, not in a fit, and yet not myself; and I found myself in his arms, quite void of 
strength; and he kissed me two or three times, with frightful eagerness. At last I burst 
from him […]" (55).42 In the midst of Mr. B.'s advance, Pamela's intellectual and moral 
responses are periodically silenced, while her body trembles and is frozen in a 
momentary physiological reaction to it. She has an automatic intellectual and physical 
aversion to the immoral sexual advances. 
 As Mr. B. taunts her, the power balance shifts. When she refuses to stay with him 
in the summerhouse, he mocks her and demands obedience. Pamela knows, however, that 
his power as an employer lies not in sexual advances and mockery and regains her 
composure to protest his behavior as inappropriate. Mr. B. attempts to reassert his 
dominion over her in two ways, by demanding her silence about the advances and by 
paying her with gold. The offended maidservant refuses both. Before she exits the 
summerhouse, Pamela leaves the money to its keeper. And despite seriously weighing 
Mr. B.'s demand "Be secret, I charge you, Pamela," she divulges the master's 
transgressions to her confidante, Mrs. Jervis (56-57). From the beginning, this 
confrontation is a psychological battle in which the lord flirts with and kisses his servant 
and bobbles his power, then Pamela, initially caught off guard, asserts her dignity and 
                                                 
42 In an engaging study, Geoffrey Sill unnecessarily foreshortens the summer-house episode by saying that 
Pamela "neither faints nor succumbs." In reality, however, in Richardson's "writing to the moment," the 
astounded Pamela momentarily loses her ability to react, and thereby her means of resistance that allows 
his embrace – she partially does both faint and succumb. Geoffrey Sill, The Cure of the Passions and the 
Origins of the English Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 173-174. 
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chastity, and thereby her own limited power, and finally Mr. B. promises her forgiveness 
in the midst of his offenses and reasserts his power.  
In a series of subsequent advances, Mr. B. attempts to force Pamela to submit to 
his power by charging her of plotting against him, by openly kissing her against her will, 
and by inventing accusations of an affair with Chaplain Williams. The lord's 
psychological strategy involves defaming her and bringing her to tears so that she will 
relent in her resistance to him. To force his advances on the heroine, Mr. B invokes her 
confusion. He interrupts and argues with her as she is sewing (63-64), uses self-serving 
logic to accost her in her plain (peasant) clothes (88-90), and surprises her as she and 
Mrs. Jervis settle into bed (95) – in each case to steal kisses despite Pamela's well-
guarded virtue. Each of Mr. B.’s flirtatious embraces provokes a physical reaction in 
Pamela. 
 In the absence of the lady of the house, Pamela's life becomes entangled with the 
passions of her lady's son and his power games. Physical responses repeatedly have a role 
to play in the heroine's moral crises. For example, in Mr. B.'s second advance on Pamela, 
he looses an argument about his honor when she convinces him that it must include 
respect for her virtue.43 Disarmed in oratory, he returns to seduction. Mr. B. offers his 
maidservant his knee, pulls her down on it, and gloats she will be unable to resist his 
power to bed her. He even offers to take the blame and give her the "merit" of rape, 
                                                 
43 Mr. B. decries Pamela for having resisted his advances and for having told Mrs. Jervis about these 
private matters. The heroine catches him in his own doubletalk and asks why he is so angry about the 
revelation if he truly "intended no harm?" (62, cf. 55) When Pamela says she has not talked with any other 
person about the incident, Mr. B. reveals that he knows she wrote about the confrontation in a letter to her 
parents. She counters that he could not have known of her request for advice from her parents had he not 
read her outgoing mail. He complains of being "exposed" by a gossip ("saucebox"), and she responds that 
she does not expose him by telling the truth. Indeed, she insists on honesty, which in her case includes her 
virtue. When he charges her with disobedience, she refuses to follow commands contrary to her first 
principle of honesty and virtue.  
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which she can share with Mrs. Jervis and her parents as a "pretty tale" or "romance" (63, 
66). She gathers her physical strength to escape the barrage of kisses: "Indignation gave 
me double strength, and I got from him by a sudden spring, and ran out of the room" (63). 
On reaching solitude behind a locked door, however, she faints. When he appears several 
hours later to check up on her condition, her anxiety over the assault on her virtue 
triggers the physical reaction and causes her to faint again. 
Though Mr. B.'s pursuit never directly threatens her life, it repeatedly threatens 
her virtue, and a life without virtue is, she claims, a life not worth living (63, 74, 83). The 
threats to her virtue elicit desperate tears and struggles, but also nervous reactions, such 
as trembling, being stunned, and fainting. Mr. B.'s turpitude tests her resolve to do good 
and pushes her to a limit state of cognizance of transgression and resistance to actions 
that threaten her virtue, indeed, her social life. If deflowered, she believes she would be 
as good as dead (63, 226). The body semiotics dramatize her moral trials by making the 
silence psychologically readable, by conveying responses to experience through the 
description of body language. 
 The representation of sensibility in Pamela relies on the interdependence of body 
and soul. The influence occurs in several ways: an emotional state causes physical 
effects, a physical state causes emotional effects, or there is a combination of both. The 
most common case of the emotional state prompting a physical effect occurs when Mr. B. 
gruffly subordinates Pamela and threatens her virtue. Generally, this occurs when he is in 
her presence, as in the scenes cited above. But he also belittles her and reiterates his plan 
to steal her innocence in letters to Mrs. Jewkes, one of which he mistakenly addresses to 
Pamela and which Mrs. Jewkes unknowingly gives her. Just like his presence evokes her 
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fear, reading Mr. B.’s letter and his plans to conquer her also frightens her to near 
fainting (201-202).  
 Richardson focuses sensibility in the female lead character, Pamela, but Mr. B. 
also demonstrates episodes of sensibility that expand his character. Her ultimate 
departure from her imprisonment in Lincolnshire at a much later time brings her master 
to an emotional abyss. In letting her return to her family, Pamela and Mr. B. discover the 
depth of their attraction to each other, no matter how uneven the power balance in its 
development (280-281, 283, 285-286). The lord is lovesick: "I […] am really indisposed; 
I believe, with vexation, that I should part thus with the delight of my soul, as I now find 
you are, and must be, in spite of the pride of my heart" (286). Mr. B.'s emotional loss at 
her departure induces a debilitating fever that requires a bloodletting, a common physical 
treatment for psychological stress, and sack-whey (286).44 Irregardless of the 
effectiveness of these physical cures, he claims she is the reason for his recovery, i.e. that 
her presence promotes joy (an emotional remedy) that lifts his physical illness. Indeed, he 
hints at his own sensitive nature in his assessment of the cause of the illness:  
"'O my Pamela! you have made me quite well. […] I can't be ill,' said he, 'while you are with me. I 
am well already […] Life is no life without you! If you had refused to return (and yet I had hardly 
hopes you would oblige me) I should have had a very severe fit of it, I believe; for I was taken 
very oddly, and knew not what to make of myself: but now I shall be well instantly. You need not, 
Mrs. Jewkes,' added he, 'send for Dr. Harpur from Stamford; for this lovely creature is my doctor, 
as her absence was my disease'" (291).  
 
                                                 
44 Sack-whey is a medicinal remedy of white wine and the thin milk that separates from the curd in the 
making of cheese. In his letters to Samuel Richardson, Dr. Cheyne diagnoses Richardson's low moods as 
hypochondria and prescribes, among other cures, bloodletting every two or three months and regular 
exercise. The characterization of Mr. B. reflects elements of Richardson's personal experience of nervous 
disorder prior to publication of Pamela in 1740. Charles F. Mullett, ed., "The Letters of Doctor George 
Cheyne to Samuel Richardson (1733-1743)," The University of Missouri Studies XVIII (1943): 38 [22 June 
1738]. 
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Just as the emotional state provokes physical effects, the physical state can also 
prompt emotional changes. One of the most striking examples involves the psychological 
effects of one of Pamela's pregnancies, diagnosed by one of her friends as the vapours, 
i.e. a case of depression. In a letter, Pamela enjoins her good friend Miss Darnford to visit 
an ill servant, Mrs. Jewkes. The heroine organizes women's social networks, directing 
Darnford's sensible faculties, such as empathy and friendship, for the benefit of others. 
Yet Pamela also wishes Darnford would call on her. She pleas with Miss Darnford for a 
visit, claiming her request is punctuated by the strains of her pregnancy. Pamela petitions: 
"[I long] for the Company of my dear Miss Darnford. O when shall I see you? When 
shall I? – To speak to my present Case, it is all I long for; and, pardon my Freedom of 
Expression, as well as Thought, when I let you know in this Instance, how early I 
experience the ardent Longings of one in the Way I am in" (italics as printed, Richardson 
3:405).45 The heroine recognizes her language of intense feeling transgresses decorum 
and causally links her spiritual state to her dynamic material being. This is an insistent 
address that reverberates a sense of desperation: 
I am a sad weak, apprehensive Body; to be sure I am! How much better fitted for the 
contingencies of Life are the gay, frolick, Minds that think not of any thing before it comes upon 
them, than such thoughtful Futurity-Pokers as I! 
But why should I trouble you, my honoured and dear Friends, with my idle Fears and Follies – just 
as if nobody was ever in my Case before? – Yet weak and apprehensive Spirits will be gloomily -
affected sometimes; and how can one help it? – And if I may not hope for the indulgent Soothings 
of the best of Parents, and of my Miss Darnford, in whose Bosom besides can one disburden one's 
Heart, when oppressed by too great a Weight of Thought? (3:406) 
 
Pamela describes her state of sadness, weakness, and apprehensiveness in juxtaposition to 
the "gay, frolick Minds": she cannot be happy because of her worry. On a first reading, 
the opposition appears to extend to the categories of body and mind. Yet in this passage, 
                                                 
45 The subsequent quotations from parts III and IV of Richardson's novel are cited from the Shakespeare 
Head edition.  
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body and mind function equally as synonyms for "human being," making the relationship 
of the words to each other more ambiguous. The heroine desires sympathy – not from just 
anyone who has experienced pregnancy, but from people in her intimate circle with 
feeling hearts, such as father, mother, and Miss Darnford. As an expecting mother, 
Pamela's physiological state necessitates an emotional cure. 
Alarmed at this confession, Miss Darnford writes to moderate Pamela's 
lamentations: "My dear friend, are you not in danger of falling in too thoughtful and 
gloomy way?" (3:408) In addition to concern for Pamela’s emotional stability, Darnford 
may be concerned for her physical or social being. In eighteenth-century England, 
medical and popular knowledge of women’s physiology linked the physical and mental 
spheres through the nervous system, so that disorder in one area could affect the other 
(Peters 435). Miss Darnford might be worried not only for Pamela’s mental balance, but 
for her physical strength, which was especially desirable for a healthy pregnancy. 
Additionally, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, society had begun to mock 
women afflicted with vapours (441). Miss Darnford might be anxious to moderate 
Pamela’s anxiety to preserve her status in her family as well as among extended family 
and friends. Warning with a coterie of women against falling into a "vapourish Habit" 
(Richardson 3:410), Miss Darnford explains away her friend's worries as part of 
pregnancy. She recommends: "Think little, and hope much, is a good Lesson in your 
Case, and to a Lady of your Temper; and I hope that Lady Davers will not in vain have 
given you that Caution. After all, I dare say, your Thoughtfulness is but symptomatical, 
and will go off, in proper Time" (3:408). Miss Darnford acknowledges a link between 
body and soul in stating that Pamela's emotional trials result from pregnancy. Her advice 
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to be headstrong by "hoping much" approximates a call for positive thinking. Mind 
(hope) should prevail over matter (and the worry of the "thoughtful and gloomy way" it 
induces).  
 From fainting, to lovesickness, to pregnancy, Richardson represents human nature 
as an unstable thing, as a nervous organism. These extreme states dramatically show how 
the body influences the soul, and how the soul influences the body. Pamela's anxiety over 
the loss of her virtue, Mr. B.'s respect for her moral framework, and his fear of losing her 
create turning points in the novel. These key scenes incorporate sensible human nature 
into an overall picture of what it is right to be, a state Pamela demonstrates from the 
beginning, developing through the course of the novel, but not changing. Mr. B. models a 
reform to virtue, yet with his affair in the novel's third and fourth volumes, this moral 
transformation also ends unsuccessfully. The nexus of body and soul plays an important 
role in dramatizing the characters, yet the novel's focus lies in human sentimental nature. 
The discourse of sensibility supports the representation of sentimentality. 
 
Pamela and German Physical Sensibility 
 Pamela (1740) illustrates a confluence of discourses about the body, the soul, and 
morality available to German readers in 1742 with the translation by Mattheson. While 
this is a text of English origin, it is essential here to re-emphasize that it was also read and 
circulated in Germany. The combination of sensibility and the body/soul nexus provoked 
responses among German readers and writers. For example, in a letter to Johann Jakob 
Bodmer, who had embraced the moral function of physical sensibility in poetry,46 the 
                                                 
46"Die Sinnen sind die ersten Lehrer der Menschen. Alle Erkenntnis kommt von ihnen" (Bodmer 4, cited in 
Siegrist 297). 
  114 
anacreontic poet Friedrich von Hagedorn admitted being emotionally overwhelmed when 
reading Pamela. Hagedorn defended his bravado while describing the novel's effect: "'Ich 
könnte Ew. Hochedelgeborenen jemand nennen, der nicht ein weibisches Herz hat, der 
aber dieses Buch nicht ohne viel Thränen [hat] lessen können…. Ich würde mich 
beklagen, wenn es mir nicht gefiel'" (Unpublished letter from Hagedorn to Bodmer on 11 
May 1745, cited in Price 164). The reader's tears give physical evidence of his empathy 
for Pamela and represent one aspect of the interconnections of the body/soul discourse 
with sensibility. The last sentence quoted from the letter confirms that Hagedorn grasped 
the moral thrust of these interconnections and acknowledged his responsibility not only to 
be moved, but implicitly to pursue the novel's example of moral human action.  
Dr. George Cheyne's reception of Pamela further indicates how Richardson struck 
the nerve of the time. Convinced of the persuasive power of the popular novel Pamela, 
Cheyne proposed a commercial follow-up book to Richardson. The project involved 
printing a collection of texts to cure melancholy, hypochondria, and hysteria and to 
promote virtue. In this way, moral instruction and medical knowledge could be sold to an 
eager public. The project never came to fruition, but Cheyne's title page for the proposed 
series describes its all-encompassing scope:  
The Universal Cure of Lingering Disorders either of the Mind or of the Body, being The 
Characters, a brief Summary and Catalogue of the most approved Books, Their Prices, and the 
Places where to be had, in all the Sciences fit to instruct in the Cure of Chronical Distempers, to 
Eradicate the black Passions, to bend the Vices to Virtue and Piety, to sooth Melancholy, Vapours, 
and Pain, and to support the Spirits under Misfortunes or Bodily Ails…. With a general Preface 
and Reflections on the Use and Benefit of such a Work and of such Writings as agreeably 
withdraw the Mind from Thinking (Shuttleton 59).  
 
Cheyne's Univseral Cure addresses a dualistic image of humankind similar to Hagedorn's. 
This combination of writing about body and soul, of sensibility, and of the development 
of moral individuality echoes earlier themes from Marivaux's comedies (which played in 
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many German states) and its development in the theory and practice of the rührende 
Lustspiel and bürgerliche Trauerspiel by Gellert and Lessing between 1745 and 1755. 
 In her article titled "Literary Empfindsamkeit and Nervous Sensibility in 
Eighteenth-Century Germany" (2001), Catherine J. Minter also links Enlightenment 
anthropology – defining the term with Platner as "Körper und Seele in ihren 
gegenseitigen Verhältnissen, Einschränkungen und Beziehungen zusammen betrachte[t]" 
– to sensibility (Platner xvii). The analysis acknowledges shared language between the 
moral and physical spheres: "for example, the word Empfindsamkeit in its moral sense 
signifies the quality of being easily affected by emotional influences; in its physical 
sense, it denotes physiological (nervous) sensibility" (Minter, "Literary Empfindsamkeit" 
1017). Using words such as zücken, rühren, zittern, and reizen, the article adeptly looks 
at the positive sides of Empfindsamkeit as well as its critique, at the weakness and illness 
in Empfindelei as well as the active vigor of feeling, and at the positive elements of 
sympathy. The study proves insightful – the text includes numerous references to non-
canonical authors such as Caroline von Wolzogen, Christiane Benedikte Naubert, and 
Karl Theodor Beck – but Minter primarily references literary sources published after 
1770 and uses Albrecht von Haller's physiology textbook (1788 German edition cited, 
orig. 1747 Latin) as her reference for the language of neurology (Primae lineae 
physiologiae). The essay focuses on Empfindsamkeit during the period of its critique, i.e. 
after 1770, and except for a mention of Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von 
G*** (1747), avoids the pre-1770 discourse of sensibility and anthropology in 
physiological and literary works.  
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Physical sensibility can be directly linked to anthropology through earlier texts 
purposely written to explore the physiological and philosophical basis of the mind/body 
interrelationship. This includes neurological function that is so important in discussing 
physical sensibility. The historical record typically emphasizes the monumental effect of 
Haller's discoveries in neurology, regarding him as a "towering figure" in the negotiation 
of meaning of the nexus of body and soul (Porter, Greatest Benefit 250). Between 1740 
and 1760, Johanna Geyer-Kordesch notes, however, other philosophers and physicians, 
including the University of Halle students and later instructors Johann Gottlob Krüger, 
Johann August Unzer, Ernst Anton Nicolai, and Georg Friedrich Meier, provided 
significant theories about physical sensibility (Geyer-Kordesch, "Georg Ernst Stahl" 
368). The earliest of their publications include Krügers dissertation De sensatione (1742) 
and the second part of his Naturlehre, the Physiologie, oder Lehre von dem Leben und 
der Gesundheit der Menschen (1743), with 250 pages on sensation, covering topics from 
irritability to the five senses to the imagination (Krüger, Physiologie 519-769). Krüger 
develops a vocabulary of physical sensibility in German. His terminology is likely based 
on the work of physiologists before him, from Thomas Willis to Georg Ernst Stahl and 
Friedrich Hoffmann. These words represent a reference point on neurological function 
and include general terms surrounding sensation, such as Empfindung, Empfindlichkeit, 
and empfinden (Physiologie 540). Minter has noted that "Typically, verbs that describe 
nervous and vital processes in the physiological and psychological literature of the time 
also play a starring role in accounts of emotional processes in the literature of sensibility" 
("Literary Empfindsamkeit" 1017). She goes on to cite German verbs from Haller's 
Physiologie (1747 Latin, 11759-1776 German). Already in 1743, Krüger's Naturlehre 
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(vol. 2) uses verbs to explain neurological function that appear in the literature of 
sensibility to explain psychological processes, including berühren (Krüger, Physiologie 
542), rühren (Physiologie 610), zittern (Physiologie 563), and erschüttern (Physiologie 
570, cf. Minter 1017). 
 Novelists in Germany began to use elements from the vocabulary of sensibility 
and anthropology to define the human as a moral being, for example in Schnabel's Insel 
Felsenburg (1731-1743). Brockes's "Bewährtes Mittel, Gemüths=Bewegungen zu stillen" 
(21730) in poetry and Bernd's Eigene Lebensbeschreibung (1738) in autobiography 
helped create these historical discourses. Frank Baasner has shown that the physical and 
moral elements of sensibility develop historically in France, for example, and shape the 
modern discourse in the seventeenth century. The German discourses of body, soul, 
morality, and literature must be seen within this European context. Richardson's Pamela 
(1740-1741) represents one of the best examples of interplay between themes of dualistic 
human nature, sensibility, and morality in the novel (next to La vie de Marianne). 
Through early translations into German and a reception by a broad readership, it 
conveyed these connections. My reading of Pamela could easily be extended to Clarissa, 
but my point has been made.47 Other German novelists contemporary with Schnabel also 
employ this nexus. 
                                                 
47 I intend to develop this argument in a future article. Raymond Stephanson provides the groundwork for 
such a study. See Raymond Stephanson, "Richardson's 'Nerves': The Physiology of Sensibility in Clarissa," 
Journal of the History of Ideas 49.2 (1988): 267-285. 
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Sensibility and Body/Soul Discourse in Loën's Contemporaneous Novel 
 The gradual nature of the combination of body/soul discourse with morality in 
German fiction is evident in Johann Michael von Loën's Der redliche Mann am Hofe 
(1740), which I address briefly. Loën uses the literary model of the speculum, a narrative 
designed to train a ruler, to structure Count Rivera's story. Each chapter of the novel 
contributes either to Rivera's biography, or recounts a moralized life story of a person he 
has encountered during his adventures. Sensibility is an underlying theme of these 
adventures, especially when the topic centers on love or the emotions. In the biography of 
Baron Riesenburg, for example, the author employs the physiological vocabulary of 
sensibility. Riesenburg, disguised as a man of limited means named Rossan, meets the 
beautiful young noblewoman Miss Thurris, who is traveling to a noblewoman's cloister to 
become a novitiate. Distressed by the idea of the young woman being locked away (and 
desirous to personally liberate her from a commitment to the abbey and to a celibate life), 
Riesenburg questions her and discovers her own ambivalence about being confined to a 
convent. When they meet in a church, a place of dedication to god, he shows that spiritual 
dedication can be a part of lay life by proposing marriage. Like Des Grieux and Manon in 
Prèvost's Manon Lescaut (1731), Riesenburg asks for Miss Thurris's dedication to him:  
[B]leiben sie denn für mich in der Welt und lieben mich. Diese Erklärung seßte das gute Kind in 
eine ungemeine Bewegung: sie reichte mir mit Zittern ihre rechte Hand und sagte mir mit dem 
allerernstlichen Blick: ich beschwöre sie bey dem Gott, den wir beyde hier verehren, daß sie 
meiner Neigung, die ich ihnen auch wider meinen Willen zeige, nicht mißbrauchen. An statt ihr 
darauf zu antworten, neigte ich meinen Mund, und küste ihre Hand: sie zog solche mit ihrem 
Schnuptuch in die Höh, wischte damit die Thränen ab, welche ihr in die Augen drangen, und bat, 
ich solte mich in acht nehmen, weil man uns beobachten könte (Loën 141-142).  
 
Her response of trembling and tears demonstrate a bodily response to a situation of 
emotional and sexual tension. Riesenburg effects her commitment to a secular life and 
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aids her process of self-definition by encouraging her self-determination and by revealing 
his ability to financially support her in marriage. 
 Physical sensibility also plays a role in the love triangle of the lead character, 
Count Rivera. As the king's chamberlain, the count receives orders to persuade Countess 
Monteras, a woman he himself loves, to become queen. When the king becomes 
suspicious that Rivera may have a secret love pact with Monteras, the ruler banishes the 
count to Rozzomonte, a distant fortress. Countess Monteras, horrified at hearing Count 
Rivera had been removed from the city, suffers trembling limbs and a sudden strong 
fever (reprint cited here wrongly paginated, second occurrence 96-97). Because she loves 
Rivera and has rejected the king, she blames herself for Rivera's troubles. Her sense of 
moral responsibility expresses itself in physical sickness. The countess had been 
submitted to a bloodletting to aid her illness, but nonetheless experienced a rising fever 
that drove her to unconsciousness (101). Through a medication used to subdue fever and 
agitation of the blood, Countess Monteras recovers her consciousness. The medicine 
mitigates the physical symptoms of her illness. By comparison, news of Count Rivera's 
well-being – a moral impetus – provides the means for her emotional and physical 
recovery:  
Der Herßog versicherte dabey seine kranke Base, daß er den Grafen an einen so guten und sichern 
Ort [Rozzomonte] hätte bringen lassen, daß er nirgendwo besser seyn könnte.  
Diese Nachrichten waren der betrübten Gräfin so angenehm, daß solche ihr besser, als alle 
bisherige Arzneyen zuschlugen: ihre Augen wurden munterer, ihre schier erblaßte Wangen 
durchzogen wieder ein wenig Farbe: ihre Lippen rührten sich zu einer holden Schmeicheley: sie 
ergriff den Herßog bey der Ha[n]d und führte solche mit einer zarten Bewegnung nach dem Mund 
(104).  
 
Her investment in the moral responsibility for the Count's life affects her physical health. 
 Countess Monteras's recovery at the news of Count Rivera's safety approximates 
Mr. B's recovery from a fever when Pamela returns at his request to his country estate. 
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Though the anthropological system works similarly – worry over lost love provokes 
illness, and evidence proving no loss of love promotes recovery – the motivations of the 
actors are different in each work. Countess Monteras's illness is a response to her concern 
for Rivera's well-being and an expression of personal anguish over a fear of losing him. 
Mr. B's loss of love reveals less magnanimity, as he solely wants Pamela back in his 
presence. Overall, though Loën describes the sensibility of his characters using the 
interdependence of body and soul, it remains episodic in Der redliche Mann am Hofe. 
The interrelationship of body, soul, and sensibility is much more prevalent and more 
focused in Richardson's first novel. Because both novels were published in the same year, 
and Richardson published Pamela at the end of 1740, the appearance of a similar scene in 
the two novels may be a trope of debilitation and nervous sensibility prevalent in 
European literature at the time. Neither novel represents an example of the 
anthropological subgenre, but both use the discourse of body and soul and sensibility to 
represent and analyze the increased interest and attention to the emotions and nerves in 
representing moral life. 
 Reading the physiological explanations of human nature in Cheyne's 
correspondence or Krüger's Naturlehre alongside novels by Richardson and Loën, 
respectively, should serve neither to equate nor to rank their importance as sources of 
knowledge about humankind. In their own way, the examples of writing in natural 
science and literature cited here are asking the same important questions of the long 
eighteenth century. Both forms of knowledge seek answers to questions about how the 
human psyche functions and how body and soul interact in human emotions and ethics. 
To answer these questions, physiologists build on the organic functioning of the human 
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body, especially the system of neurology proposed by Willis. At the same time, writers of 
literature, philosophy, and theology draw on the introspective contemplation of Descartes 
and the Pietists. Reading physiological, philosophical, and literary works from a specific 
historical and geographic context parallel to each other informs and accentuates 
important themes that define human experience. In Germany of the mid-Eighteenth 
century, the interplay of body and soul via the nerves shapes human morality. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
PHYSICAL SENSIBILITY AND THE PERFORMANCE OF HUMAN NATURE 
 
 For eighteenth-century German writers, one of the starting points for talking about 
the nexus of body/soul discourse and morality was located in feeling and the exploration 
of the sources, nature, and limits of the emotions. In the preceding chapter, novels by 
Schnabel, Loën, and Richardson demonstrated the intwinement of body and soul: 
corporal sensations make the soul readable just as physical states can affect psychological 
mood. Contemporaneous with the publication of Richardson's novels (1740-1753), 
sensibility experienced a semantic shift. Gerhard Sauder argues that the English term 
gradually moved from the French sentiment (thought, opinion, or sense) to an 
increasingly emotion-based sentimentality, including moral feeling (3).  
Today, Pamela is classified as empfindsame Literatur. Beginning in the 1730's 
and 1740's, the novels of Prèvost, Marivaux, and Richardson helped shape the German 
discourse on sensibility. Only gradually did German writers develop their own 
vocabulary to describe sensibility. The term empfindsam first appeared around 1750, but 
it did not become popular until after Lessing’s 1768 translation of "sentimental" in 
Sterne's A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy. Similarly, the term 
Empfindsamkeit dates to a letter from 1757 by Louise Adelgunde Victorie Gottsched. 
Like the term sensibility, Empfindsamkeit combines the elements of thought and feeling. 
According to Sauder, it refers to a "Gefühlmäßiges als Intellektuell-Moralisches" (4). 
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Based on German lexicographical history, it appears that the history of the term 
Empfindsamkeit follows French and English predecessors.  
Yet German texts also prepared the German reception of sensibility from England 
and France. In his Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre (1691), Christian Thomasius placed 
sensation at the center of his epistemology, arguing that physical sensibility provided the 
impetus for knowledge formation (103-104). Observation and experience superceded 
theoretical speculation as sources of reliable conclusions and of true knowledge 
(Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre 275-276, 252-260; cf. H. M. Wolff 30). Georg Ernst Stahl 
similarly argued for the primacy of sensation as a source of knowledge about the natural 
world. In his Negotium Otiosum (1720), Stahl viewed objects as dynamic entities. 
Knowledge production therefore required observation and interpretation of the 
expressions and signs of bodily processes, including physiological, emotional, kinetic, 
and mental change (Geyer-Kordesch, "Georg Ernst Stahl" 323-325). Additional 
contributors to a German discourse on sensibility included the moral weeklies from the 
1720's and their "culture of feeling," which Sauder draws from Wolfgang Martens's study 
Die Botschaft der Tugend (Sauder 32). Pietist vocabulary from the early eighteenth 
century also contributed to the language of Empfindsamkeit, as August Langen's 
Wortschatz des deutschen Pietismus argues (cf. Blackall 407-408), although the exact 
relationship is disputed (Sauder 8-11). While my purpose here is not to give a detailed 
analysis of sensibility's German sources, some acknowledgement is due. German sources 
of sensibility created a fertile environment for the reception of English and French 
philosophical theories on sensibility from John Locke's Essay Concerning Human 
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Understanding (1690) through Richardson's trilogy of novels (1740-1753) to Rousseau's 
Julie, ou la nouvelle Hèloïse (1761).  
Continuing the investigation of the intersection of body/soul discourse with 
morality from chapter three, the present chapter traces the history of dualistic and 
sensible human nature in three German novels published from 1747 to 1767. Christian 
Fürchtegott Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G** (1747/1748) reveals a 
multi-faceted use of themes of body and soul to represent and motivate moral action. 
Johann Timotheus Hermes' Miß Fanny Wilkes (1766) provides evidence of how this 
discourse had entered popular language to describe specific types of mental illness such 
as melancholia. Finally, Christoph Martin Wieland's Agathon shifts the concentration of 
the body/soul discourse from the popular to the philosophical realm. Letters and essays 
by Gellert and Wieland viewed alongside their novels help substantiate their participation 
in the creation of a unique discourse about body and soul. Although biographical details 
about Gellert's health or Wieland's reading habits, for example, do not allow us to draw 
concrete conclusions about their position on the body/soul nexus or morality, they do 
enlighten readers about the authors' attitudes regarding this discourse. Tracing the 
evolution of the body/soul conjunction in novels shows the constitutive role of sensibility 
in the birth of the anthropological novel. Physical sensibility plays a role here. 
 
Gellert, Hypochondria, and Moral Cures 
 Gellert, like Richardson, personally experienced symptoms of an anxiety-induced 
illness that restricted his physical and intellectual pursuits. While Cheyne's letters 
revealed fairly specific symptoms in Richardson's complaints, Gellert provided more 
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general information about his illness in his correspondence to friends and family. In the 
spirit of his age, he termed his illness hypochondria. In tandem with the essay "Von den 
Trostgründen wider ein sieches Leben," the letters not only define hypochondria, but also 
propose physical and intellectual cures. Dating from 1742 to 1766, Gellert's surviving 
correspondence shapes the German discourse on hypochondria twenty to thirty years 
prior to its popular discussion in works of the late Enlightenment. These include Karl 
Philipp Moritz's Magazine of Experimental Psychology (1783-1793) and, as Robert 
Tobin has argued, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's novel William Meister's 
Apprenticeship (1796).  
 Before turning to Gellert's letters, it is important to note that hypochondria in the 
eighteenth century meant more than it does in our current common usage. Merriam-
Webster defines the term as an extreme depression of mind or spirits stemming from 
imagined physical ailments. The eighteenth-century usage extended this term to include 
numerous disorders with physical and moral causes. Zedler's Universal-Lexicon surveys 
German use of hypochondria in the early Enlightenment. Published in 1739, the 
hypochondria entry begins as follows: 
Hypochondrisches Übel, Milz=Kranckheit, Milz=S[e]uche, Milz=Weh, 
Milz=Beschwerung...ist eine beschwerliche Kranckheit, welche wegen ihrer vermischten und 
widerwärtigen Zufälle, von denen Alten ein Gegen=Streit derer natürlichen Verrichtungen 
genennet wird. Und weil Hippocrates eine dergleichen Kranckheit unter dem Namen der 
Milz=Blehung oder Milz Geschwulst beschrieben, hat man daher Anlaß genommen, die erste 
Schuld alles solches Ubels der Milz beyzulegen. Insgemein wird es die Kranckheit derer 
Gelehrten genennet, weil diese, durch ihr vieles Sitzen, den Bauch für und für drücken, wodurch 
die Bewegung derer Eingeweide verhindert und die Verstopffungen verursachet werden. Es giebet 
in dieser Beschwerung vornemlich drey Grade.... Der erste Grad ist, wenn die Patienten nur über 
einige Angst klagen, bey welcher sich aber doch bald Verstopffung des Leibes, bald 
abwechselndes Grimmen[,] bald Aufblehung derer Weichen findet. Die Patienten sind im übrigen 
noch gesund, haben Appetit zum Essen, Schlaffen und stehen ihren Verrichtungen noch vor. Es 
fehlet ihnen sonsten nichts, als daß sie nur bißweilen eine Angst bekommen, und wissen nicht 
warum und woher....Der andere Grad gegenwärtiger Kranckheit ist, wenn ausser die angeführten 
Zufälle die Angst grösser und öffterer kommt, die Patienten kurtzen und schweren Athem kriegen, 
und dem Hertzklopffen unterworffen sind, als wenn ein Gewächse in dem Hertze wäre, wodurch 
die Angst dergestalt arg und schlimm wird, daß sie Tag und Nacht anhält, und dahero Traurigkeit 
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entstehet, die Patienten alle Gesellschafften fliehen, und, wenn sie nur alleine seyn und 
schwermüthigen Gedancken nachhängen können, zufrieden sind. Bey diesen allen aber haben sie 
doch noch ihren Verstand. Indessen sind sie nicht beständig mit gedachten Zufällen geplaget, 
sondern haben manchmahl ziemlich Zeit Ruhe, und behalten nur die Zufälle des ersten Grades. 
Etliche Wochen sind sie gut, hernach aber gehet es wieder an. Und ob sie schon noch zur Zeit 
ihren Verstand haben, so stellen sie sich doch die geringsten Kleinigkeiten, als die wichtigsten 
Sachen vor. Der dritte Grad der Milz=Kranckheit entstehet endlich, wenn Melancholey dazu 
kommet, welche sich offtmahls in die Tollsucht verwandelt. Diese ist aber entweder alleine 
zugegen, da die Patienten noch starck sind, oder mit dem abzehrenden Fieber, welches Marasmus 
heisset, und dem höchsten Abnehmen des Leibes vergesellschafftet, und machet also den höchsten 
Grad der Milz=Sucht. 48  (Zedler 13:1479) 
 
Hypochondria thus represents a long-term debilitating condition with varying degrees and 
combinations of symptoms. Its principal causes are inactivity, poor digestion, and the 
imagination. In its multifaceted nature, the disease remains highly specific to the 
experience of the individual. The term thus becomes a kind of catch-all for debilitating 
mental illness such that when someone like Gellert does not explain his symptoms, the 
appellation hypochondria is inherently vague. Authors attributed hypochondria and the 
equivalent in women, hysteria, to wide-ranging physical and mental sources and 
symptoms (Tobin 100-102). 
One can assume that by the time Gellert diagnosed his hypochondria in 1742, he 
was familiar with elements of the hypochondria discourse outlined in Zedler. Gellert may 
have gained knowledge about the nature of hypochondria through his study and work at 
the University of Leipzig. Under the care of his physician, Johann Tilling, who 
specialized in mineral bath cures often prescribed for mental illness, he traveled to 
Karlsbad multiple times with hope of a reprieve. In addition, Gellert certainly was 
acquainted with the hypochondria discourse from literature, such as fellow Leipziger 
Adam Bernd's 1738 autobiography Eigene Lebensbeschreibung or Theodor Johann 
Quistorp's 1745 play Der Hypochondrist. Quistorp's comedy was printed in Leipzig as 
                                                 
48 Spelling, punctuation, and orthography are maintained throughout. 
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part of Johann Christoph Gottsched's multi-volume collection, Die deutsche Schaubühne 
(Tobin 101). As a fervent reader of Samuel Richardson's novels, he may have gained 
further exposure to the discourse of nervous illness in Pamela (trans. 1742), Clarissa 
(trans. beginning in 1748), and Sir Charles Grandison (trans. 1754-55). 
 In his correspondence to friends and family, Gellert initially described how his 
nervous illness interrupted his life. As early as June 1742, the Leipzig poet directly 
complained about how hypochondria restricted his work, excusing himself for a poorly 
written poem and canceling a meeting with Gottsched (Gellert, Briefwechsel I:6). The 
malaise limited activities in his private life as well, preventing him from attending family 
events such as his sister's wedding in January 1746 (Briefwechsel I:17). Though he 
depended on friends for psychological support as "Schwärmer in der Freundschaft"and 
for consultation about professional opportunities, he distanced himself from marriage 
(Briefwechsel 1:21-22). Defying his mother's wish that he would marry, Gellert deplored 
hypochondria and marriage equally. Gellert explained to his sister: "Die Mama würde 
von Freuden weinen und ich vor Betrübniß, daß ich eine Frau hätte. Zur Hypochondrie 
auch noch eine Frau; das wäre zu viel Kreuz. Ich kann das eine allein kaum ertragen" 
(Briefwechsel 1:16 [14 January 1746]). Marriage and hypochondria both represented 
burdens to Gellert. Ironically, other members of society might have viewed each 
“burden” positively: proponents of the nuclear family would have embraced marriage, 
and those who saw hypochondria as a unique capacity to feel may have welcomed the 
nervous affliction (Mullan). In most of Gellert's surviving early letters, the hypochondria 
was a personal diagnosis and the symptoms went virtually unexplained. With resignation, 
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the poet reluctantly accepted his fate to suffer a debilitated body and its restriction of his 
intellectual activity. 
 In the same year that the first volume of Das Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von 
G*** (1747) appeared, Gellert also published an essay on the consolation for a life 
plagued by illness: "Von den Trostgründen wider ein sieches Leben." Gellert explores 
here the causes, diagnosis, and treatment of sickness. On one level, the essay functions as 
an apology for religion. Despite the multiple causes of illness and the varied effectiveness 
of treatments, Gellert argues that religion offers the virtuous solace for life's suffering. 
(Gellert, "Trostgründen" 75). The text uses moral characters, a device familiar to 
Enlightenment readers from the moral weeklies, to reach a broad audience and to make 
the moral immediate.  
More than representing a moral code, "Trostgründen" also describes human 
nature. Both psychological and physical factors can induce illness. Psychological origins 
of ill health may include poor judgment, haste, stress, uncontrolled or sudden emotion 
(anger, revenge), debauchery, disorder, or foolishness. Examples of physical factors 
include a medication that is rejected by the body or the "careless" (i.e. immoderate ?) use 
of alcohol ("Trostgründen" 24). According to Gellert's conception, the causes of illness 
stem from the will as choices based either on flawed knowledge (the medication) or on 
moral turpitude (all other examples). And individuals should be held accountable for the 
moral outcome of their actions. Setting aside the epidemiological and physiological 
causes of sickness, Gellert confronts human nature and focuses on correcting moral 
foibles (26).  
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Proper diagnosis of illness requires self-knowledge, even though self-observation 
may not be as easy as it appears. Obstacles to self-knowledge are plentiful. The human 
ego can blind reason, some causes of life events are indeterminable, and ultimately, 
anxiety frequently causes infirmity (24-25). Thus, the essay intimates that the soul affects 
the body and that the body affects the soul. Gellert explains:  
Wer aus natürlicher Schwermuth und Furchtsamkeit die Leiden seines Körpers für selbstgemachte 
Plagen und für den Lohn seiner Thorheiten ansieht, da es doch Folgen der Beschaffenheit seiner 
schwachen Natur, oder göttliche Schickungen sind, der wird die Bangigkeit seiner Seele eben so 
wenig bestreiten, als ein Mensch, der durch sein wallendes Blut in eine furchtsame Einbildung im 
Schlafe geräth, und doch glaubt, daß er von bösen Geister beunruhiget werde. (25) 
 
Here the author also acknowledges providence as a possible source of illness, but overall 
the text focuses on illness resulting from human failures. Human folly contributes 
significantly to self-induced physical suffering, yet many people fail to recognize the true 
cause of their ailments and disease. 
 The essay aims to curb these human missteps through virtue and religion while 
acknowledging that religion provides different degrees of solace to different people. Here 
Gellert offers a brief look at symptoms that can plague the hypochondriac. These may 
include a pervasive fear that provokes a bodily sense of inescapable restriction. The 
hypochondriac may be plagued by melancholy, or given over to a debauched imagination 
(65). As constructed by Gellert, hypochondria combines symptoms of nervous anxiety, 
melancholy, and enthusiasm. Trostgründen regards hypochondria as a nervous disorder, 
i.e. as located in the body and as an ailment incurable by religion. Hypochondria 
represents a moral problem because the souls of the afflicted cannot be calmed or turned 
to virtue. The analysis of nervous conditions in the essay diagnoses individual symptoms 
to facilitate individual moral edification. In an effort to maintain the image of a 
homogeneous society of virtue, the essay excludes the morally corrupt individual as a 
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pathogen. For the pedagogue Gellert, hypochondria demonstrates the nexus of body, soul, 
and morality. It remains worthy of representation, even when there is no moral cure. 
What Gellert outlines in this seminal essay, he utilizes in his novel that represents 
nervous disorders as a problem for both the individual and society. 
 In letters from the 1740's and early 1750's, Gellert periodically bemoaned his own 
state of health. Until 1753, the letters rarely reveal any details about his condition, 
however. Perhaps this had to do with the medial event of the letter during the 
Enlightenment. Correspondents frequently shared private letters with family and friends, 
even making copies for further distribution. In this way, letter writing involved 
participation in the public sphere (Arto-Haumacher 70). Thus, Gellert may have 
consciously used his illness to excuse himself from work or social functions, but may 
have only occasionally revealed its nature in a self-reflective manner. While the surviving 
correspondence refers to physical indisposition fairly frequently, the contours of what 
constituted hypochondria remains vague into the 1750's. 
 Two of Gellert's friends provide insight into his illness. In Johann Fürchtegott 
Gellerts Leben (1774), Johann Andreas Cramer dated a first highpoint of Gellert's 
ongoing struggle with hypochondria in the year 1752. Cramer notes that Gellert followed 
the common prescription for hypochondria to eat a moderate diet and exercise, but 
suffered debilitating anxiety and nightmares. The effects were not only psychological, but 
also physical: "He suffered frequently under anxiety, and the powers of his spirit were 
stifled through the heaviest bodily suffering in all of his activities. He seldom 
experienced the vivacity, which accompanies a healthy and free circulation of blood and 
bodily fluids. An extraordinary affliction spread from the most hidden source of his 
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debilitating life over his entire spirit" (Cramer 91). Cramer's account invokes 
temperamental theory and implies that anxiety interrupted the circulation of blood and 
other fluids. In turn, the debilitated body promoted sullenness; using temperamental 
theory to interpret this change, the slowed circulation hampered flow of blood to the 
brain and thereby caused the hypochondria. Thus, Cramer's biography suggests the 
intwinement of the material and the metaphysical. 
 A letter from Carl Wilhelm Christian von Craussen that responded to Gellert's 
symptoms is also especially insightful. It confirms Cramer's description of Gellert's 
anxiety as a "Brust Beschwerung" and reassures him that the malady will subside with 
time. More importantly, von Craussen prescribes physical cures common at the time: 
drinking diluted white wine instead of heavy beer, limiting sedentary office work, riding 
a chamber horse, and periodic bloodlettings. His treatment also recommends 
psychological cures, such as limiting contemplation and writing; avoiding poetry 
composition, which exhausts the body; and reading Moliere's satires of the medical 
establishment (Gellert, Briefwechsel 1:122-123). These may have included Le médecin 
malgré lui (1668) and Le malade imaginaire (1673). Therefore, von Craussen directed 
Gellert to "appropriate" objects of contemplation and proposed literature as an 
imaginative cure for his friend's nervous disorder. 
 Years before, Gellert had tried psychological cures to moderate his illness. In a 
letter to Johann Adolf Schlegel from February 1749, he playfully tried to treat his 
condition: 
Mein lieber Schlegel 
Ich bin krank. Kann man sich denn etwan gesund schreiben, wenn man an Sie schreibt? Sonst 
konnte ich mich zuweilen gesund lesen; aber itzt hilft es auch nicht mehr. Ich habe gestern alle 
vier Theile von den Beyträgen hervor gesucht, ich las insonderheit Ihre Stücken, ich las so gar 
meine eignen, und ich blieb immer noch hypochondrisch, immer noch schwergeistig. Ja, ja, der 
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Witzt mag freylich nicht für alles helfen. Wenn ichs gleich versuchen wollte, ob ich mich an 
Carolinchen gesund küssen könnte. Was meynen Sie? Es kann mir doch wenigstens nichts 
schaden, und Sie verlieren nichts dabey. Ich habe mir immer sagen lassen, daß ein Kuß von einem 
lieben Mädchen was recht balsamisches seyn soll. Ach was müssen nicht tausend, nicht noch 
einmal tausend, für Stärkungen geben! Ich will es also immer wagen; u. Sie sollen der erste seyn, 
dem ich meine Gesundheit melden will, wenn das Mittel anschlägt. Was thut man nicht der 
Gesundheit wegen, u. was läßt sich nicht ein guter Freund gefallen, um dem andern dazu zu 
verhelfen! Machen Sie sich keine Sorge, es soll keine Gewonheit daraus werden: Sie sollen auch 
nicht dabey vergessen werden: Ach, will ich sprechen, noch eins, Carlinchen, nur noch eins, nicht 
für mich, für Herr Schlegeln, für den lieben Herrn Schlegel. Sehn Sie, so küßt Herr Schlegel! – – 
Doch nein, er küßt nicht ganz so: aber so – – Ich will gleich gehen, mein lieber Schlegel, denn es 
wird über dem Schreiben immer schlimmer. Itzt trift mirs recht ans Herze. Leben Sie wohl, 
Brüderchen!   
Ihr lieber Gellert (Briefwechsel 1:37) 
The letter begins with the author's admission that he is sick. He then plays with possible 
diversions, noting that reading fails to alter his current condition, and wonders if writing 
to Schlegel might provide him the peace of mind he seeks. In his letter, Gellert talks 
about writing as a medium for self-knowledge and exploration at the same time as he 
performs this process of self-reflection. His reflections emphasize the performative aspect 
of identity formation and literary communication (cf. Reinlein 33-34). Like he does in a 
letter of 4 July 1745 to Wilhelmine Steinauer, Gellert demonstrates in his letter to 
Schlegel that personal reflection and a playful imagination are as important as 
communicating with the addressee (Briefwechsel 1:11-13).  
The letter at first seems to playfully flirt with Caroline, like a love letter, but more 
likely represents a cult of friendship between Gellert, Caroline Schlegel, and Johann A. 
Schlegel. It is a variation on the "Wollust um das Gefühl der Freundschaft" he offers to 
Pastor Johann Jacob Mack (Gellert, Briefwechsel 1:22 [Early 1748]). The kissing fantasy 
invokes the imagination for a playful experiment that treats the depressed psychological 
state with desire. Certainly this has homoerotic overtones, but that is not my focus here. 
This is an egocentric therapy with unforeseen or at least postponed closure, evidenced by 
the frequency and manner of kissing ("was müssen nicht tausend, nicht noch einmal 
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tausend [Küssen sein]"; "nicht ganz so: aber so"). Gellert's nervous state with its tendency 
to periodic fits requires physical closeness, or at least imagined closeness, to balance his 
spiritual condition. Comparing his earlier protestations against marriage to this fantasy, 
he abhors the idea of a relationship but idealizes momentary rapture. 
 In Trostgründen, imagination is also key. When the imagination fails to directly 
quell a physical pain, the next best therapy is to imagine an idea that will create a 
pleasing effect in the soul. When reason fails to console, imagination is an alternative. 
Citing an example of a miser, Gellert explains how disappointment of business losses 
might be subdued through the hope of even greater gains. Thus a feeling of joy could 
counteract despair with the anticipation of an imagined reprieve. 
 Gellert repeatedly attempted to "write himself well" and "read himself well." 
Activating extreme emotions through the imagination provided a respite from his 
hypochondria, if only briefly. While "reading himself well" failed in the letter just 
discussed, several years later the moral actions of Richardson's Sir Charles Grandison 
overwhelmed Gellert's fantasy and induced a state of enthusiasm lasting several days. In 
reading Richardson's novel, Gellert generated a feeling that provided momentary 
transcendence from the weight of his bodily pains. This was an example of what he had 
argued in the "Consolation" essay, that when pain could not be quelled, the sufferer must 
create a joy of greater magnitude to supplant the pain. This may have been what he aimed 
for with the kissing fantasy letter, a friendly and erotic interlude that through play 
elevated his soul momentarily out of the realm of physical suffering. 
 Gellert’s case history of hypochondria provides evidence for selected physical and 
psychological theories practiced in the German states at the middle of the eighteenth 
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century. In a manner characteristic of the Enlightenment he sought both to entertain and 
educate his readers. Writing and reading engaged the imagination in the solution of moral 
dilemmas. Discourses of the material and the metaphysical shape these goals in Leben 
der schwedischen Gräfin von G***. 
 
The Body/Soul Discourse and Reader Sympathy in Gellert's 
Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** 
The moral program of Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** derives from life 
experiences that invite reader identification (Meyer-Krentler 90). Orphaned as a child, the 
titular heroine receives an exemplary moral education at home. In the development of the 
psychological action, the first part of the novel details the Countess's confrontation with a 
series of moral challenges: adultery, incest, homocide, mental illness, and bigamy. 
Maintaining a focus on the conflict between the individual and society, the second part 
reveals how her closest friends surmount their own confrontations with power and social 
mores. According to Bernd Witte, the novel depicts immoral relationships as negative 
examples for the bourgeois readership to reify marriage as a defining institution of 
bourgeois life (Witte 121-123). Thus in the first book, the marriage of the Graf and 
Gräfin contrasts with the Prinz von S.'s proposition to the Gräfin to have an affair, with 
the Graf's early liaison with Caroline, with the incestuous marriage of their children 
Carlson and Mariane, and with Dormund's murder of Carlson to possess Mariane.  
These comparisons serve to persuade the reader of the ubiquity and force of 
virtue. In Der andere Roman: Gellerts »Schwedische Gräfin«, Von der aufklärerischen 
Propaganda gegen den »Roman« zur empfindsamen Erlebnisdichtung (1974), Eckert 
Meyer-Krentler argues that the first part of Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von 
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G** reshapes elements of the gallant novel and moral narration for moral storytelling. 
The novel adapts three key kinds of narrative techniques from existing prose forms. First, 
in a variation on the gallant novel, the Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G** 
functionalizes an episodic story to illustrate the conversion of vice to virtue (the Gräfin 
resists repeated advances from the Prinz von S** with statements of her commitment to 
her husband) (Meyer-Krentler 86). Second, the Countess narrates the triumph over 
progressively greater challenges of vice to confirm the greater power of virtue (she 
informs Carlson and Mariane that they are siblings and cares for Mariane after Dormund 
confesses that he murdered Carlson) (57, 87-88). Third, the novel provokes the reader to 
sympathize with the fictional characters, to analyze the characters' struggles, and to 
pursue virtue (97-98). Meier-Krentler shows that the first section of the novel appeals to 
the reader claiming not only that the novel genre can represent moral content, but also 
argues rhetorically that a moral life is desirable.  
 On another level, Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G** depicts the intersection 
of an individual's moral existence with a discourse on body and soul in the description of 
human nature. It uses metaphors to describe that nature through the representation of 
emotion, especially love and suffering. By representing moral human action, the novel 
inherently includes the discourse of body and soul. In telling her life story, the Countess 
of G. uses a dualistic model of human nature. When describing her love for her second 
husband, Mr. R**, she ascribes this dualism to him: "Ich liebte ihn, wie ich aufrichtig 
versichern kann, ganz ausnehmend und so zärtlich als meinen ersten Gemahl. An 
Gemütsgaben war er ihm gleich, wo er ihn nicht noch in gewissen Stücken übertraf. Aber 
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an dem Äußerlichen kam er ihm nicht bei" (Gellert, Leben 37). This contrast of character 
illustrates the proper priority of soul over body in love. 
Yet the body is not to be neglected. The Countess of G. sometimes digresses from 
her story to philosophize about the reason why sentimental love decreases in marriage. 
She underscores the necessary balance between the physical and the intellectual aspects 
of love:  
Man denke ja nicht, weil wir die Wissenschaften liebten, daß wir an uns nur unsere Seelen geliebt 
hätten. Ich habe bei allen meinen Büchern über die metaphysische Geisterliebe nur lachen müssen. 
Der Körper gehört so gut als die Seele zu unserer Natur. Und wer uns beredet, daß er nichts als die 
Vollkommenheiten des Geistes an einer Person liebt, der redet entweder wider sein Gewissen, 
oder er weiß gar nicht, was er redet. Die sinnliche Liebe, die bloß auf den Körper geht, ist eine 
Beschäftigung kleiner und unfruchtbarer Seelen. Und die geistige Liebe, die sich nur mit den 
Eigenschaften der Seele gattet, ist ein Hirngespenste hochmütiger Schulweisen, die sich schämen, 
daß ihnen der Himmel einen Körper gegeben hat, den sie doch, wenn es von den Reden zu der Tat 
käme, um zehen Seelen nicht würden fahrenlassen. (38-39) 
 
The text outlines a two-fold pedagogic lesson on love. While sentimentality may decrease 
in marriage, the intensity of the relationship between partners can remain "fiery and 
lively" if both parties have a well-founded love. Together, the material and the 
metaphysical contribute to the completeness of this affection. According to the heroine, 
humans cannot, in fact, do not want to rid themselves of this dualistic existence. Nature 
condemns people to a life that combines sensuality and intellect. The reader is 
encouraged to embrace both aspects in pursuit of a moral life.  
 The text develops a dualistic perspective of human nature by using physiological 
metaphors to describe psychological states and processes. In her digression on the nature 
of love, the Countess argues for the possibility of romantic love over the length of a 
marriage. Through prudence and care, couples can survive the routine of marriage 
without smothering tender affection. Like the beating of the human heart, love can 
become mechanical, and even emotionally suffocating:  
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Viele können es nicht vertragen, wenn sie die Liebe verehelichter Personen so zärtlich 
abgeschildert sehen als die Liebe zwischen unverehelichten, weil man sieht, daß die meisten Ehen 
die Liebe eher auslöschen als vermehren. Doch solche Leute wissen nicht, was Klugheit und 
Behutsamkeit in der Ehe für Wunder tun können. Sie erhlalten die Liebe und befördern ihren 
Fortgang wie das Herz durch seine Bewegung den Umlauf des Geblüts. (38) 
 
Human emotion suffers when it devolves into a mechanical process. In a later passage, 
the narrator uses a metaphor of invasive therapy to describe how misfortune promotes 
understanding of good fortune. Like a vaccination, a bad experience provides a context to 
better appreciate a good one: 
Das Unglück, das uns zeither betroffen, hatte unsere Gemüter gleichsam aufgelöset, die Ruhe 
nunmehr desto stärker zu schmecken. Man dürfte fast sagen, wer lauter Glück hätte, der hätte gar 
keines. Es ist wohl wahr, daß das Unglück an und für sich nichts Angenehmes ist; allein es ist es 
doch in der Folge und in dem Zusammenhange. Wenigstens gleichet es den Arzneien, die unserm 
Körper einen Schmerz verursachen, damit er desto gesünder wird. (Leben 53) 
 
The waning hope for Carlson's recovery from sickness and the ultimate confirmation of 
his death plunges Mariane into despair. The torrential emotional experience gives way, 
however, to an ensuing calmness that proves much more satisfying for her simply 
because she is so much more responsive to sensations of all types. 
 Another way Gellert's characters pursue moral goodness is by balancing extremes, 
seen especially in the characters' reactions to incest between siblings. The background to 
this episode is brief. Before the count meets the Countess of G., he has fallen in love with 
a bourgeois woman, Caroline, who has borne their two children out of wedlock, a son 
Carlson and a daughter Mariane. The count has chosen not to marry his bourgeois lover 
because the royal court would not have assented. Caroline has ended their relationship. 
As a single mother, Caroline is forced to separate the children. Years later, at an abbey in 
the Netherlands, the soldier son unknowingly falls in love with his sister and they elope. 
The recognition of Carlson and Mariane's incestuous relationship, socially and religiously 
forbidden, shocks all involved. Anticipating a messy resolution to the conflict between 
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individual desire and social regulation, the countess reacts with a physical shudder and 
not just morally (43). Meanwhile, the unsuspecting Mariane exhibits signs of distress at 
the unexplainable and secretive silence of the Countess and their visitors. Confronted 
with knowledge of her transgression, Mariane faints. The psychological trauma weighs so 
heavily on her that she remains virtually unconscious for the remainder of the day.  
In the first edition of the novel, her condition is further exacerbated by the fact 
that she is pregnant (Leben 46, 157).49 Linking the fainting spell to pregnancy suggests a 
physical cause for a physical reaction. By eliminating this passage, the text relies on 
Mariane's psychological characterization to explain her blackout. This editing emphasizes 
more forcefully the influence of the soul on the body. Based on the psychosomatic 
representation of the Countess and Mariane, the novel acknowledges an interrelationship 
of the psychological states of worry and dread and of the physical effects of shuddering 
and fainting.  
 The denouement of the Mariane and Carlson subplot further links the physical and 
moral spheres. After Carlson dies in military service on the front, Mariane falls in love 
with Dormund, Carlson's friend from the army. In a final letter to Mariane, Carlson 
recommends Dormund as one person worthy of her love and thereby her instinctual 
attraction appears to be morally condoned '(52). The new marriage falters, however, 
because the friend's conscience plagues him for having poisoned Carlson in order to court 
Mariane. Feeling guilty for the murder, he exhibits psychopathic behavior, begins to 
neglect Mariane, and eventually stifles their relationship. Ultimately, the crisis of 
                                                 
49 Editor of the Reclam edition Jörg-Ulrich Fechner rationalizes the selection of the second edition on the 
grounds that all reprints in Gellert's time were based on the second edition. See Christian Fürchtegott 
Gellert, Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***, ed. Jörg-Ulrich Fechner, 2 ed. (Leipzig: Johann 
Wendler, 1750).Cited text p. 46, on the edition philology and text variations see p. 154-158, esp. note 33. 
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conscience results in physical sickness (55). His doctors warn him that he is near death; 
his dire physical and psychological state prompts his confession. The Countess describes 
this nexus of emotional torment and physical debilitation: 
Sein Ende schien immer näher herbeizukommen, und die Ärzte selbst kündigten es ihm an. Es war 
um Mitternacht, da er uns beide [Gräfin und Herr R**] zu sich rufen ließ. Er rang halb mit dem 
Tode. Alles mußte aus der Stube. Darauf fing er mit gebrochenen und erpreßten Worten an, sich 
und die Liebe auf das abscheulichste zu verfluchen. Gott wie war uns dabei zumute! Er nannte 
sich den größten Missetäter, den die Welt gesehen hätte. "Ich bin", schrie er "Carlsons Mörder. Ich 
hab ihm mit eigener Hand Gift beigebracht, um Marianen zu bekommen. Ich Unsinniger! Welche 
Gerechtigkeit, welch Urteil wartet auf mich! Ich bin verloren. Ich sehe ihn, ich sehe ihn! Bringt 
mich um", rief er wieder. Mein Mann redte ihm zu, er sollte sich besinnen, er würde in einer 
starken Phantasie gelegen haben. "Nein, nein", rief er, "es ist mehr als zu gewiß. Mein Gewissen 
hat mich lange genug gemartert. Ich bin der Mörder meines besten Freundes. Ich Barbar! Ich 
Bösewicht!" (55-56) 
 
The psychological release of admitting his crime provides him a physical reprieve from 
the unidentified illness. After a partial recovery, he chooses self-induced banishment, 
declares himself unworthy of pity, and dreams of earning forgiveness by dying in war as 
a soldier, of gaining moral absolution through physical sacrifice (57). In Dormund's case, 
the moral redemption of confession opens the way to physical recovery.  
 Dormund's declaration of guilt has an opposite effect on Mariane. The confession 
induces an emotional storm and she descends into a depression (56). The verbal 
communication has psychological and physical ramifications. Using a common medical 
treatment for psychological disorders, the Countess as Mariane's caretaker organizes two 
simultaneous bloodlettings (58). This therapy incorporates temperament theory, which 
proposes that the distribution of elementary fluids (black bile, yellow bile, phlegm, and 
blood) significantly affects an individual's psyche. By effecting a physical change, the 
heroine hopes to balance the bodily fluids and induce a psychological change: a decrease 
in agitation. In the end, however, the physical treatment of the patient's psychological 
state fails. While Enlightenment medicine viewed bloodletting as a key therapy to 
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remove toxins and balance the humoral system (Porter, "Health and Disease" 216), 
mechanical physicians such as Friedrich Hoffmann regarded this treatment as ineffective 
for ailments of psychological origin (Ingo Wilhelm Müller 232). Thus either because the 
countess provides an inappropriate treatment, or because the patient removes the 
bandages applied after the bloodlettings and weakens herself, Mariane dies. A primarily 
physical treatment fails to provide the desired moral effect: a psychological respite for 
Mariane. Her moral dilemma also requires a treatment of the soul to balance her state of 
health. 
 The Countess represents the principle of moral balance. Since her childhood, she 
has accepted bourgeois moral codes that promote love in marriage and has refused an 
extramarital affair with the prince. Faced with Dormund's crime, she again takes a middle 
position: "Wir mußten ihn als einen Mörder hassen; doch die allgemeine Menschenliebe 
verband uns auch zum Mitleiden" (Gellert, Leben 57). Her ability to humanly sympathize 
with Mariane's love for Carlson, despite their incestuous relationship, means that she 
must disavow Dormund's murderous act. But her sympathy for the crying Dormund, who 
signals repentance with an apology and the physical sign of tears, also demands 
recognition for his humanity. In her pursuit of virtue, she balances her physical, 
intellectual, and moral natures and attempts to return Mariane and Carlson to a life of 
moral equilibrium. They are mixed characters. While she condemns their actions, she 
empathizes with their suffering. This acknowledges their humanity, however fallible it 
might be, and expresses her own. 
 In his essay "Pro comoedia commovente" (1751, trans. "Abhandlung für das 
rührende Lustspiel" by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, 1755) Gellert cites sympathy as a key 
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principle in the composition of comedies, an innovative move. This apology for the 
rührende Lustspiel provides guidelines for a new comedic form. In doing so, it reveals 
the author's use of intersubstantial causation, i.e. causal interaction between humankind's 
physical and intellectual capacities, to create moral entertainment (cf. Zammito 44-49). 
More generally, the essay functions as a guide for the production of effective Enlightment 
literature. Comedy focuses on a recognizable action that evokes feeling and pathos 
(Gellert, "Abhandlung" 121, 123). The comedic text investigates the private lives of 
ordinary persons and their experiences of friendship, constancy, generosity, and gratitude 
(123, 127). By differentiating between a Posse (farce), which prompts the viewer/reader 
to laugh at the character's folly, and the rührende Lustspiel, which selectively contrasts 
laughing to pathos, Gellert argues for a new comedic subgenre that follows a natural 
voice to achieve edification (125-129). 
 The theory of feeling in the "Abhandlung für das rührende Lustspiel" focuses on 
how a play triggers viewer/reader empathy with a character's moral dilemma. Instead of 
describing the representation of anthropological concerns, it analyzes their function in the 
reception of a drama. This evocation is similar to the intent of the Leben der 
schwedischen Gräfin von G***: to edify the reader. Central to Gellert's definition of 
comedy is its pedagogical purpose: "[D]ie Komödie sei ein dramatisches Gedicht, 
welches Abschilderungen von dem gemeinen Privatleben enthalte, die Tugend anpreise 
und verschiedene Laster und Ungereimtheiten der Menschen auf eine scherzhafte und 
feine Art durchziehe" (120). The definition applies also to Gellert's conception of the 
moral novel despite obvious differences between the two genres. If rewritten for the 
novel, it would read: "Ein moralischer Roman ist ein episches Gedicht, welches 
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Abschilderungen von dem gemeinen Privatleben enthalte, die Tugend anpreise und 
verschiedene Laster und Ungereimtheiten der Menschen auf eine scherzhafte und feine 
Art durchziehe." (Italics mark my word substitutions in the previous sentence.) Though 
the Countess of G** begins her life in noble privilege, it applies to a greater extent to her 
middle-class life during her exile in Holland. The didacticism of the essay on the 
sentimental comedy incorporates overarching principles of enlightenment evident in the 
novel. 
 By juxtaposing bad and good, the author inspires pathos and heightens the 
reader/viewer's perception of moral qualities (125). This is most effective when the 
characters' morals motivate the action:  
Denn wenn dasjenige, was der Dichter, Glückliches oder Unglückliches, wider alle Hoffnung sich 
ereignen läßt und zu den Gemütsbewegungen die Gelegenheit geben muß, aus den Sitten der 
Personen so natürlich fließt, daß es sich fast nicht anders hätte zutragen können: so überläßt sich 
alsdann der Zuschauer, dessen sich Verwunderung und Wahrscheinlichkeit bemächtigt haben, er 
mag nun der Person wohlwollen oder nicht, willig und gern den Bewegungen und wird bald mit 
Vergnügen zürnen, bald trauren und bald über die Zufälle derjenigen Personen, deren er sich am 
meisten annimt, für Freuden weinen. (126) 
 
When the moral motivation is captivating, viewers or readers are more likely to engage 
their imaginations and become angry, distressed, and moved to tears. Der Mensch, a 
moral weekly published in the same time frame as Gellert's works, recommended a 
similar ethos for authors because by engaging emotion, one can effect moral change 
(McCarthy, "Lektüre" 53). Outlining essential qualities of the effective writer, Der 
Mensch emphasized that the writer must know the human heart in order to animate 
feeling in the reader: "Ich verlange überhaupt, daß ein Verfasser die Menschen kenne, vor 
er schreibet. Diese Kenntniß der Menschen beruhet […] auf der Erkenntnis des 
menschlichen Herzens. Alle Wahrheiten müssen so vorgetragen werden, daß sie der 
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Leser fühle, alsdenn ist sie nüßlich" (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch II:207-208, no. 
61).  
The Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G** models this evocation of emotion. 
The crisis situations of the first book, such as the Mariane-Carlson-Dormund love 
triangle and Countess-Mr. R**-Count love triangle, are designed to heighten emotional 
response. Elliciting identification, the novel engages the reader with stages including 
dramatic tension, identification with the characters, agitation, sympathy, and participation 
in the character's test of virtue (Meyer-Krentler 97). Gellert reveals this intent in the 
novel itself, when the Countess reflects: "Ich weiß, daß es eine von den Haupttugenden 
einer guten Art zu erzählen ist, wenn man so erzählt, daß die Leser nicht die Sache zu 
lesen, sondern selbst zu sehen glauben, und durch eine abgenötigte Empfindung sich 
unvermerkt an die Stelle der Person setzen, welcher die Sache begegnet ist" (Gellert, 
Leben 61). In the second part, the novel promotes using moral feeling to guide social 
action. This culminates in the ideal of middle-class marriage. In telling her life story, the 
Countess expands the narrative material to include stories of other people's relation to 
her. When individuals narrate their own life events, she emphasizes, they captivate 
audience emotions more fully: "Es ist immer, als wenn man mehr Anteil an einer 
Begebenheit nähme, wenn sie der selbst erzählet, dem sie zugestossen ist" (68). Thus the 
multiple first-person perspectives in the second book (the heroine's biography, personal 
accounts by the Count, Steeley, and Amalie) invite the reader to a closer experience of 
moral trials. 
 Modelling moral behavior, the characters exemplify how readers can respond to 
suffering. Steeley rejoices when the count frees him from imprisonment in Siberia. Out of 
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friendship, the count gives Steeley new clothes, an act that moves his English friend to 
tears. The reader can surmise from Steeley's speechlessness that he did not encounter this 
kind of humanity during his Siberian detention (96). When Steeley later visits the count 
in Holland, the count trembles with joy. The Countess describes this second reunion as 
follows: "Der Graf zitterte, daß er kaum von dem Sessel aufstehen konnte, und wir sahen 
ihren Umarmungen mit einem freudigen Schauer lange zu" (116). Demonstrations of 
friendship produce physical responses of speechlessness, crying, and shaking. The text 
emphasizes that these strong emotions help shape moral life, and that they connect the 
movements of body and soul. Steely's reunion with the count in Holland invites reader 
participation in the count's fate. 
 Using Andreas as an example, Meyer-Krentler notes that in contrast to the broad 
appeal to virtue addressing all readers in part one of the novel, the second part's social 
experience of feeling can be exclusionary: "Der Empfindsame richtet sich an die 
Gleichgesinnten; Autor und Leser bilden einen geschlossenen Zirkel, in dem für den 
Außenstehenden, den nicht Empfindsamen, kein Platz ist: Das Verhältnis zwischen dem 
empfindsamen Zirkel der Freunde im zweiten Teil und dem zwar gutmütigen, aber 
extrovierten Andreas ist dessen getreue Spiegelung" (Meyer-Krentler 142). The range of 
emotive response also differs. For instance, the Countess invokes empathy with those 
who suffer misfortune. She describes her theory of feeling after hearing a pastor's lesson 
on providence. She gives thanks for her divinely-directed fate. Despite the suffering 
caused by her husband's captivity in Siberia and her separation from him, she concedes 
that this may seem unbelievable: 
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Leuten, die nie unglücklich gewesen, Leuten, die zu frostig sind, andrer Unglück zu fühlen, wird 
das Vergnügen, das wir aus dieser Rede schöpften, als ein scheinheiliges Rätsel vorkommen. Sie 
werden sich nicht einbilden können, wie sich solche ersthafte Betrachtungen zu einem Tage der 
Freude und der Liebe schicken; allein sie werden mir auch nicht zumuten, daß ich ihnen eine 
Sache beweisen soll, die auf die Empfindung ankömmt. (Gellert, Leben 137) 
 
For people who have not lived through misfortune, or who refuse to imagine it, her 
appeal to feeling may not resonate with their life experience. They may not acknowledge 
strong emotion as a valid basis of argument, thus prompting a divide in understanding 
between an empfindsame person and a nicht-empfindsame person. But with the tears 
exchanged by the count and Steeley at their reunions, Amalie's weeping about Steeley's 
suffering, and the heroine's lamentations about the count's suffering, the novel illustrates 
appropriate situations and ways to show emotion (121, 124, 128). In the key display of 
empathy, the characters demonstrate to the reader when to shed tears for those who 
suffer; it is the physical response to a moral impetus. Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von 
G** (1747/1748) points to the function of empathy to elicit another's feelings that Gellert 
develops more fully in Pro comoedia commovente (1751), and Lessing expands upon in 
the Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel (1756-1757) and installments of the Hamburgische 
Dramaturgie (1768). 
 Because it focuses on moral pedagogy, Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin 
von G** can be labeled a sentimental novel. The text includes the body/soul discourse as 
a means to demonstrate a moral response to the emotions. Using the principle of contrast 
emphasized in the essay on the tearful comedy, the novel represents immorality in the 
incestuous love between Mariane and Carlson, and lust as Dormund's motivation for 
murder to possess Mariane. While it may be natural to experience intense passions, these 
belong, according to the novel, in a moderate form in marriage, such as the one between 
the Countess and the count. The love triangle of Mariane, Carlson, and Dormund 
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illustrates the extremes the passions may provoke, and how psychological conflicts 
produce physical effects. By contrast, the love triangle between the count, Countess, and 
Mr. R.** demonstrates the pain of those emotions and their moderation in an appropriate 
manner. Furthermore, in part two, the Countess positively influences the recovery of the 
unwed couple, Wid and his lover, through financial support, personal caregiving, and 
their reintegration into society as a married couple (Gellert, Leben 110-112, 138-140, 
144-145). In contrast to the counseling she gives Mariane, Carlson, and Dormund, the 
reintegration of Wid and his family as useful members of society succeeds. The venues 
for the nexus of morality and the body/soul discourse include representation within the 
work, such as the Countess's attempts to heal and reform Mariane and Dormund. This 
nexus extends, in the example of Steeley and Amalie's friendship and love, to the novel's 
engagement of the reader's tears of pathos.  
 Between 1748, when Wendler published the second volume of Gellert's Leben der 
schwedischen von G*** and 1764, when Bartholomäi published Wieland's Der Sieg der 
Natur über die Schwärmerey, oder die Abenteuer des Don Sylvio von Rosalva, German 
novelists gravitated to an anthropological discourse. Inspired by French and English 
models, Gellert and others created sentimental (i.e. moral) novels with a focus on 
sensibility. Johann Timotheus Hermes' Miß Fanny Wilkes illustrates one way a foreign 
literature of sensibility shaped anthropological knowledge in German literature. 
 
Richardsonian Sensibility and Melancholy in Miß Fanny Wilkes 
 Hermes, a Breslau pastor and admirer of the novels of Richardson and Fielding, 
further popularized the discourse of sensibility in German literature. Like Gellert, Hermes 
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used the novel as a pedagogical tool. But for the Breslau pastor, religious principles 
overwhelmingly guided plot and character development (Weber 250a). Inspired by the 
example of the English moral weeklies, he aimed to teach and entertain according to the 
doctrine of a rationalized Christian theology (Bautz 2:762-763). His early novels Miß 
Fanny Wilkes (1766) and Sophiens Reise von Memel nach Sachsen (1769-1772) were the 
most influential. A key focus of these novels, as well as other novels by Hermes 
published in the 1780's and 1790's, lies in the effort to discipline feeling (Weber 250b). 
 Miß Fanny Wilkes combines discourse about body and soul with writing about 
morality. In its moral content, the novel exhibits multiple themes of sensibility similar to 
those in Richardson's novels. The full title Miß Fanny Wilkes; so gut als aus dem 
Englischen übersetzt points to the novel's heritage; in fact, it is closely modeled after 
Richardson's novel Sir Charles Grandison (1753-1754). In the following, I compare the 
struggle with power and the fate of the virtuous heroine in Miß Fanny Wilkes with 
Pamela because the texts use similar plot devices. In Pamela, Mr. B. unsuccessfully tries 
to seduce the heroine and instead falls in love with her. When he acknowledges her virtue 
and sends her home to her parents, her absence immediately provokes his melancholic 
sickness. In Miß Fanny Wilkes, Lady Foster assigns her chambermaid Betty the seduction 
of Herr Handsom, but the servant instead falls hopelessly in love with him. When 
Handsom does not return her love, she falls deathly ill. The physical changes provoked 
by Pamela's pregnancy make her melancholy, and Hermes' Elizabeth also develops a 
nervous temperament during her pregnancy. Pamela and Clarissa suffer fainting spells 
during episodes of nervous stress. Similarly, Hermes' Fanny faints when she sees 
Mademoiselle DuBois going into the mill, as someone who, like herself, has escaped the 
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attack of robbers at the Foster estate. In another example, when Herr Handsom, the 
Foster's tutor, meets Jinny Heavy and on behalf of Lady Foster asks for her to tell about 
herself, she shows signs of uneasiness and also falls unconscious. Handsom tries physical 
means to return Jinny to consciousness, sprinkling her face with water, holding alcohol 
under her nose, and removing a choking necklace. Herr Handsom can not know that her 
life represents an existence based on the trials of a virtuous person – not unlike Pamela – 
and that his question will provoke a crisis of conscience that prompts her fainting spell. 
The accounts of virtue in Jinny's history and Handsom's past comprise the remainder of 
the novel. 
 The representation of sensibility involves two further themes that affect the 
body/soul nexus: the preservation of virtue and how unrealized love induces melancholy. 
Hermes' novel demands the preservation of virtue and contrasts this ideal with 
lasciviousness and moral turpitude. The sensible body conveys signs that dissociate Jinny 
from vice and mark her commitment to virtue. Recalling her youth, Jinny details two life 
crises in discussions and letters with Elisabeth Handsom. In these flashbacks, she 
remembers how her father made her learn French and Italian and then demanded that she 
translate "die abscheulichsten Schriften." Through beatings, he also forced her to draw a 
copy of whatever he asked: "Die allerfrechsten Zeichnungen in den Tabatieren der 
Ungesitteten sind nichts, sie sind keusch in Vergleichung der Stücke, die ich habe 
machen müssen" (Hermes 1:113). Just the memory of this part of her childhood brings 
back strong emotion, which she releases in tearful dialogue with Elisabeth. Their 
sympathetic (i.e. sensible) exchanges illustrate a typical morally reflective (sentimental) 
friendship (cf. Todd 7-8). 
  149 
 Confronting her with what is likely pornography, Jinny's father has tried to 
corrupt her innate moral sense to gain her willing participation in his reproduction 
business. Ultimately, he has planned to arouse her lasciviousness so that he could sell her 
as a mistress on the open market. To this end, the father has also ordered her to spend 
time with her licentious brother and coquettish women she abhors. It is these experiences 
that put Jinny into her sick bed. She recalls:  
Ich war damals fünfzehn Jahr alt, und nunmehr fieng man an, mich mit Gewalt zu gewissen 
Dingen bewegen zu wollen, zu denen die allerfrechsten Reden und Beyspiele mich nicht hatten 
[sic] bringen können.  
Ich fiel damals in einen Zustand, den ich fast nicht ohn ein Wunderwerk mit dem Begriff des 
Lebens zusammendenken kann, der aber unter allen möglichen Dingen das einzige war, was mich 
retten konnte. – Ich ward totkrank, und nie war eine Krankheit dieser gänzlichen Zerrüttung 
ähnlich." (Hermes 1:114) 
 
Forced to witness the foundation of life in debauchery, Jinny's moral sense has provoked 
a stress-induced illness. Her doctor has diagnosed this sickness as mental illness, which 
he believed offered little hope for recovery. To promote her convalescence, her father has 
sent her to London. Unbeknownst to Jinny, she has landed in the care of a woman intent 
on her physical recovery to enable her further indoctrination as a courtesan. 
 Though removed from the direct interaction with her defiling father and brother, 
Jinny's seeming respite from immediate moral danger in London has allowed her to 
reflect and has prompted a crisis of conscience. She has felt self-condemnation for 
participation in her father's trade of pornographic drawings and texts. In her discussion 
with Elisabeth, she recalls her self-loathing: 
Meine einzige Empfindung war der Jammer, den ich ausstehen mußte, da mir mein Gewissen 
vorwarf, daß ich, aus Menschenfurcht und aus Liebe zu einem so nichtswürdigen Leben, durch 
mein Singen und Zeichnen, meinem Vater Hoffnung gemacht hatte, daß er seinen Zweck 
erreichen würde. Ich war in meinen eigenen Augen so verabscheungswürdig, daß ich keine 
Arzneyen einnehmen wollte, weil mir mein Leben zu einer unerträglichen Last geworden war. In 
diesem Zustande rang ich einige Tage lang mit dem Tode. Ich kann Ihnen gar nicht sagen, was in 
diesen Umständen in mir vorgegangen ist. O wie ganz ohne Trost ist man, wenn das Andenken an 
unsre strafbaren Handlungen auf die Seele losstürmt! Selbst der Gedanke, daß ich den 
Aufforderungen zur thätigen Unzucht widerstanden hatte, konnte mich gar nicht beruhigen, weil 
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ich den Schatten der Ruhe immer selbst vertrieb, indem ich mir vorwarf, daß ich gewiß mich in 
alle Schande gestürzt haben würde, wenn mich die Krankheit nicht gehindert hätte. (1:115-116) 
 
Fifteen years before Schiller's Die Räuber (1781), this episode and the echo of Herr 
Poor's suicide (1:251-252) provide a glimpse of the self-criticism that achieves full form 
in late Enlightenment nihilism (Schings, "Philosophie der Liebe"). Highlighting the 
interaction of moral and physical human nature, Jinny's crisis has multiple sources. She 
rebuffs her father's morals and feels self-loathing over her own behavior under her 
father's influence. This self-criticism helps generate her psychosomatic illness. Holding 
herself responsible for commiting misdeeds, she refuses medicinal treatment. This 
worsens her condition, leading to self-endangerment. Her self-destructive judgment 
exemplifies, if only momentarily, the self-hate more prominent in literature during the 
late Enlightenment. 
 In a second episode, the heroine tells Elisabeth another story of how her moral 
sense saved her from debauchery. When she is forced into a whorehouse, Jinny has 
frantically defended her separation from the prostitutes. By refusing their welcoming 
embraces and by crying, Jinny has postponed having to sleep with customers and has 
avoided descent into a life of vice (Hermes 1:352-353). The recollection of this trial 
brings back feelings of fear and desperation and prompts her to shake and cry. Recalling 
the brothel owner's threats to have her bound and forcefully misused prompts a similar 
response (1:357). Working together, the spiritual faculties of memory and imagination 
induce feelings of fear/empathy and trigger weeping.  
The novel also encodes an intended response to this story. Sobbing and crying at 
the memory of it all, Jinny and Elisabeth model the proper moral response for the reader. 
In this short passage, the discourses of body and soul and of morality function on three 
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levels: first, as a retelling of Jinny's experience; second, through Jinny and Elisabeth's 
identification with the past events; and third, as the presentation of a moral norm to the 
reader as mirrored in the characters' sobs and tears. To establish her sense of identity, 
Jinny, like Pamela, narrates her memories, judges her behavior, and perceives her virtue. 
This is a performative act. 
The narrator in Miß Fanny Wilkes directly addresses the female reader to ensure 
that she realizes how the intended identification with the heroine should function: 
Das Andenken fürchterlicher Gefahren, auch wenn sie vorüber und glücklich überstanden sind – 
welch einen Abgrund öfnen sie den Blicken der Seele. Sie weis, daß sie nicht hineinstürzt: aber sie 
bebt zurück. Die Augen werden dunkel und Thränen kommen aus denjenigen Quellen, die nie 
anders geöfnet werden, als wenn eine Empfindung, die alle gewöhnliche Wirkung der Sinnlichkeit 
übertrifft, die zarten Bande zwischen Leib und Seele ergreift. – Verstehn mich hier viele meiner 
Leserinnen? (1:353)   
 
A confrontation with the abyss of turpitude thus activates an internal moral sense. Fear of 
moral danger, the narrator insists, prompts a physical and a moral reaction. The call for 
reader sympathy echoes Gellert's Trostgründen Essay and Lessings Mitleidstheorie. 
Together with Pamela and Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***, Miß Fanny Wilkes 
chronicles the rising prominence of the body/soul discourse. 
 Hermes' novel also links sympathy to the imagination. Sympathizing with young 
women, Jinny wishes to preserve them from the abyss: "O, sagte Jinny mit der leisen 
Sprache eines aus der heftigen Erschütterung sich erholenden Herzens, wie sehnlich 
wünsche ich allen Personen unsers Geschlechts, die sich aus Unwissenheit oder 
Leichtsinn in solche Gefahr [ihre Tugend zu verlieren] begeben, unsere Empfindungen!" 
(1:354). Accompanied by copious tears, she imagines the fate of young women who 
receive moral instruction only through the Bible and who thus are susceptible to 
dissembling rogues. Temperate sensibility, on the other hand, provides appropriate 
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guidance to help women avoid losing their virginity. Hermes makes an indirect reference 
to the natural tendency to follow virtue as a human universal, as Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson claim and Richardson's heroines illustrate. Other factors such as temperament 
also shape the individual's moral action (1:355). Thus from Jinny's crying as a 
physiological response to other women's fate, to the acknowledgment of temperament as 
a contributing physiological factor to moral action, Hermes' sensible moral characters 
assume the interaction of the material and the metaphysical. 
If abused, sympathy's moral basis can be subverted. Handsom recalls his 
relationship with Frau Widow, and how she manipulates him using moral claims to 
achieve her desires. She acts the moral role, dismissing appearances of immorality. At the 
same time, she wins Handsom's sympathy through her copious tears and reports of 
digestive sickness and a fever. Her ruse involves winning his emotional investment in her 
physical state. She then blames Handsom's excessive virtue for her illness, predicting her 
own death and representing the physical sign of her suffering through shaking. Imagining 
her claim to be true, Handsom uncritically reads her bodily signs of illness as the product 
of his virtue. He wants to avoid having the blood of another life on his hands. Moved by 
extreme melancholy, Handsom sympathizes with Widow's suffering and proposes 
marriage, only to discover she has feigned her illness (2:282-284). She has manipulated 
his moral sense using strategies of seduction to appeal to his desire, sympathy, and 
conscience. In contrast to Jinny's linking of sympathy and imagination, Handsom's 
conscience leads him awry because Widow exploits signs of connections between the 
material and metaphysical for personal advantage. Whereas the novel posits the reliability 
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of the material/metaphysical link for discerning moral intention, it also warns against that 
link's pernicious simulation. 
Miß Fanny Wilkes creates characters in a constellation that regards women as 
more guarded with their virtue than men and men as especially subject to melancholy. 
"Melancholy" referred to black bile, so named for the excess of black bile in comparison 
to other basic bodily fluids. It could also be caused by an overactive imagination or heavy 
thoughts (Zedler 36:464). Within the theory of temperament, it was characterized by slow 
speech, slow movement, a good memory, and miserliness (Walch and Hennings 2:1094-
1095). A person with melancholy might share characteristics with Hypochondristen 
(Schings, Melancholie und Aufklärung 3).  
Hermes offers exceptions to stereotyped gender characteristics such as when 
Handsom tries to redeem his virtue in the hope of marrying Jinny, and Jinny also falls 
prey to melancholy. Male disquietude frequently stems from unrealized love. When 
Handsom, the family tutor, surprises Jinny in the Foster's garden and she faints, 
Handsom's anxiety about her paleness provokes his own fainting spell and sickness. The 
narrator reveals the cause of Handsom's illness to the fictional reader using theories of 
temperament and neurological function.  
The tutor's illness stems from a unique capacity of feeling. On the one hand, 
Handsom has a melancholy temperament characterized by slow reactions to sad or 
painful situations (1:124). Because he delays or suppresses emotion, when he does 
respond, his emotion flows like a torrent. In this overpowering feeling "wird [das Herz] 
von der Heftigkeit der lange zurückgehaltenen Empfindung so gewaltsam überfallen, daß 
die ganze Natur nachgiebt; und ich glaube, erfahren zu haben, daß die Seele alsdenn 
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entweder alle Nerven auf einmal, oder keine einzige spannt" (1:125). Handsom's 
recognition that Jinny loves him provokes this tidal wave of emotion that overwhelms his 
sense of feeling. Awaking from his fainting episode, the tutor confesses his sensitive 
nerves to Jinny: "Ich habe, sagte er, ein gar zu empfindliches Herz; Sie konnten mir nicht 
gleichgültig sein – war es also nicht natürlich, daß meine Ruhe durch Ihre Leiden mußte 
gestört werden? O wie befürchte ich, daß sie nur zu sehr gestört worden ist" (1:126). 
Handsom has previously defined his personal moral standards by distancing himself from 
Betty's alluring flirtations because she demonstrates little knowledge of religion and little 
interest in it (1:91). By contrast, his infatuation with Jinny, who critically judges herself, 
confirms his attraction to women with a noble moral feeling. The body's sensitivity 
serves the tutor as a conduit for the transmission of emotion and as a sign board to others 
of his capacity to feel. 
 Sir James Hope, who at one point rescues Jinny from a bordello, also has an 
enhanced capacity of feeling that descends into melancholy. Lord Hope reaches his state 
of lovesickness when, after the rescue, he longs for Jinny's love, but realizes she will only 
grant him sympathy. Though he tries to be happy with Jinny's bliss, he instead confesses 
"traurige Stunden" and "finstre Tage" and despairingly awaits a "zu langes, unglückliches 
Leben." The problem, he recognizes, lies in his inability to recover from unrequited love: 
"Ich kann mein Herz nicht mehr heilen! So trägt ein Jüngling das schleichende Gift des 
Todes in den Adern der blühenden Wangen, bis sein Innres anfängt verzehrt zu werden, 
und die Schwindsucht ihn unter den Blicken seiner Freundinn niederreißt, wie Blumen 
unter Sonnenstrahlen, die andere beleben, dahin sinken und verwelken" (2:6). The 
metaphor of the creeping viper in one's veins describes not only James's view of death, 
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but the effect of melancholy's slow poison on his mental health. As his spiritual condition 
worsens, so does his physical health (2:8). James promises to renounce his love for Jinny 
and honor her love for Handsom. 
 Yet James, overwhelmed by emotion, eventually confesses his love to Jinny. Lord 
Speed, James's brother-in-law, sympathizes with Hope's sadness, but regards the 
disclosure as an act of desperate egoism. Speed recommends moderation of Hope's love: 
"Sie müssen also Ihre Traurigkeit mäßigen. Eine unverdroßne Anwendung Ihrer 
Gemüthskräfte in jeder Arbeit, die Sie jeßt beschäftigt, wird das Schmachten hemmen, 
durch das eine verletzte Liebe die Fähigkeiten der Seele müßig macht, und den Körper 
auszehrt" (2:227). James's melancholy temperament, already tending to sadness and slow, 
festering emotion according to the personality characteristics of the theory of 
temperament, moves even further out of balance. A wounded, jealous love such as Sir 
Hope's dulls the soul and physical strength. Mental health not only influences physical 
well-being, but is a key factor in James's overwhelming melancholy. Speed offers Hope 
the social reintegration of friendship and impells him to turn to God to mend his "kranke 
Seele" (2:229).  
James Hope embodies a kind of obsessive personality similar to Anton Reiser. 
Despite periods of less despondency, Sir Hope, like Anton Reiser, fails to achieve a state 
of stability. In a poem to Jinny, James admits weakness and resolves to abandon his love. 
More than a renunciation, however, the poem confesses the extent of his love:  
   An Jinny 
Ich fühle Schmerzen! Doch will ich nicht klagen! 
 Nein! du bleibst meine Trösterinn. –– 
Sey du ganz glücklich! Ich will es ertragen, 
 Daß ich durch dich nicht glücklich bin. (2:331) 
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As consoler of his pains, Jinny takes on a muse function for James. Though he promises 
not to complain, the poem literally reveals the pain of love he feels and endures. 
 Miß Fanny Wilkes shows how characters shape their moral status through the 
faculties of memory and imagination. Jinny's narration allows her to distance herself from 
her past, which was blemished by coercion to sing lewd lyrics, by forced translation of 
pornographic literature, and by her detention in a whorehouse. By reporting her 
biography to Eduard and Elisabeth, Jinny relives her moral trials, sheds tears over past 
misdeeds, and reasserts her moral nature. Through her imagination, Jinny sympathizes 
with young women who fail to receive adequate moral instruction and provides further 
evidence of her strong ethical impetus. By contrast, Frau Widow feigns illness and 
manipulates Handsom's sympathy to induce his marriage proposal. Handsom reluctantly 
confronts this episode of youthful moral ineptitude, but reaffirms his virtuous character in 
his relationship with Jinny. Because he fails to find balance in love and friendship, James 
Hope remains trapped in his melacholy. Despite Jinny's engagement to Handsom, Hope 
persists in his dream of wooing Jinny, remaining distant from reality.  
Hermes' novel classifies the egoistic melancholy of Sir Hope and the 
lasciviousness of Frau Widow or Lord ** – predominantly spiritual or physical ways of 
being respectively – as immoral. By contrast, Jinny learns to manage her fear of turpitude 
and self-hate, and Handsom moderates the hold of melancholy on his imagination. Both 
Jinny and Handsom demonstrate how virtue moves body and soul. Their lives embody a 
moral framework based on mixed character and belief in perfectibility. Ultimately, when 
combined with critical self-examination and the admission of errors, memory and 
imagination can help promote moral redemption. In navigating the interaction of body 
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and soul, of the world and the imagination, the title character of Wieland's Agathon 
similarly struggles to achieve moral balance, to which we now turn. 
 
Origins of Wieland’s Anthropological Thought 
Researchers have identified major sources of Wieland's anthropological thought 
up to Agathon. From early published texts, such as the didactic poem Die Natur der 
Dinge oder die vollkommenste Welt (1751), the Biberach author works to locate human 
nature in the intersection of body and soul (cf. Hacker). This poem, inspired by the 
author's love for Sophie Gutermann (later married to Georg Michael von La Roche), 
presents an Enlightenment cosmology that situates humankind in the chain of being 
(McCarthy, Christoph Martin Wieland 19). The human place in this puzzle lies in the 
pursuit of spiritual life. In this context, Schings reads the poem as a lens focused on the 
teleological movement of sensitive beings through the spiritual world ("Anthropologische 
Roman", 248). Wieland echoes a criticism of solely materialist existence from Die Natur 
der Dinge in a letter to Bodmer, which asserts his detestation of La Mettrie as a "Schrift 
Spötter." At this point in early 1752, the eighteen-year-old author works to order his 
philosophical knowledge with a framework of divine providence and seems thereby to 
confirm Schings's identification of young Wieland's predisposition for the spiritual 
(Wieland, Briefwechsel 1:52 [6 March 1752]). McCarthy notes, however, that despite an 
orientation to the subject of the soul, the poem's combination of "spiritual entities" with 
"bodily components" already shows an inherent interdependence of body and soul 
(McCarthy, Christoph Martin Wieland 21). The text represents human beings in a manner 
that characterizes a recurring ideal in the author's writing, one of moderation and balance. 
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Die Natur der Dinge also directly addresses philosophical systems of influence 
between body and soul, with Wieland postulating a unique solution for causation: "ein 
subtile[r] ästherische[r], unsichtbare[r] und unsterbliche[r] Leib" (Schings, 
"Anthropologische Roman" 250). This body, separate from our perceptible physical 
being, would coordinate between the material and the metaphysical. Published in 1755, 
the Betrachtungen über den Menschen again focuses humankind on the chain of being, 
on climbing the ladder to the angels and bypassing the problematic elements of material 
existence. Schings describes Wieland's writing, interspersed with quotes from 
Betrachtungen über den Menschen:  
Zugespitzt gesagt: der jungen Philosoph [Wieland] geht achtlos an der Anthropologie vorbei, weil 
für ihn eher die Angelogie zuständig ist. Die Vernunft "adelt das Thier zu einer Art von Engeln," 
führt den Menschen "von Stuffe zu Stuffe bis zum unendlich vollkommenen Wesen," den 
Menschen, der "ein blosser Embryon" einer weit erhabeneren Kreatur ist, der "einer unendlichen 
Verschönerung fähig" und für die Ewigkeit geschaffen ist, mit dem "Hang zum Unendlichen" 
geboren als dem "dunklen Gefühl unsrer Bestimmung." ("Anthropologische Roman" 248) 
 
According to this text, humankind is much nobler than the animal – that is caught solely 
in a life of the senses – by virtue of its pursuit of the divine. Such a persistent focus 
propels human nature beyond the lower parts of the chain of being "– dafür also, daß die 
Betrachtungen über den Menschen die 'Chain of being' gewissermassen halbieren, aus 
der Wesensleiter eine Geisterleiter machen und deshalb, so paradox es klingt, just die 
Anthropologie vermeiden" (249). Yet the focus on solely the spiritual development of 
human nature comes at the cost of another element that makes it human: the desirous and 
the physical being. 
 From his arrival as Bodmer's guest in Zurich in October 1752, Wieland studied 
and wrote. Entering Bodmer's circle, he also made social and professional contacts 
(McCarthy, Christoph Martin Wieland 24). In 1756, Breitinger passed a poem titled "Die 
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Zerstörung von Lissabon" to Wieland. Intrigued by the poem's footnotes to David 
Hartley's Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations (1749), the 
young man from Biberach began a correspondence with the author of "Die Zerstörung," 
Johann Georg Zimmermann (Schings, "Anthropologische Roman" 251). In an initial 
letter to Zimmermann, Wieland acknowledges having read the first part of Hartley's 
treatise, the physiology, and asks for a continued loan of Zimmermann's copy of the 
Observations. Like in the Betrachtungen über den Menschen, he especially desires 
knowledge of humankind's spiritual nature. Wieland writes: 
Ich danke Ihnen verbindlichst für Hartley …. Ich bin, ungefähr wie Sokrates, u:[nd] zwar nicht aus 
Nachahmung, über Erklärung der Phänomenen in der materiellen Welt nicht sehr neugierig. Doch 
hat mir sowohl die Methode als das System Selbst und die scharfsinnige Art womit er die 
Phaenomena daraus erklärt, Vergnügen gemacht.… Sonst wünschte ich daß Physiologie und 
Psychologie immer von einander geschieden blieben, oder wenigstens daß man den Leib nie für 
etwas anders als das Sensorium und das Instrument der Seele ansähe, ohne das Gewebe der Fibern 
allzusehr mit derselben zu verflechten. (Wieland, Briefwechsel 1:257 [11 May 1756]) 
 
The nerves transmit sensation from the body to the soul, but are not the soul itself. 
Physiology thus threatens, in Wieland's view, to supplant the autonomy of the soul. It 
raises the danger, already heated to a boiling point in 1748 with La Mettrie's publication 
of L'homme machine, of viewing the body/soul nexus as essentially a physical entity. The 
Biberach author resists viewing the human soul as subject to the direct influence of the 
body: 
[N]ach der Meynung der allergeistigsten unter den denkenden Köpfen, der Platoniker u:[nd] 
Idealisten[,] der Leib ist ein Spiegel der Seele. Wo ich also nicht in die Seele selbst hineinsehen 
kann, da gucke ich in Ihren Spiegel. Man muß nur nie so reden[,] als ob der Leib etwas in der 
Seele per influxum physicum gleichsam erschaffe, welches ein sehr gemeiner Fehler ist, der mir 
nicht um metaphysicher sondern um m o r a l i s c h e r  G r ü n d e willen mißfällt. (Briefwechsel 
1:260 [12 June 1756]) 
 
The letter harbors fears that a body that directly influenced the soul would reduce 
morality to sensation. What it is good to be and right to do is in danger of being decided 
based on subjective criteria about the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain. 
  160 
At the latest by February 1759 Wieland experienced an "empiristische Wendung," 
a turn to the sciences as a new source of knowledge (Thomé 117-127). This involved the 
recognition that individuals create their own knowledge through perception and thought. 
Further, Thomé stresses, Wieland realized individuals develop knowledge if sciences are 
also active (118). On 20 August 1758 Wieland provides evidence of a change in 
perspective when he writes to Zimmermann seeking a discussion partner on the article 
"Experience" in Diderot and D'Alembert's Encyclopédie (1751-1772) (Wieland, 
Briefwechsel 1:354). Two months later, Wieland again recommends an article from the 
Encyclopédie to Zimmermann, this time "Abstraction" (1:370 [17 October 1758]). 
Wieland's interest in the encyclopedia articles, Thomé avers, shows an embrace of 
popularized science and an abandonment of the principle of the soul as the center of 
identity, but not an acceptance of a mechanistic anthropology (122). The Encyclopédie, 
like Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, emphasized a theoretical position 
that located the origin of knowledge in sensation and thereby acknowledged the body's 
function, along with the soul, in knowledge formation (cf. Oettinger 57). The evolving 
reading list reveals the Biberach poet's slow embrace of Enlightenment philosophy, from 
the admission that Locke requires some patience to the "discovery" of Helvétius's De 
l'espirit (1758) (Wieland, Briefwechsel 1:365 [6 October 1758], 1:399 [1 February 
1759]).  
 In the late 1750's the writings of Helvétius and La Mettrie represent two models 
of anthropological knowledge that helped shape Wieland's views about human nature. 
Helvétius's influence lay in the conception of new natural laws, especially the translation 
of the term "force" from Newton's laws of motion to moral situations (Thomé 132). The 
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definition of what it is good to be or to do received a biological foundation (138). The 
French Enlightenment thereby removed theology from Newton's cosmology, secularizing 
the basis for moral action (136, 144). La Mettrie specifically developed a materialistic 
anthropology that prioritized physiology and the individual pursuit of happiness, without 
reference to an overarching answer to the problems of what is right (144). By 1760, when 
Wieland published Araspes und Panthea and cast Araspes as a "patient," he was well on 
his way to viewing humankind from the perspective of a philosophical doctor as he does 
in Agathon. 
 Thomé shows how the representation of the character Hippias combines the 
materialist philosophy of Helvétius and La Mettrie (145-157). Schings stresses the 
classification of Agathon as the first anthropological novel, but only spends two pages 
pointing to anthropological moments in the novel ("Anthropologische Roman" 254-256). 
For her part, Heinz avoids Agathon entirely, perhaps in deference to Schings, perhaps in 
an effort to direct the reader to her other essays (Heinz, Wissen vom Menschen 172-173; 
Heinz, "Figur des Schwärmers"). Thus, without detailing its anthropological base, critics 
nonetheless regard Wieland's text as establishing a tradition. The following reading of 
Agathon draws on Thomé's interpretation by identifying the diagnosis and treatment of 
the title character's Schwärmerei as an essentially anthropological rather than a religious 
problem. 
 
Agathon’s Homeopathic Cure and the Anthropological Novel 
 The Geschichte des Agathon (1766/1767) explores the role of body and soul in 
shaping humankind's moral being. In a series of dialogues, Hippias and Agathon critique 
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each other's philosophy sketching out the positions of materialism and Platonism. While 
Hippias contends that Agathon's life revolves too much around his imagination, Agathon 
defines his identity by pointedly restating the Cartesian "cogito ergo sum" as "sentio ergo 
sum" (McCarthy, Fantasy and Reality 81): "Ich empfinde mich selbst, ich bin also; ich 
empfinde, ich sehe diesen obersten Geist, er ist also" (Wieland, Agathon 73). This move 
essentially equates the reality of an object with that of the imagination. Even if one 
concurs with Thomé that this kind of language recreates a lyrical, hymnic tone, one need 
not conclude that this language lacks a speculative aspect (Thomé 159). The words also 
represent a poetic or rhetorical idea, and thereby the title character's reality. To the extent 
that a world is shaped by the intricate choices of language, Agathon makes his world out 
of his chosen fantasies and their activation in words.  
In the manner of a philosophical doctor, Hippias proclaims this sensualism a 
possible sickness, concluding that Agathon has succumbed to enthusiasm (Wieland, 
Agathon 74, 76). This diagnosis includes a moral condemnation of Agathon for failing to 
remain realistic (75). The Sophist argues isolation and an overactive imagination drive 
individuals to pursue fulfillment through fantasies (77). Lauding moderation and 
contentment, Hippias warns Agathon that he is on the wrong path and suggests a more 
judicious use of reason as a possible cure (77-78). 
Since his separation from his beloved Psyche, however, Agathon experiences no 
pleasure in the real world. In a soliloquy, Agathon prefers his enthusiasm to Hippias' 
hedonism. Instead of pleasure, Agathon insists that human nature includes as a key 
element an inner moral sense, which the sensualist Hippias lacks. Persuading worldly 
men about the essence of moral feeling is difficult: "Die Weltleute sind in der Tat nicht 
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zu verdenken, wenn sie uns andre für ein wenig mondsüchtig halten; wer will ihnen 
zumuten, daß sie glauben sollen, es fehle ihnen etwas, das zu einem vollständigen 
Menschen gehört?" (81) In this way, Agathon emphasizes the difficulty of persuading 
other people to work at shaping their moral compass. Agathon's version of the moral 
individual thus requires more spirit, while Hippias pursues the balance of body and soul 
to achieve happiness.  
 After trying to alter Agathon's Platonic idealism through Sophistic argumentation 
and sexual seduction (Danae), Hippias employs a hedonistic argument to countermand 
Agathon's recalcitrance. In an excursus on happiness, Hippias believes humankind 
generally lacks the knowledge to achieve lasting contentment. This presents a dilemma 
because most people pursue happiness, but like Sisyphus with the boulder, they must 
continually pursue their chosen virtue. The pessimistic view of human nature groups 
individuals into three categories:  
Einige Menschen scheinen kaum einer größeren Glückseligkeit fähig zu sein als die Austern, und 
wenn sie ja eine Seele haben, so ist es nur so viel, als sie brauchen, um ihren Leib eine Zeitlang 
vor der Fäulnis zu bewahren. Ein größerer und vielleicht der größte Teil der Menschen befindet 
sich nicht in diesem Fall; aber weil es ihnen an genugsamer Stärke des Gemüts und an einer 
gewissen Zärtlichkeit der Empfindung mangelt, so ist ihr Leben gleich dem Leben der übrigen 
Tiere des Erdbodens zwischen Vergnügen, die sie weder zu wählen noch zu genießen und 
Schmerzen, denen sie weder zu widerstehen noch zu entfliehen wissen, geteilt. Wahn und 
Leidenschaften sind die Triebfedern dieser menschlichen Maschinen; beide setzen sie einer 
unendlichen Menge von Übeln aus, die es nur in einer betrognen Einbildung, aber eben darum, wo 
nicht schmerzlicher, doch anhaltender und unheilbarer sind als diejenigen, die uns die Natur 
auferlegt. Diese Art von Menschen ist keines gesetzten und anhaltenden Vergnügens, keines 
Zustandes von Glückseligkeit fähig. (Agathon 90-91) 
 
The first is virtually incapable of achieving happiness, while the second lacks the 
developed understanding and sensitivity of perception to rise above an existence caught 
between pleasure and pain. Hippias argues that many individuals limit themselves to the 
body, failing to refine the soul. Such individuals, machines as he calls them to emphasize 
their physical function, lack essential human qualities. True humanity, by contrast, 
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requires an element of sentimentality and control of desire to enable the pleasure and 
satisfaction that comprise happiness. Hippias argues against pure physicality and for 
moderation of physical pleasure and fantasy:  
Es scheint also unmöglich zu sein, ohne eine gewisse Zärtlichkeit der Empfindung, die uns in 
einer weitern Sphäre, mit feinern Sinnen und auf eine angenehmere Art genießen läßt und ohne 
diejenige Stärke der Seele, die uns fähig macht, das Joch der Phantasie und des Wahns 
abzuschütteln und die Leidenschaften in unsrer Gewalt zu haben, zu demjenigen ruhigen zustande 
von Genuß und Zufriedenheit zu kommen, der die Glückseligkeit ausmacht. Nur derjenige ist in 
der Tat glücklich, der sich von den Übeln, die nur in der Einbildung bestehen, gänzlich frei zu 
machen. (91) 
 
 Addressing Agathon in the guise of a philosophical "doctor," as a person who 
knows the interdependence of physical and moral human nature, Hippias diagnoses 
Agathon as sick. That illness involves a denial of the body:  
 
Du wendest die Stärke deiner Seele an, dein Herz gegen das wahre Vergnügen unempfindlich zu 
machen, und beschäftigst deine Empfindlichkeit mit unwesentlichen Gegenständen, die du nur in 
der Einbildung siehst und nur im Traume genießest; die Vergnügungen, welche die Natur dem 
Menschen zugeteilt hat, sind für dich Schmerzen, weil du dir Gewalt antun mußt sie zu entbehren; 
und du setzest dich allen Übeln aus, die sie uns vermeiden lehrt, indem du, anstatt einer nützlichen 
Geschäftigkeit dein Leben mit den süßen Einbildungen wegträumst, womit du dir die Beraubung 
des wirklichen Vergnügens zu ersetzen suchst. Dein Übel, mein lieber Kallias, entspringt von 
einer Einbildungskraft, die dir ihre Geschöpfe in einem überirdischen Glanze zeigt, der dein Herz 
verblendet und ein falsches Licht über das, was wirklich ist, ausbreitet; einer dichterischen 
Einbildungskraft, die sich beschäftigt, schönere Schönheiten und angenehmere Vergnügungen zu 
erfinden, als die Natur hat; einer Einbildungskraft, ohne welche weder Homere noch Alkamene 
noch Polygnote wären, welche gemacht ist, unsre Ergötzungen zu verschönern, aber nicht, die 
Führerin unseres Lebens zu sein. Um weise zu sein, hast du nichts nötig, als die gesunde Vernunft 
an die Stelle dieser begeisterten Zauberin und die kalte Überlegung an den Platz eines sehr oft 
betrüglichen Gefühls zu setzen. Bilde dir auf etliche Augenblicke ein, daß du den Weg zur 
Glückseligkeit erst suchen müssest, frage die Natur, höre ihre Antwort und folge dem Pfade den 
sie dir vorzeichnen wird. (92) 
 
The cure of a body/soul imbalance requires an anthropological treatment, one that returns 
material and metaphysical being to a state of balance. The "doctor's" treatment calls for 
healthy reason, unemotional judgment, and following the demands of nature (93).  
 In the first treatment for Agathon's enthusiasm, Hippias attempts to remedy his 
patient's overactive imagination by educating him in the principles of materialist 
philosophy. The cure of the soul lies in acknowledging limits of the reality produced in 
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the imagination. Such a cure also requires embracing the body. Achieving happiness 
involves pursuing nature's simplicity and innocence [Einfalt]. By appealing to nature in 
evaluating the human condition, the Sophist presents a hedonism derived from the 
originary innocence of the natural world. This claim assumes a doctrine of the primacy 
and the universal applicability of reason to humanity characteristic of natural law theory. 
Living according to nature requires satisfying needs, experiencing pleasure, and avoiding 
pain. Hippias also argues that it is morally good to pursue the innate drive for happiness. 
The hedonistic moral doctrine provides a simpler path to happiness than other codes of 
virtue.  
 The materialist rationale for prioritizing physical pleasure includes a description 
of bodily functions. Hippias' theory of sensation can be viewed as anthropological theory. 
Insisting pleasurable sensation is naturally good, Hippias asserts: "Es ist unleugbar, daß 
nicht alle Arten und Grade des Vergnügens gut sind. Die Natur allein hat das Recht, uns 
die Vergnügen anzuzeigen, die sie uns bestimmt hat" (Wieland, Agathon 96). Natural 
forces shape decorum, either through the physical senses or the imagination. Spiritual 
pleasure derives from activation of sensual pleasure through different rational faculties 
such as memory, imagination, and poetic verve (97).  
 This anthropological system evokes a physiology of pleasure based on body and 
soul. Pleasures of the heart, Hippias claims, are in fact the most sensuous. The activation 
of emotion produces physical results: it triggers a feeling of physical warmth, increases 
blood pressure, enlivens the nerves, and sets the physical being at ease (99). In every 
sensual emotion, whether admiration, love, desire, hope, or empathy, there is a common 
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response. Thus the mechanical function of the corporal/spiritual connection in response to 
emotions differs primarily in degree. 
 Without balance of the spiritual and the physical, one-sided renunciation of the 
body risks serious psychosomatic illness, in particular melancholy (107). By participating 
in the life of the body, one can limit the imagination and thereby prevent the onset of 
madness (110). Setting limits promotes an equilibrium of the material and the 
metaphysical. Hippias' ethical code clearly represents a materialist position: "Befriedige 
deine Bedürfnisse, vergnüge alle deine Sinne, und erspare dir, soviel du kannst, alle 
schmerzhaften Empfindungen" (95). These three principles represent a way of knowing 
and an ethical stance rooted in physical pleasure. Nonetheless, the argument defines 
human nature in more than a material way. In a second formulation, Hippias reestablishes 
the order of the three principles:  
Wir haben die Natur gefragt, Kallias, worin die Glückseligkeit bestehe, die sie uns zugedacht 
habe, und wir habe ihre Antwort. Ein schmerzenfreies Leben, die angenehmste Befriedigung 
unsrer natürlichen Bedürfnisse und der abwechselnde Genuß aller Arten von Vergnügen, womit 
die Einbildungskraft, der Witz und die Künste unseren Sinnen zu schmeicheln fähig sind.  
(105) 
 
Thus imagination, intelligence, and artistic production engage the senses next to the 
physical sensations and body and soul work in tandem. Having failed to persuade 
Agathon with physical pleasure alone, Hippias acknowledges a moderate role of 
imagination and thought in the pursuit of happiness. 
 The moral individual must also pursue an active public life. In an advanced 
society organized around market principles, Hippias proposes that the individual can 
achieve happiness in seeking personal profit. By inculcating human beings to pursue their 
personal interest, this model creates an economy of desire transferable to all areas of life. 
Pursuing this advantage includes activating others' imagination and action for personal 
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benefit. In this sense, the practical pursuit of happiness is a political philosophy. Society 
also requires self-limitation through work and the moderation of the passions (116). 
While community enables the pursuit of personal advantage through others, it also limits 
the pursuit of pleasure. Reversing altruism, Hippias encourages using the community for 
personal gain to achieve happiness.  
 As a "priest" of the body, Hippias fails to convert Agathon to hedonism. Hippias 
has attempted to moderate Agathon's predilection for the soul by offering alternatives: the 
body as an object of desire and materialist philosophy as a moral theory. Both are means 
to attain happiness. These appeals argue Agathon must experience the physical world.  
 The Sophist also knows, however, that his beautiful servant's flirtations evoke 
Agathon's desire (158). Despite a vocal dismissal of a materialistic existence, the 
enthusiast feels corporal drives as any other human being would. To rehabilitate Agathon 
from his overwrought imagination, Hippias persuades the hetera Danae to join his 
project. Reflecting with Danae on his failure to reform Agathon, the Sophist calls him a 
"Schwärmer und ein unbrauchbarer Mensch" (157). The materialist uses the courtesan to 
effect a psychosomatic treatment. Hippias aims to cure Agathon's overactive intellectual 
fantasy through the body.  
 Though Hippias provides the diagnosis of Agathon's fantasy, Danae alone 
initiates an effective treatment. After hearing Hippias' diagnosis of the enthusiast's 
condition, Danae anticipates that she can win Agathon if she activates his soul. In her 
calculations, she dismisses Hippias' strategy of rational argumentation and of bodily 
sensuality to instead activate Agathon's imagination (Agathon 165). By priming 
Agathon's memory, Danae aims to create a new story and a new experience through 
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observation and fancy. Like Hippias' efforts, her plan to sway the enthusiast requires 
repeated attempts, much like a scientific experiment.  
To initiate Agathon's new therapy, Danae invites both men to a party. During 
dinner, dancers portray the myth of Daphne and Apollo to inspire the guests' imagination. 
The partygoers observe the enactment of Cupid's revenge: with a golden arrow he made 
Apollo love Daphne, and with a leaden arrow, Cupid made Daphne refuse love. Apollo 
pursues Daphne through the forest, and when he catches her, she turns into a tree, so that 
his love remains unrequited. Though the drama pleases some viewers, Agathon reads the 
dance intellectually and judges the performance of Daphne as overly flirtatious compared 
to his memory of her traditional representation. Agathon recalls the heroine as more 
indifferent and innocent (171). Because the two representations do not match, because 
Agathon fails to acknowledge the dancer's depiction of a vanquished morality and a 
longing for physical embrace, he finds the production inadequate (170). In his disdain for 
the actors and in his intellectual approach to the drama, Agathon fails to notice the 
dancer's beauty, revealing costume, and the nuance of her performance (169). The 
dramatic rendition of the myth ignites Agathon's interest and his criticism, but it does not 
change him.  
 In a second performance, however, Danae dons the actress's costume and 
transforms herself into Daphne to enact the virtuous version of the mythic character from 
Agathon's fantasy. With grace Danae gives his imagination wings and successfully 
garners his attention: "Ihr ganzes Spiel drückte die eigenste Idee des Agathon aus, aber 
mit einer Anmut, mit einer Zauberei, wovon ihm seine Phantasie keine Idee gegeben 
hatte. Die Empfindungen, von denen seine Seele in diesen Augenblicken überfallen 
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wurde, waren so lebhaft, daß er sich bemühte, seine Augen von diesem zu sehr 
bezaubernden Gegenstand abzuziehen; aber vergeblich!" (173). Moonstruck, the 
enthusiast cannot remove himself from the rapture over her constitution. Danae thereby 
uses homeopathy as the first step in a cure for his overactive imagination. She employs 
his most active faculty, the imagination, to ensnare him and reduce its effects on his 
person. Through the artistic demands of combining body and soul in performance, Danae 
engages Agathon's desire and persuades him to pursue a balance of physical and spiritual 
life.  
 Homeopathy has traditionally been dated to the close of the eighteenth century. It 
was formally developed by Samuel Hahnemann (1755-1833), who outlined the method in 
Organon der rationellen Heilkunde (1810) (Porter, Greatest Benefit 390). As a critic of 
contemporary, unsystematic physicians and pharmacists, he proposed that a naturally 
occuring disease could be treated with a slightly stronger medicinally-induced disease 
(King, The Medical World of the Eighteenth Century 167-168). While Hahnemann 
developed his system in a series of papers from the 1790's (The Medical World of the 
Eighteenth Century 164-166), philosophical doctors had previously considered similar 
ideas. Literary studies such as Georg Reuchlein's Die Heilung des Wahnsinns bei Goethe, 
Orest, Lila, der Harfner und Sperata  and Tobin's Dr.'s Orders (2001) recover how 
Goethe integrated the idea into his literary works from the 1770's. Together with 
Wieland's Agathon, Goethe's Lila archives an early example of homeopathic treatment in 
anthropology and psychology. In Wieland's novel, Danae draws Agathon from his 
Schwärmerei by gradually over-stimulating his imagination.  
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 In the ensuing relationship, Danae and Agathon fall in love and Agathon 
momentarily realizes a balance of his physical and spiritual life. Upon hearing from 
Hippias that Danae has had multiple lovers, Agathon experiences jealousy and rejects 
Danae. By leaving Smyrna for Syracuse, Agathon casts off the body to concentrate on 
Archytas's practice of Platonism. Agathon's quest to define moral nature through a 
balance of body and soul leads him to attempt a balance of individual needs and the 
promotion of the commonwealth. In Fantasy and Reality: An Epistemological Approach 
to Wieland (1974), John A. McCarthy suggests that Agathon does not regain this balance 
until the end of the novel because his conception of the moral individual changes in 
response to Hippias' sensualism and Archytas's Platonism. The hero must distance 
himself from Hippias' materialist philosophy, Archytas's subordination of the body by the 
soul, and his own ego to achieve the desired equilibrium (McCarthy, Fantasy and Reality 
85, 96-98).  
 In conclusion, like the Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G**, the Geschichte 
des Agathon sees in the interaction of body and soul the moral core of human nature. For 
Gellert, this core involves a balance of the intellect and the body expressed in bourgeois 
reading and in sensual love. The Countess's social network reinforces this equilibrium by 
depicting her encounters with adultery, murder, abandonment, and suicide. Miß Fanny 
Wilkes also depicts the danger of not achieving balance in one’s ethical life. Hermes' 
novel paints morality in terms of a dualistic logic of good and evil: Jinny and Eduard 
Handsom achieve a balance as heroine and hero, whereas James Hope fails to moderate 
his love and melancholy and lives an unbalanced life. Wieland's text similarly argues 
against the extremes of fantasy by depicting Agathon's Schwärmerei. The novel 
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discredits hedonism by showing how it leads away from moral life. By contrast, Danae 
and Agathon demonstrate how genuine balance can be attained.  
 Das Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** and Miß Fanny Wilkes elicit the 
reader's sympathy and activate the anthropological connection of physical and spiritual 
spheres in readers to evoke their edification. In Gellert's novel, the Mariane – Carlson 
subplot links the psychological and physical spheres in moral crises and models of caring 
for the whole person. In Miß Fanny Wilkes, physical signs of sensibility, such as crying 
and fainting during psychological stress, verify Jinny's and Eduard Handsom's inherent 
moral virtue. Neither novel makes direct references to specific medical or philosophical 
theories for their representation of sensibility. Each is a sentimental novel that illustrates 
the increasing use of anthropological discourse into a larger narrative framework.  
Die Geschichte des Agathon emphatically places the interaction of body and soul 
at the center of theories of knowledge and of ethics, and reveals an awareness of the state 
of the contemporary debate on the subject. Wieland's famous work displays the same 
characteristics observable in later examples of the anthropological novel: the 
commercium problem and conflict between an individual's moral system and social 
mores. Agathon prefigures preferred techniques of the anthropological novel: 
polyperspectivity, dialogue, paratexts (prefaces and fictional editor), and clear resonance 
with other disciplinary discourse (philosophy and medicine) (see characteristics in Heinz, 
Wissen vom Menschen 339-343, summarized in Chapter 3 above). As an example of the 
anthropological subgenre, Agathon debates the role of morality in human life, not as a 
theoretical concept, but a real artifact. The book's title and the eponymous character 
immediately reveal the author's ethical intent, for agathon is Greek for virtue. The lead 
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character's pursuit of the good shapes his reconciliation of his dual nature as an active 
member of society.  
Moreover, the title plays with the plurality of meanings unique to the German 
term Geschichte. The "History of Agathon" points to a history of an imagined character, 
his fictitious life, and his relationships insofar as they are believable, like Fielding does in 
The History of Tom Jones, a Foundling. At the same time, it participates in the early 
discourse on human nature, the history of anthropology. We turn now to anthropology's 
early development in one of the German centers of Enlightenment reform, a provincial 
town on the Saale river: Halle. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
SHIFTING THE FOCUS: PROBING HUMAN NATURE IN HALLE 
 
We must now take a step back in time in order to take a step forward in the 
development of eighteenth-century anthropological knowledge. In the remainder of the 
dissertation, I investigate how authors transferred anthropological knowledge from 
philosophical and medical essays to literature, as well as how they used narration in 
expository writings. Searching for evidence of an early anthropology requires examining 
diverse sources in a process like panning for gold. In "sifting" philosophical, medical, and 
theological texts from around 1750, I will clear away the unnecessary material to reveal a 
few select nuggets of wisdom that illustrate how German writers conceptualized human 
nature. Because writers had not yet institutionalized anthropology in an academic setting, 
I must draw on different evidence than the hard and fast proof one could cite in 
evaluating changes in law, medicine, theology, or philosophy.  
 This chapter argues that Halle's unique intellectual culture significantly shaped 
eighteenth-century anthropological discourses. Building on Brandenburg's policy of 
religious tolerance, Halle leaders redefined their social institutions. Pietists reformed 
religious practice and emphasized helping the poor. At the same time, the founders of 
Halle's university developed a new hierarchy of sciences, displacing theology as the 
leading discipline. Amid these changes, Halle reformers also negotiated the body/soul 
relationship in new ways. Arguing from medical, philosophical, and theological 
perspectives, thinkers such as Georg Ernst Stahl, Christian Wolff, and Joachim Lange 
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confronted the Leibnizian hypothesis of preestablished harmony through dialogue. In the 
following generation, Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann August Unzer contested the 
appropriate epistemological framework for studying the emotions. In each of these 
debates, consideration of the problem of intersubstantial causation – the question of how 
body and soul interact – promoted a further flowering of Halle's anthropological 
knowledge. 
 
Halle's Enlightenment Origins 
 Throughout its history, the achievements of Halle citizens have inevitably been 
compared to those of its neighbor, Leipzig. This intensified as Halle and Leipzig grew 
during the Enlightenment. Located only thirty kilometers to the northwest of Leipzig, 
Halle's atmosphere differed economically, politically, religiously, artistically, and 
demographically from its sister city. This was especially true as the eighteenth century 
began. 
After the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), Leipzig solidified its position as a center 
for trade. The city marked an intersection of trade routes from Cologne in the west to 
Breslau in the east, from Augsburg and Nürnberg to Poland and Russia, and from 
Bohemia to the Baltic Sea (Bruford 183). Growing in importance with the expansion of 
its three annual fairs, Leipzig surpassed Frankfurt (Main) as the leading German 
marketplace in 1681 (Martens, "Das Bild Leipzigs" 14). Visitors easily identified the 
city's unique tenor as the product of an open, international merchant community that 
encouraged a gallant style of life – Leipzig was dubbed "little Paris" – along with middle-
class values (16). In addition to the clergy, authors from the university and private life 
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directed public discourse on how to integrate gallantry into an active, ethical life. To 
persuade others to pursue middle-class values, writers addressed their audiences in books 
and periodicals. The authors' intense work boosted Leipzig's reputation as a center of 
printing and of learning (18-19). Numerous Enlightenment thinkers began their careers at 
the University of Leipzig: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Thomasius studied 
philosophy with Jakob Thomasius (Christian's father); August Hermann Francke 
garnered popularity for teaching Pietist biblical exegesis; and Christian Wolff earned his 
M.A. and began teaching there. Philosopher Erhard Weigel, natural law and political 
theoretician Samuel Pufendorf, jurist Nikolaus Hieronymus Gundling, and jurist J. 
Gottlieb Heineccius also studied or taught there. Despite these fruitful beginnings, all of 
these thinkers left Leipzig, not least due to the preponderance of restrictive university, 
state, and Lutheran orthodox traditions (Mühlpfordt 49). Around 1700, the University of 
Leipzig was decidedly conservative; only gradually did the university as a whole pursue a 
moderate curriculum and political position (Hammerstein, "Die Universität Leipzig" 125, 
137).   
By contrast, the city of Halle represented a spirit of reform. It was part of a larger 
renewal undertaken in Brandenburg state. Since 1613, Brandenburg princes such as 
Johann Sigismund (1572-1619, 1608-1619 prince elector of Brandenburg and Herzog and 
co-regent of Prussia) and Frederick William, the Great Elector (1620-1688, 1640-1688 
Brandenburg prince elector) had promoted religious toleration to gain popular acceptance 
of their Calvinist faith. Multi-confessionalism – Catholics lived alongside Lutherans in 
parts of the western territories, and Lutherans and Calvinists coexisted in the middle and 
eastern parts – characterized the Hohenzollern state and provided another impetus for 
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toleration. Further, in the wake of the Thirty Years War that purged both Brandenburg 
proper and the duchy of Magdeburg of up to half of their inhabitants, Brandenburg 
regarded immigration as a tool for economic revitalization (Deppermann 7, 22-23). As a 
result, the state encouraged workers from largely Catholic Poland to resettle in 
Brandenburg (1667), and granted asylum to French Huguenots in the 1685 Potsdam 
Tolerance Decree (23). Reform aided the educational, religious, political, and economic 
needs of Brandenburg citizens. 
Brandenburg-Prussia's policies of religious toleration affected Halle directly. In 
response to Frederick William's Toleranzedikt, a colony of French Huguenots settled in 
Halle in 1686. Another Huguenot group from the Pfalz arrived in 1689, Swiss Huguenots 
followed, and the community grew continually, establishing its first school in 1711 (72). 
In 1692, Jewish leaders founded a community in Halle. Writing on behalf of Jewish 
friends and at the behest of Brandenburg officials, Halle theologians such as Johann 
Heinrich Michaelis (1668-1738) supported toleration of Jewish religious practices 
(Arnoldi 230-241). And King Frederick William I (1688-1740, reigned as King in Prussia 
from 1713-1740) granted Catholic students (1716), Italian traders (1717), and Catholic 
mercenaries (1723) the privilege to live in the city proper before later extending the right 
to all Catholics. Thus all three Christian confessions and the Jewish community lived 
side-by-side in Halle (Kathe 57). Brandenburg-Prussia's politics of expansion and 
religious tolerance during the seventeenth century shaped Halle's multi-confessional and 
international profile at the beginning of the eighteenth century.  
 Halle's spirit of reform extended into additional areas, including the promotion of 
academic freedom at Halle's knightly academy, the institution for noble-courtly education 
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that preceded the local university. In Leipzig, August Hermann Francke's success in 
teaching Pietist biblical hermeneutics challenged the doctrine and existence of Lutheran 
Orthodoxy and cost him his job (Stoeffler 6; Deppermann 65-66). Christian Thomasius 
had a similar experience at Leipzig University. Attacking state religion and Saxony's 
political interests – Thomasius defended bigamy (1686); supported natural law, proposed 
the autonomy of legal studies from theology, and critiqued social inequalities (Monats-
Gespräche, 1688-1690); supported popular sovereignty based in reformed Protestantism 
(1688); and defended marriage between a noble Saxon (Lutheran) and a princess of 
Brandenburg (reformed Protestant) (1689) – prompted officials to prohibit Thomasius 
from publishing and teaching (Lieberwirth 33-38). This effectively ended his career in 
Leipzig.  
Called to serve Brandenburg, Thomasius began teaching in Halle in 1690 and 
Francke arrived in 1692. The new start was not easy. Working in Halle meant Thomasius 
and Francke had to outlast initial resistance by Halle's Orthodox Lutherans (Lieberwirth 
41; Deppermann 69-87). Yet in contrast to the unsympathetic Saxon ruler, Frederick III 
intervened on Thomasius's behalf when he was critiqued by government representatives 
from Denmark and Saxony (Lieberwirth 40). Supporting Francke in a similar fashion, the 
Brandenburg prince elector promised Francke personal protection, forbade preaching 
against Pietism in Brandenburg state and in Berlin, and outlawed public criticism of 
Pietism and Pietists in Halle (Hinrichs 217, 219). Frederick III promoted a degree of 
academic freedom crucial for Thomasius and Francke, especially underwriting their 
critiques of Orthodox Lutheran positions. 
Frederick William I and Frederick III pursued policies of religious toleration and 
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academic freedom for political ends. Supporting Pietism was a calculated move to 
enhance its profile in the public sphere. With their sanction of reformed Protestantism, 
Thomasius and Francke's firings from Leipzig and Erfurt played into Frederick III's 
hands. To continue strengthening Brandenburg as begun under Frederick William I, 
Frederick III wanted to demonstrate the state's power and prestige to foreign rivals. 
Maximizing Halle's political, strategic, and economic position displayed power. 
Showcasing Brandenburg's institutions, for example in a university, also aided this goal 
(cf. Hammerstein, "[University] Relations" 143).  
Like rulers in other German states, Friedrich III opened a university to increase 
the state's prestige (Schindling, Bildung 38; Mühlpfordt 46). Founded in 1694, Halle's 
Fridericiana aimed to compete with the large and prominent University of Leipzig 
(Schindling, "Die protestantischen Universitäten" 13). Functioning on multiple levels, the 
inauguration of the university represented Hohenzollern power symbolically through the 
grandeur of unique university regalia, including a bejeweled scepter. The founding of the 
Fridericiana represented state power academically, because appointments of Thomasius 
and Samuel Stryck in law, Francke and Franz Budde in theology, Friedrich Hoffmann 
and Georg Ernst Stahl in medicine, and a decade later, Christian Wolff in mathematics 
and philosophy, emphasized new theoretical models and thereby accentuated a renewal of 
university education in Brandenburg. Establishing the university entailed a practical 
exercise of power by curtailing the export of students to neighboring states. Within a 
short time, Halle's steady enrollment of around 1000 students made it one of the largest 
universities next to Leipzig, Jena, and by mid-century, Göttingen ("Die protestantischen 
Universitäten" 13). By educating youth within Brandenburg, the Halle university 
  180 
prepared them to serve as pastors, bureaucrats, lawyers, teachers, and doctors in service 
to the Hohenzollern state (Mühlpfordt 46-47).  
 Led by Thomasius's emphasis of law and history as lead disciplines, the new 
university reshaped the social atmosphere and the means for creating knowledge. For 
Thomasius, this meant creating new, respectful means of comportment and a correlating 
focus on psychological needs (Hammerstein, "Halle's Ort" 24). Concerned equally with 
proper living and inner absolution, Pietists in Halle shared similar concerns. Halle's 
reform of knowledge also principally challenged established norms by emphasizing 
individual responsibility and autonomous thought (26). As the first among the German 
universities of its time, the Fridericiana thus combined a new life philosophy and a new 
scientific approach, as Notker Hammerstein has claimed: "Die erste in dieser Weise 
moderne, frühaufgeklärte Universität war mit der Fridericiana in Halle ins Leben 
getreten. Hier war ein neuer Wissenschaftsbegriff, eine neue Universitätspraxis und ein 
neues Universitätsleben verwirklicht worden" (24). Halle symbolized a new beginning. 
This was true specifically for the sciences, to which we now turn. 
 
Holism or Monadology: Stahl and Leibniz 
 From the university's founding, the medical faculty contributed key elements of 
Halle's scientific innovation. Leading the medical division was Halle native Friedrich 
Hoffmann the Younger (1660-1742), who recruited his colleague Georg Ernst Stahl 
(1659-1734) for the second medical professorship in 1694. In 1679, Hoffmann and Stahl 
had studied briefly together in Jena, where each began teaching several years later. 
Troubled by poor health and conflict with the medical faculty in Jena, Hoffmann 
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journeyed to Holland and London, meeting Robert Boyle, before working as a doctor in 
Minden and Halberstadt between 1685 and 1693. From 1683 to 1687 Stahl taught at the 
university in Jena and then served from 1687 to 1694 as personal physician to Duke 
Johann Ernst II of Saxony-Weimar (1664-1707) (I. W. Müller "Mechanismus" 246). In 
Jena and Weimar Stahl worshipped with members of Thüringen's revivalist movements 
(Geyer-Kordesch, "G. E. Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 75). At the command of the 
ducal family, Stahl worked to recruit August Hermann Francke for the post of court 
preacher in 1691, but failed.  
 Stahl's renown as a scientist stemmed partly from his work in chemistry. After 
initially supporting the study of alchemy, he became one of its early critics. By 
synthesizing results from diverse chemical experiments, Stahl provided an early 
systematic account of chemical theory (Liliencron et al. 35:781). He also explained 
combustion and oxidation by arguing that the release of phlogiston enabled these 
chemical transformations. The theory inspired much of eighteenth-century chemical 
research (35:782-783). Between 1770 and 1790, Antoine Lavoisier conducted oxidation 
experiments and eventually replaced the phlogiston theory by attributing oxidation and 
combustion to oxygen (King, Philosophy 143; Rothschuh 74-75). 
 After Hermann Boerhaave in Leiden, Hoffmann and Stahl were two of the most 
important doctors of the early eighteenth century (Helm 62; Geyer-Kordesch, "G. E. 
Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 75). This judgment may stem in part from the fact that 
between 1700 and 1740, the Halle faculty educated far more medical students than any 
other German university (Konert 25). In contrast to many university physicians of their 
time, both Halle physicians placed particular emphasis on their skills as clinicians. For 
  182 
Hoffmann, treating patients required the judicious application of practical experience and 
theoretical knowledge to an individual case. Focusing on physical motion, Hoffmann's 
iatromechanical theory argued that changes in fluid circulation enabled sensation and 
movement; the healthy body functioned like a clockwork (I. W. Müller "Mechanismus" 
248). Disruption of the hydraulic system prompted infirmity. Treating illness in the 
human machine required restoring normal circulation of fluids such as the blood (251, 
253). Hoffmann's mechanical physiology accorded the soul little influence in bodily 
function and his therapy left treatment of the soul to men of the cloth (249).  
 Though Stahl shared with Hoffmann a primary interest in the practical treatment 
of patients, he set different theoretical accents. Declining Hoffmann's theory of "nerve 
spirits" as the material intermediary between body and soul, Stahl believed the body's 
mechanism was controlled by the soul. The soul used the blood to regulate cellular 
respiration and thereby to sustain the mechanism. Illnesses developed, like for Hoffmann, 
from disturbances in circulation and excretion; at worst, they could become toxic. While 
blockages in the body's hydraulic system were to be avoided, other symptoms of sickness 
such as fever and infection increased circulation and aided the larger healing process 
(258). Treating illness by normalizing circulation, Stahl proposed therapies like those of 
Hoffmann and additionally emphasized bloodletting (259). In his medical practice, Stahl 
thus integrated mechanistic doctrine into his animistic philosophy (King, Philosophy 
146). This combination in Stahl's Theoria medica vera (1708) prompted a challenge 
issued in a series of letters by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716).  
 Stahl published an account of Leibniz's challenges and his own responses in 
Negotium otiosum (1720). Because of the way it recounts multiple exchanges, the book 
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has an unusually complicated structure. After opening with Leibniz's initial objections 
(Dubia), Stahl included his own replies (Enodationes) and a review of contested ideas 
(Conspectus). A second exchange ensued, beginning with thirty-one Exceptiones from 
Leibniz, followed by Stahl's equal number of Replicationes (Duchesneau 218; cf. table of 
contents in Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 22-23). In 1709, Leibniz 
penned a critique of the Theoria medica vera and asked Pietist theologian and founder of 
Halle's Biblical Institute Karl Hildebrandt von Canstein (1667-1719) to deliver it to Stahl 
(Hartmann 98). Continuing until 1715, the exchange surveyed views contesting the 
relationship of the material to the metaphysical. Three differences were particularly 
relevant for the development of anthropology, including Leibniz and Stahl's different 
views of organism vs. mechanism, of causality and the laws of nature, and of theories of 
motion and the emotions. 
 While Cartesian dualism and materialist theory explained life processes 
mechanically, Stahl made the case that human beings were more than machines 
(Hartmann 110). The physician defined a mechanism as a physical thing governed by 
logical and mechanical principles of undesigned movement (Duchesneau 218). Like a 
divinely-regulated clockwork, mechanisms functioned, but did not determine their own 
purpose (Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy II" 62). By contrast, an 
organism chose to act within and using the body to accomplish its own goals. Stahl's 
organism generated its heterogeneous, dynamic, and complex chemical nature under 
direction of the soul (Duchesneau 219). The term "organism" meant something different 
from our current popular usage. "When Stahl writes about the organism," Johanna Geyer-
Kordesch notes, "he does not mean a body 'endowed with organs'. 'Organic' to him means 
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a coordinated and integrated whole, the 'organism' adjusting to its environment both on a 
conscious and unconscious level (sensually, emotionally, and mentally) with immediate 
physiological results. Thus Stahl's medical theory is essentially a theory of a holistic, self-
determined 'organism'" (Geyer-Kordesch, "G. E. Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 69). 
 Leibniz shared Stahl's dissatisfaction with Cartesian dualism's mechanistic 
interpretation of human faculties and embraced a reformed view of mechanism 
(Hartmann 110; Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 28). Using the phrase 
omnia in corporibus fieri mechanice, Leibniz evaluated qualities of bodies – their size, 
shape, and motion – to explain physical phenomena rationally (Hartmann 113; 
Duchesneau 223-224). Physical things changed based on cause and effect and laws of 
motion. For those complex mechanical states that escaped explanation, Leibniz reverted 
to teleology (227). Meanwhile, perception and appetition shaped the psychic realm (228). 
Organisms were refined mechanisms that developed from an endless series of functional 
processes, the physical and the psychological alike (Duchesneau 225; Rather and 
Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 29). Whereas for Stahl the organism established 
its own purpose, for Leibniz divine providence guided the organism. 
Theories of intersubstantial causation, of how body and soul influence each other, 
further illustrate Leibniz's and Stahl's theoretical differences. Representatives of 
occasionalism, most notably Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), argued that because the 
material and the immaterial could not interact on their own, God intervened whenever 
necessary to facilitate between the body and the soul. Leibniz proposed a different idea. 
Functioning separately in parallel spheres, the body and the soul (entelechy) responded to 
each other with complementary actions as pre-determined by God (Rather and Frerichs, 
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"Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 26-27). This system of preestablished harmony relied on 
the correlation of the soul's representations with bodily movement and vice versa, though 
each sphere remained bound to its own laws and limited to action in its own realm 
(Duchesneau 232). Prepared by the correlation, each domain responded internally to 
perceived changes in the other realm, as Leibniz illustrates: "Therefore when the soul 
wills something with success the machine is inclined and ready to do this spontaneously 
out of its own natural motions; and on the other hand, when the soul perceives changes in 
the body she draws new perceptions from her own series of earlier (but confused) 
perceptions, rather than from the fact that the body is disturbing the laws of the soul" 
(Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 26). Such coordination might even 
go unnoticed, Leibniz claimed, because the physical body could synchronize 
imperceptible actions with representations in the soul (Duchesneau 231; Rather and 
Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 28).  
 Years of medical experience led Stahl to reject Leibniz's hypothesis. Placing 
himself among physicians, Stahl acknowledged interaction between the material and the 
metaphysical: "But it is that I, along with the whole school of medical physiologists, 
attribute to the soul the energy for actively exciting movements suited to the conservation 
as well as to every other need of her body. Alternatively, of providing and supervising 
her body with vital as well as animal movements" (Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl 
Controversy II" 57).  The soul directly influenced the body, thus any aid from spirits, as 
Leibniz proposed, was false and simply weakened the claim of an interrelationship. 
Interdependence meant that the two spheres were not in opposition, as preestablished 
harmony implied, but complementary. Emphasizing integration versus division was a key 
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aspect of Stahl's holistic understanding of the organism. Refusing to recognize the co-
dependence of the material and the metaphysical implied the nonexistence of key life 
experiences such as action and passion (58). 
 The theories of Leibniz and Stahl differed most in explaining emotion and 
voluntary bodily motion. While Leibniz admitted affections in the soul and the body 
corresponded, each realm remained separate according to the theory of preestablished 
harmony. People who attributed bodily change to emotions neglected their physical 
cause. For Leibniz, the logic of the physical universe was at stake: bodies had to follow 
mechanical laws. He surmised that there must be a physical cause for each bodily change 
in the emotions (Hartmann 118). And insofar as the emotions affected the soul, they 
represented confused ideas that complicated the hierarchy of cognition. From Leibniz's 
perspective, disorder stemmed merely from illness or a lack of human perspective in 
divine purposes (114). 
 Stahl viewed motion not according to physics and the law of nature as power or 
energy, but as an element of life's dynamic process (Geyer-Kordesch, "Georg Ernst 
Stahl" 322). De-emphasizing the question of how movement started, he shifted the focus 
from causation to continuation of organic processes (Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl 
Controversy II" 60). In this holistic framework, the emotions were an important test case 
for the theories of causation. Stahl emphasized that Leibniz's preestablished harmony 
hypothesis failed to explain how emotions diverted divinely pre-programmed matter, 
producing agitation or even death. The emotions prompted symptoms in the material and 
metaphysical realms: 
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For since those movements seated within the body itself were properly and 
directly established and intended for the conservation of the body, since the soul is 
supposed to have nothing in common with them, even with conservation itself as a whole, 
yet indeed the soul does not have an appetite for injury and destruction of the body 
whether immediately or only mediately, surely the fact remains inexplicable how, I say, 
from a sudden inconsidered idea (such as are formed by the emotions with such little 
clarity that a man himself does not recall that he thought of, wished for, or grasped after 
any such thing as that which powerfully results) not only do movements so prompt and 
powerful follow, leaving orderly vital management far behind, but also those not intended 
by the soul even in thought, let alone in appetite, for example collapse, pallor, chill, 
trembling from fear, nausea even to the most violent attempts at vomiting, from subject 
matter falsely imagined, recalled, or prefigured in the memory, not so much detestable as 
only adversely made, since by agreement of all other men it is good or even desirable. 
Palpitations of the heart, anxious sweats, panting, breathing, changeable pulse, from fear; 
none of which the soul either desires, or even directly knows or remembers, etc. (63) 
 
Extending his own philosophy to the emotions, Stahl assumed that the soul 
influenced the body, naming common signs. Physical and emotional cues included: 
"fainting, pallor, chills, fearful trembling, nausea, anxious sweats, panting," and a 
"changeable pulse." But in the passions physical influx was unpredictable. Bodily signs 
made this exchange visible, if not always decipherable. 
 Confronting each other's ideas, Stahl and Leibniz were forced to clarify 
their argumentation. Diverging from Newtonian mechanics, Stahl conceived of motion as 
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a dynamic action. Leibniz developed his idea of preestablished harmony by working out 
the principles of the monadology (Hartmann 123). Both Leibniz and Stahl reacted 
critically to Cartesian definitions of dualism, yet reached separate anthropological 
conclusions. Leibniz defined the human based on the individual and cosmological 
structure of monads, i.e. immaterial components of all things that contained a whisper of 
divine essence and were ruled by perception and appetite (Hartmann 121; Jolley 67-68). 
Stahl described the human based on a holistic conception of organism as he observed in 
his clinical practice. Additionally, though Leibniz and Stahl shared a teleological 
worldview, their horizons diverged. Beginning with the Cartesian categories of the res 
cogitans and res extensa, Leibniz insisted upon cosmological order by classifying human 
functions as either corporal or spiritual. Intermediary states were problematic. Because 
the emotions were difficult to understand, he attributed them to the sensorial body 
(Hartmann 114). By contrast, Stahl integrated the emotions as an imperfect dimension of 
human nature, a mode of being equal to and indivisible from reason, the imagination, or 
volition (Geyer-Kordesch, "G. E. Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 77). 
 This debate resonated in Halle and across Germany. Leibniz's theories of 
intersubstantial causation and mechanistic theory shaped Wolff's philosophy (Geyer-
Kordesch, "Georg Ernst Stahl" 326, 348-350). Stahl's hypothesis that the soul could 
influence matter paralleled Pietist beliefs in transformative processes, i.e. that the natural 
could be changed by rebirth (Geyer-Kordesch, "G. E. Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 
78). By faithfully questioning mechanist views of the universe and incorporating the soul 
into his medical theory, Stahl gained Pietist support. Likewise his view that intelligence 
involved sensation, imagination, and the emotions as well as reason intersected with the 
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Pietist focus on spiritual growth through imagination and emotion (81). By probing the 
nature of the soul, the role of the nervous system, and the imbalance of the mind, Stahl 
proves to be a pioneer in bridging the realms of the material and the metaphysical ("G. E. 
Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 87). Ultimately, his lasting medical contribution was 
anthropological in nature. 
 
Determinism versus Freedom: Wolff and Lange 
 Defining human nature and describing causation also shaped a debate between 
Halle philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and theologian Joachim Lange (1670-
1744). Wolff was educated in Breslau, Jena, and Leipzig, and began teaching 
mathematics and physic in Halle in 1707. In 1709/1710, he added philosophical lectures 
to his repertoire and increasingly taught metaphysics, logic, and ethics (C. Wolff, "Eigene 
Lebensbeschreibung" 14). Amid early Latin treatises on mathematics, Wolff published 
his own logic, ethics, and metaphysics in German with titles such as Vernünftige 
Gedanken, von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes, und ihrem richtigen 
Gebrauche in Erkenntniß der Wahrheit (1713, also called Deutsche Logik) and 
Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen 
Dingen überhaupt (1719, also known as Deutsche Metaphysik) (cf. Gottsched 2:104-
105). He gained notoriety throughout Germany for the Vernünftige Gedanken series of 
publications, and his profile rose through debate with Lange. 
 After a youth devoted to theological study, Lange attended Francke's Collegium 
Philobiblicum in Leipzig, living with Francke during the founding years of Pietism. After 
Leipzig's theological faculty forbade Francke's philological courses in 1689, Lange 
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followed his mentor to Erfurt, then on to Halle, where he developed ties to other Pietists 
from 1691 to 1693 (Kühnel 11). While studying in Halle, Lange tutored children of 
prominent families, including those of Thomasius, and from 1693 in Berlin, children of 
Baron von Canitz (12). Though educated for the clergy, Lange saw teaching and writing 
as his real calling and declined numerous pastoral positions. He subsequently directed a 
Berlin school (1698-1709) before assuming a theological chair at the Fridericiana in 
1709 (13). 
 The impetus for Wolff's clash with Lange and the Pietists dates to 1721. At the 
annual ceremony marking power transfer from the outgoing to the incoming university 
president, the philosopher Wolff was transferring the rotating office to the theologian 
Lange. Wolff spoke on ethics in Chinese philosophy. Arguing that reason could provide a 
systematic basis for ethics without revelation, Christian doctrine, or God, the lecture 
displaced Christian theology with human reason to determine what it is good to do and to 
be. Additionally, while maintaining his own Christian faith, Wolff proclaimed Christian 
and Chinese ethical systems equally valid. Protesting the lecture, dean of theology 
Francke asked for a lecture transcript; Wolff refused. Determined to take action, the 
Pietist professors each read a portion of Wolff's oeuvre to examine his moral positions 
and to identify traces of atheism (14). Lange directed the ensuing Pietist critique of 
Wolff's philosophical system, an exchange that continued from 1723 to 1736. 
 Writing from the Pietist viewpoint, Lange identified two key philosophical 
problems with Wolff's philosophy. Lange argued Wolff chose the wrong explanation of 
intersubstantial causation, preestablished harmony. This made Wolff's philosophy 
inherently deterministic and denied the Enlightenment subject the possibility of self-
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determination, which was essential for the Pietists. The argument here closely follows 
Bruno Bianco's essay "Freiheit gegen Fatalismus: Zu Joachim Langes Kritik an Wolff." 
Whereas Bianco cites Lange's Modesto disquisitio and Wolff's response in the Luculenta 
commentatio and Monitum ad commentationem luculentam from 1723, my analysis 
draws on Lange's writings in German. Like Wolff, Lange published in the traditional 
academic Latin as well as in German for a broader audience. Because this dissertation 
aims to trace the popularization of anthropological concepts in Germany, the focus falls 
here on the Bescheidene und ausführliche Entdeckung der falschen und schädlichen 
Philosophie in dem Wolffianischen Systemate Metaphysico von Gott, der Welt und den 
Menschen [...] (1724, hereafter Bescheidene Entdeckung). 
 In §765 of Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, 
Wolff drew his explanation of intersubstantial causation from Leibniz. Both human 
spheres functioned concurrently:  
Da nun die Seele ihre eigene Kraft hat, wodurch sie sich die Welt vorstellet 
(§753): hingegen auch alle natürliche Veränderungen des Leibes in seinem Wesen und 
seiner Natur gegründet sind (§630); so siehet man leicht, daß die Seele das ihre für sich 
thut, und der Cörper gleichfals seine Veränderungen für sich hat, ohne daß entweder die 
Seele in den Leib, und der Leib in die Seele würcket, oder auch GOtt durch seine 
unmittelbahre Würckung solches verrichtet, nur stimmen die Empfindungen und 
Begierden der Seele mit den Veränderungen und Bewegungen des Leibes überein. (478-
479)  
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Neither realm directly influenced the other. The material and the metaphysical remained 
parallel and functioned separately in a synchronized fashion.  
 Lange saw Wolff's explanation of causation using preestablished harmony as 
fundamentally flawed. In the introduction or Protheorie to Bescheidene Entdeckung, 
Lange posited the reciprocal relation of body and soul. People were made of two natural 
substances, which must have a natural coexistence and interaction (J. Lange, 
"Bescheidene Entdeckung" 39-40). And experience confirmed the dualistic 
interrelationship based on the soul's control and movement of the physical organism, and 
the soul's use of sensations to form representations and ideas (41, 47). Thus logic and 
experience provided evidence for material and metaphysical interaction. As a theologian, 
Lange made an appeal to the authority of the Bible, which also stated in "almost 
innumerable cases" that the soul directs the body, and must guide it well. For example, he 
cited Paul in 1 Corinthians 9: "[Every athlete exercises self-control in all things. They do 
it to receive a perishable wreath, but we an imperishable. …] I pommel my body and 
subdue it, lest after preaching to others I myself should be disqualified" (43). Certainly 
this passage represented the biblical hierarchy of body and soul, yet it did little to explain 
how their connection functioned. This reference to the Bible served as a claim to the 
authority of the Holy Scriptures, an argument that carried greater weight in the eighteenth 
century than it might among a general audience today. Overall, Lange's case used 
Scripture moderately. According to his account, reason, experience, and the Bible 
supported physical influx as the explanation of causation and not Wolff's preestablished 
harmony. 
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 To underscore the validity of the physical influx argument, Lange gave it a 
cosmological scope. Paralleling the soul's choices of bodily action, God shaped the 
material world through his will (49). The sphere of a single human will analogically 
represented a microcosm of the divine will directing the universe. By extending the 
significance of physical influx beyond the individual, Lange gave his hypothesis a 
systematic thrust Leibniz and Wolff had already developed for preestablished harmony. 
 In addition to these arguments for physical influx, Lange also discredited 
opposing arguments. For example, he claimed that those who supported another theory of 
causation failed to disprove the real-world experience of physical influx; the actual 
connection was replaced with a metaphysical one ("Bescheidene Entdeckung" 43-44). 
And though opponents objected that Lange had misrepresented experience, he said such 
claims were unfounded and judged metaphysical explanations of causation 
(preestablished harmony and occasionalism) as unbelievable (44-45). Despite the body's 
mechanical structure, human beings depended on the soul for movement and were neither 
machines nor automata. Because the soul commanded the body, materialist claims were 
unfounded. Further, the soul's direction of the body varied according to the will and 
demanded an explanation beyond the one mechanists offered (46).  
 In his most important claim against Wolff's philosophy, Lange argued the 
Deutsche Metaphysik denied the soul freedom and invoked fatalism.50 Freedom was the 
distinguishing human characteristic: "Die Freiheit aber ist dasjenige, welches die aktive 
                                                 
50 Wolfgang Riedel notes that new empirical methods in psychology (including Wolff's Psychologia 
empirica, 21738) made the concept of the soul's freedom from nature questionable. I received Riedel's essay 
just as I was to submit the dissertation and could no longer integrate it into my discussion. See Wolfgang 
Riedel, "Erster Psychologismus: Umbau des Seelenbegriffs in der deutschen Spätaufklärung," Zwischen 
Empirisierung und Konstruktionsleistung: Anthropologie im 18. Jahrhundert, eds. Jörn Garber and Heinz 
Thoma, Hallesche Beiträge zur europäischen Aufklärung 24 (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 2004) 1-17. 
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Kraft der Seele von allen andern Kräften, welche andern lebendigen und zugleich 
körperlichen, auch leblosen, Geschöpfen eigen sind, sehr weit unterscheidet, und ihre 
Vortrefflichkeit anzeiget" (35). More important than reason or volition on its own, more 
important than perception through sensation, freedom represented the active potentiality 
of human life. The soul's essence originated from autonomy:  
Die Freiheit des Verstandes und des Willens bestehet und äußert sich sonderlich darinnen, daß die 
Seele selbst ist die freie Ursache ihrer Herrschaft, ohne durch eine äußerliche, oder durch eine 
innerliche aus ihrer eignen Natur herrührende Notwendigkeit daran verhindert zu werden, nach 
ihrer freien Willkür dies oder das, so oder anders, zu beschließen, zu wollen, und zu handeln; 
dergestalt, daß das, was wirklich beschlossen und geschehen ist, entweder gar nicht, oder doch 
anders hätte geschehen können (35). 
 
Guiding the use of judgment, volition, and action, freedom as self-directed force thus 
shaped the real trajectory of one's life choices. Throughout the introduction to the 
Bescheidene Entdeckung, autonomy was Lange's anthropological marker. It was 
introduced in contradiction to the mechanistic underpinnings of other systems, including 
Wolff's. 
 Wolff defined the soul in a fundamentally different manner. Representation was 
its essence: "Die Seele [hat] eine Kraft sich die Welt vorzustellen, nach dem Stande ihres 
Cörpers in der Welt. [...] Weil demnach diese Kraft der Grund ist von allem demjenigen, 
was veränderliches [sic] in der Seele vorgehet, so bestehet in ihr das Wesen der Seele" 
(C. Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken von Gott 468-469). Yet using the soul as primarily an 
image-processing center, Lange's argued, subordinated it to laws of necessity. Due to its 
dependence on incoming sensations for ideas, Wolff conceptualized the soul's 
representation as a necessary reaction instead of as a choice.  
 Mechanistic metaphors also became touchstones in the debate over human nature. 
In the Deutsche Metaphysik, Wolff wrote that the human will functioned like a scale, 
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with the soul weighing motives (310). However the scale, a mechanical device without 
autonomy, threatened as a metaphor to misrepresent the entire nature of the soul (J. 
Lange, "Bescheidene Entdeckung", 77). Lange opposed Wolff's metaphor because 
freedom was not attributed to the soul: "Denn die Waage ist nicht ein Ding, so in seiner 
Freiheit stehet und handelt, also daß sie bei gleichem Gewichte in Bewegung kommen 
und den Ausschlag auf einer Seite geben könne, sondern sich mit ihrem Züngelein 
notwendig in der Mitten halten, oder nach dem größern Gewicht lenken oder sich ziehen 
lassen muß: Die Seele aber in der Freiheit stehet" (77-78). The scale was subject to the 
exterior forces of gravity and was governed by the laws of nature. By contrast, 
autonomous subjects created their own "forces" through their choices.  
 Lange argued that the preestablished harmony supported by Leibniz and Wolff 
relegated human beings to a universe of necessity. As we have seen, Wolff maintained in 
Deutsche Metaphysik that representations in the soul and sensations in the body occurred 
in parallel, yet without directly influencing each other (C. Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken 
von Gott 483). Challenging conclusions about experience of the world, this interpretation 
divided the anthropological unity of psyche and soma into a double mechanism (Bianco, 
121). Lange responded critically: "Hier siehet man abermal ganz klar, daß der Körper und 
die Seele in dem Zusammenhang, den sie mit der ganzen Welt haben sollen, als 2 Uhren 
vorgestellet werden, welche so eingerichtet sind, daß sie aufs allergenaueste in allen 
zusammen treffen" (J. Lange, "Bescheidene Entdeckung" 84). Like occasionalism, this 
hypothesis left the seeming interaction between the material and the metaphysical 
inadequately explained. Each clockwork or sphere operated according to regular 
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principles, like a machine. Synchronizing two spheres did not make a human being 
because Lange's defining characteristic of the subject, freedom, was excluded. 
 For Lange, the debate of free will versus necessity had great stakes. Freedom was 
an essential part of Pietist life because acts of repentance required self-evaluation and 
following a new path in life. Similarly, confessions of faith involved choosing to be born 
again in Christian redemptive history. Pietism also made it a duty to serve others. 
Without exercising freedom in their spiritual lives, Pietists neither fulfilled their calling to 
a spiritual rebirth nor to serving their community. 
 The Bescheidene Entdeckung warned that Leibniz and Wolff's deterministic 
worldview threatened to nullify freedom, and consequently nullify morality and religion. 
By removing choice from human action, people would become automata. Lange believed 
that individuals had to will participation in moral orders. Without freedom, morality and 
religion were not possible. And it was a slippery slope of degeneration, Lange argued, to 
asocial behavior, animalistic desire, and atheism (J. Lange, "Bescheidene Entdeckung" 
87). Over the next thirteen years, Wolff defended the soul's freedom in preestablished 
harmony and sought to discredit the charge of determinism (Bianco 122-123).  
 The Lange-Wolff debate featured two Protestant philosophers who took different 
views on the role of theology in philosophy. Like Stahl, Lange argued from experience 
that the material and the immaterial interacted, and from faith that the soul possessed the 
power to choose its action and to direct the body. Like Leibniz, Wolff insisted a priori 
that the Cartesian division of material and immaterial substance necessitated the theory of 
preestablished harmony as the most logical explanation of intersubstantial causation. 
Building on the Stahl-Leibniz debate, the Lange-Wolff controversy came to a head on the 
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issue of determinism. By claiming that both body and soul of necessity followed 
particular laws, Wolff's comprehensive explanation of the human system left no choices 
for human actors (C. Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken von Gott 483-486; Saine 148). 
Though the Leibniz-Wolff school attempted to diffuse the critique, skeptics such as 
Antoine Arnauld, Christian Langhansen, as well as Louis de Jaucourt in the Encyclopedie 
voiced continued critique on this issue (Bianco 128). Whereas some historians have 
dismissed Lange's negative evaluation of Wolff's philosophy (Wundt 238), the 
questioning of radical determinism was a weak point in the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy 
and a key issue for modern subjectivity (Bianco 129-136).  
The struggle between systematizing knowledge a priori and a posteriori 
significantly shaped anthropological theory. Like Leibniz, Wolff largely deduced his 
metaphysical principles, but the latter shaped them to the needs of an overarching system. 
Like Stahl, Lange chose physical influx in part based on empirical knowledge. The tools 
of reason and observation further shaped the epistemological framework and thereby the 
interpretation of causation for subsequent generations of Halle academics, to whom we 
now turn. 
 
The Halle Milieu in the 1740's 
 Around 1740, a half century of Halle reform had advanced the creation of 
knowledge and the structure of the university. August Hermann Francke had welcomed 
university students to his successful primary and secondary schools by offering practical 
teaching experience. Stahl, Hoffmann, and their medical students had initiated the clinical 
practice of medicine and grown Halle medical student enrollments to the largest number 
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in Germany (Oehme cit. in Konert 25). Similarly, Christian Wolff had revolutionized 
philosophy and become a symbol of the Enlightenment by consistently using German 
terminology and by ordering concepts,. In the wake of Wolff's system, opposing 
theologians were forced to acknowledge philosophy's appeal to truth based on reason 
alone. Young theologians such as Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten even applied the 
mathematical method to the study of religion. But researchers were unable to definitively 
explain intersubstantial causation. 
 Halle researchers from diverse fields continued to explore the nexus of the 
material and the metaphysical in new ways. Among them were three local students: 
Samuel Gotthold Lange (1711-1781), Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), and Johann 
August Unzer (1727-1799). As the son of Pietist theologian Joachim Lange, S. G. Lange 
had completed a theology degree in Halle while also studying philology, natural sciences 
and medicine (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" 402). The pastor's son Meier was 
born in a village near Halle and received private tutoring before studying theology and 
philosophy at the Fridericiana (403). Finally, Johann August Unzer, the son of a local 
wigmaker, attended Francke's Latin school and thereafter studied philosophy, 
mathematics, and medicine in Halle (Bilger 47). In addressing anthropological questions, 
these writers drew on their contemporary Halle context. 
 In an essay entitled "Intellectual Field and Creative Project," (1966) Pierre 
Bourdieu argues that the communicative context of social relations shaped intellectual 
creation (89). Historians have already applied this insight to Enlightenment culture (see, 
for example, McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries chs. 4 and 6). We all know ideas influence 
ideas. Thus around 1740, new impulses of reform shaped Meier, Lange, and Unzer's 
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Halle milieu. Beginning in 1735, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten canonized aesthetics as 
the "science of sensuous perception" (Baumgarten 3). This rhetoric-based philosophical 
discipline represented both an epistemology and the capacity to create something (Franke 
73). Between 1738 and 1742, Immanuel Jakob Pyra integrated insight from Baumgarten's 
aesthetics into one of the first German-language treatises on the sublime (Zelle, 
"Einleitung" 7). As a critic, he wielded his aesthetics in the Leipzig-Zürich Literaturstreit 
(Zelle, "Pietismus"). Collaborating with Samuel Gotthold Lange, Pyra produced the first 
volume of German poetry of sensibility, the Freundschaftliche Lieder (1745) (Siegrist 
295). Another poetic model developed simultaneously in Halle: rococo poetry. Inspired 
by Friedrich von Hagedorn's (1708-1754) verse, Johann Nikolaus Götz (1721-1781), 
Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim (1719-1803), and Johann Peter Uz (1720-1796) 
developed the Halle school of anacreontic poetry.51 Praising women and wine, they sang 
the joys of life in love, friendship, and sociability. Thus at the beginning of the 1740's, 
Halle's philosophers and poets emphasized the role of the body and of sensation in 
understanding human nature and in living a good life. 
                                                 
51 See, for example, Wolfram Mauser, "Anakreon als Therapie? Zur medizinisch-diätetischen Begründung 
der Rokokodichtung," Lessing Yearbook/Jahrbuch 20 (1988): 87-120. Wolfram Mauser, "Horaz in Halle: 
Johann Peter Uz und die Halleschen Dichterkreise," Aufklärung und Erneuerung: Beiträge zur Geschichte 
der Universität Halle im ersten Jahrhundert ihres Bestehens (1694-1806), ed. Günter Jerouschek, et al. 
(Hanau, Halle: Werner Dausien, 1994) 78-86. Theodor Verweyen, "Halle, die Hochburg des Pietismus, die 
Wiege der Anakreontik.  Über das Konfliktpotential der anakreontischen Poesie als Kunst der ,,sinnlichen 
Erkenntnis''," Zentren der Aufklärung I: Halle. Aufklärung und Pietismus, ed. Norbert Hinske, 
Wolfenbüttler Studien zur Aufklärung, 15 (Heidelberg: Schneider, 1989) 209-238. Theodor  Verweyen and 
Gunther Witting, "Zur Rezeption Baumgartens bei Uz, Gleim und Rudnick," Zeitschrift fur Deutsche 
Philologie 113.4 (1994): 496-514. Theodor Verweyen and Gunther Witting, "Zum philosophischen und 
ästhetisch-theoretischen Kontext der Rokoko-Anakreontik (mit einem unbekannten Brief A. G. 
Baumgartens an J. W. L. Gleim im Anhang)," Dichter und Bürger in der Provinz: Johann Peter Uz und die 
Aufklärung in Ansbach, eds. Ernst Rohmer and Theodor Verweyen, Frühe Neuzeit: Studien und 
Dokumente zur Deutschen Literatur und Kultur im Europäischen Kontext 42 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1998) 
1-30. Hans-Joachim Kertscher, ed., Anakreontik: zweiter Hallescher Dichterkreis. Gleim, Götz, Rudnick, 
Uz, 1. Aufl. ed. (Halle/Saale: Hallescher Verlag, 1993) 7-15. 
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 Natural scientists also eagerly investigated the nexus of physiology and 
psychology. By virtue of their Hippocratic oath, Halle's physicians worked to heal the 
body, yet they also explored connections of the material to the metaphysical. In his three-
volume Naturlehre (1740-1750), Johann Gottlob Krüger (1715-1759) departed from the 
standard historical or mathematical conceptualization of nature to theorize how the body 
functioned and how it worked with the soul in the emotions, the senses, and bodily 
movement. A key concept here, as well as in his 1742 dissertation entitled De sensatione, 
was the role of the nerves. Combining transmission of external perceptions to the brain 
and of the will's commands to the body, the nerves enabled communication between the 
physical and moral spheres. Building on Krüger's theories, Johann Christian Bolten's 
(1720-1757) Gedancken von psychologischen Curen (1751) argued for the integration of 
aesthetics into psychological therapy. Bolten understood aesthetics in a Baumgartian 
sense as the science of sensuous perception: "Die Ästhetik lehret ferner die Regeln...die 
Sinne,...die Einbildungskraft,...den Wiz,...die Scharfsinnigkeit,...das Gedächtnis,...die 
Dichtungskraft,...den Geschmack,...[und] das Bezeichnungsvermögen zu verbessern" 
(Bolten 67-79). It promised to remove debilitating distraction by increasing capacities of 
concentration and abstraction for the lower cognitive faculties (64-65).  
 Halle's reformers addressed human nature from diverse perspectives. Tapping the 
poetic imagination and the medical/philosophical investigation of sensation, writers 
explored the causal relationships between the material and the metaphysical. Distancing 
themselves from the humanistic tradition of publishing in Latin, Halle authors frequently 
published in German. Thus, their writings highlighted anthropological questions for a 
broad reading public. Scanning the titles of anthropological texts inspired by the Halle 
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reforms and published during the 1740's and 1750's reveals the authors' interest in the 
nature of body/soul causation. Titles included Gedancken von den Würckungen der 
Einbildungskraft in den menschlichen Cörper, aus den Gründen der neueren 
Weltweisheit hergeleitet (Nicolai, 1744) or Gedanken vom Einflusse der Seele in ihren 
Körper (Unzer, 1746). Explaining the psychological and physical origins of everyday 
phenomena also took center stage, for example in Abhandlung vom Seufzen (Unzer, 
1747), De sternutatione [On Sneezing] (Unzer, 1748), Abhandlung von dem Lachen 
(Nicolai, 1746), and Gedancken von Thränen und Weinen (Nicolai, 1748). Combining 
physiological knowledge and human observation, Ernst Anton Nicolai (1722-1802) and 
Unzer developed their conclusions empirically. Before turning to how Meier, S. G. 
Lange, and Unzer presented these ideas in popular periodicals, a brief look at how 
causation affected theories of emotion will provide insight into Halle's unique intellectual 
culture at this time. 
 
Emotions from Volition and Sensation: Meier and Unzer 
 Meier and Unzer's theories of the emotions were part of an ongoing discussion in 
Halle. In 1695, Halle physician Georg Ernst Stahl had published an essay entitled "On the 
Influence of the Passions on the Human Body," which identified the passions as agitators 
of the soul and thereby as causes of moral and physical illness. Drawing on the 
temperament theory from antiquity, he linked psychological states to the circulation of 
fluids throughout the body. The essay sought physical health and moral happiness by 
minimizing extreme effects of the passions. In his Ausübung der Sittenlehre (1696) 
Christian Thomasius argued a similar thesis: the three vices lust, egoism, and greed 
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fueled the emotions. Virtue resided in the moderation of such vices and pursuit of a 
vernünftige Liebe (Schneiders 183-225). The passions were not only negative, but, as 
Thomasius maintained in the Cautelen zu Erlernung der Rechts=Gelahrheit (1713), also 
the means to virtue and health (Braungart 368). Through their schooling in Francke's 
Glaucheschen Anstalten, Meier and Unzer were acquainted with classical Aristotelian 
rhetorical strategies for evoking and quelling the emotion.52 They would have 
encountered the emotional theories of Stahl and Thomasius as their studies advanced 
from the Glaucheschen Anstalten to the Fridericiana. 
 Meier's Theoretische Lehre von den Gemütsbewegungen (1744) located the study 
of the emotions within psychology. The psychological examination of the emotions 
encompassed ethics (excluded here) and the theoretical system. The theoretical again 
subdivided into the psychological and aesthetic emotional systems. The aesthetic system 
was aimed at orators and poets and included strategies for how to amplify the passions, 
how to subdue them, and how to read their signs (characteristics). The characteristics 
produced ambivalent signs; due to their symbolic complexity, Meier contemplated 
excluding them. 
Thus at first reading, the detailed definition of terms and systematic construction 
might remind the reader of a Wolffian approach: define and outline. But upon closer 
study, the book's seven parts are organized by a rhetorical model (van Hoorn, 
"Affektenlehre" 88). The first part describes a general theory of the emotions based on 
desires and dislikes. This theory is developed in the second part by combining Wolff's 
rational and empirical psychology, Baumgarten's focus on analogical reasoning in 
                                                 
52 In the following exposition, the terms emotions and passions are used interchangeably. 
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aesthetics, and the rhetorical tradition (Pozzo 150). The third part pursues the 
psychological function of the passions. The fourth and fifth parts describe strategies to 
increase and decrease passions in one's reader/listener. The sixth part argues for the soul's 
control of the emotions. Finally, the seventh part describes "Changes of the Body in the 
Emotions" and thereby provides an introduction to characteristics. It is this final part, 
because it outlines the changes the spiritually-directed emotions evoke in the body, that 
places the Theoretische Lehre squarely in anthropological debates about the influence of 
the soul on the body (van Hoorn, "Affektenlehre" 88). 
 Looking beyond the seventh part, the Theoretical Treatise contains significant 
anthropological claims throughout; three important examples follow. First, Meier 
challenged Cartesian claims about the bodily nature of the emotions. In Les passions de 
l'âme (1649), Descartes defined emotions as "perceptions or sensations or excitations of 
the soul which are referred to it in particular and which are caused, maintained, and 
strengthened by some movement of the spirits" (Descartes 34). Emotions were thoughts 
received from the nerves, i.e. they were a passive product of the soul. The interaction 
between thoughts and nerves, between the metaphysical and the material, produced 
confused and obscure ideas (emotions), instead of rational ones (Descartes 34). By 
comparison, the Theoretische Lehre defined emotions as desires and detestations and 
thereby as actions of the soul (Meier, Theoretische Lehre 39). Thus, Meier argued 
volition triggered the emotions.  
While Descartes proposed the interaction of body and soul, Meier discredited his 
position. Singling out Descartes's phrase "perceptions or sensations," Meier argued Les 
passions de l'âme erred by citing the body as a possible cause of spiritual states 
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(Theoretische Lehre 40). Based on the observation of real life, Meier wanted to argue that 
an influence of material being on the immaterial is possible, even proportional (394). 
Stahl had made a similar claim in Negotium otiosum. For Meier, however, the different 
nature of the two spheres made a mathematical proportionality between them impossible 
(Theoretische Lehre 393). Additionally, though human observation indicated parallel 
material and metaphysical change, no certain evidence existed to causally link bodily 
movement to spiritual states (395). Body and soul are exactly coordinated, Meier cited in 
an example, therefore they are also coordinated in the emotions. Because emotional states 
invoke a significant change in the soul, which is signaled by a large representation and 
large desire, there must also be great movement in the body. Here Meier used the 
example of blood. In accordance with preestablished harmony, emotions that excite the 
mind must also excite the circulatory system. Therefore, blood circulation visibly 
increased in an onset of emotions, but changes occurring in each sphere developed within 
that sphere. Changes in the emotions, Meier claimed, accompanied but were not caused 
by changes in the body (394-395). Interpreting the physical account of the emotions in 
Les passions de l'âme as a straw-man argument, the Theoretische Lehre replaced it with a 
metaphysical position. 
 In a second way, Meier made anthropological claims to explain the different 
effects of specific emotions on individuals. Physicians and philosophers typically 
referenced Hippocrates's temperament theory to explain individual psychology. 
According to this theory, personality was dynamic and shaped by the circulation of a 
mixture of four elements in the body: blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm. An 
individual's physical activity and psychological state could alter or be altered by the 
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changing balance of the elements, the so-called humors. In some cases, the dynamic 
theory's many permutations drew on biological as well as social factors, including diet 
and geographical location. 
This hydraulic model of individual psychology inherent in temperament theory 
acknowledged causation between body and soul, a position Meier thought false. 
Recognizing the diverse conceptions of the temperaments among physicians, Meier 
commented: "Der Streit der Arzneyverständigen in diesem Puncte ist so verwirrt, daß 
man nicht weiß was man dazu sagen soll. Wir wollen diesen Streit ganz beyseit setzen." 
Invoking a rhetoric of rising above the medical controversies over temperament theory, 
he claimed "complete neutrality" by not following an existing theory (Meier, 
Theoretische Lehre 180). While not taking sides sounded like taking an objective 
position, his system of temperament based only on the soul belied a break with 
physiological knowledge. The new formulation of temperament highlighted volition:  
Die Erfahrung lehrt, daß ein jeder Mensch, gewisse Dinge leichter, öfter und stärcker begehre oder 
verabscheue, als andere Dinge, und man muß sagen, daß dieses von dem Verhältnisse seiner 
Begehrungskräfte herrühre, weil die Begehrungskräfte eben die Quellen der Begierden und 
Verabscheuungen sind. Dieses Verhältniß der Begehrungskräfte, in so fern es den Menschen auf 
gewisse Gegenstände neigt, wird sein Temperament genennt. (181) 
 
Conceived as a psychological entity, temperament represented a nexus of two dynamic 
qualities: a motivator (reason or zeal) and a graduated like or dislike. In Meier's 
incarnation it excluded the body, focusing instead on the intersecting axes 
vernünftig/sinnlich and lustig/niederschlagen. Individual temperament derived from a 
unique mix of these qualities. This definition implied a geometrical model that one could 
plot on an x-y axis: 
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Figure 5-1: Meier's theory of temperament adapted from the Theoretische Lehre von den 
Gemütsbewegungen (1744, §119) 
 
While this concept of temperament avoided espousing a physiological school, it was 
anything but neutral – it was a provocation. By re-imagining the theory of temperament, 
the Theoretische Lehre attempted to write the body out of the theory of emotions. 
Temperament remained a key concept for understanding the emotions, but emotion was 
defined as volition. Departing from Descartes's anthropological concept of the emotions, 
Meier understood them metaphysically. 
 Based on the experience of everyday life, Meier was forced to acknowledge that 
the body could not be so easily erased. In a third way, the Theoretische Lehre linked body 
and soul to the emotions. Meier hypothesized that body language could signal shifts in 
emotion. Seven readable bodily signs made emotions visible: a change in facial color, an 
alteration of facial expression, a change in breathing, loss of speech, unnatural physical 
strength, heart palpitations, and the onset of illness (Meier, Theoretische Lehre 401-405). 
vernünftig sinnlich 
lustig 
niederschlagen 
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While not complete, this list represented a partial index of indicators for reading another 
person's emotions. Utilizing external signs, this section on characteristics promised to 
make the soul and its varying emotional states decipherable. 
 The introduction to the Theoretische Lehre outlined four rhetorical uses for this 
anthropological knowledge of the emotions that will prove useful in the ensuing 
investigation of “case” narratives. Learning about the signifying nature of the emotions 
meant developing better knowledge of the soul and the whole human being (13). By 
providing instruction on how to evoke and quell the emotions, the text promised practical 
advice on how to direct an audience (14). The Theoretische Lehre offered strategies to 
examine another person's soul and to hide one's own emotions (15-16). Finally, Meier's 
text offered tactics for using the emotions to direct another person's action (17). 
Promising keys to self-knowledge, empathy, dissimulation for political purposes, and 
persuasion, the theoretical treatise argued knowledge of the emotions provided a tool for 
personal success. 
 Published only two years after Meier's treatise, Johann August Unzer's Neue 
Lehre von den Gemütsbewegungen (1746) responded directly to the Halle constellation of 
Stahl, Meier, and Krüger. In relegating the emotions and temperament theory to the soul, 
Meier made himself vulnerable to divergent interpretations by natural scientists and 
medical professionals.  Stahl's essay "Disputatio inauguralis de passionibus animi corpus 
humanum varie alterantibus" ["On the Influence of the Passions on the Human Body"] 
from 1695 provided a medical model from which to address the emotions. And Krüger's 
Naturlehre, with its emphasis on sensation, provided Unzer with the tools to shape his 
reply.  
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 The Neue Lehre is an essay-length defense of the body's role in the emotions. 
Compared with Meier's book, the structure of the Neue Lehre is simpler. In eighty-five 
pages and thirty-nine sections, Unzer defined the emotions, linked them to the body 
through a theory of temperament, and explained causal connections between 
temperament and the emotions. The last quarter of the essay expanded the typology of 
temperament to briefly discuss the effects of age, sex, and nationality on the emotions 
(Unzer, Neue Lehre 62-65). Only the final paragraphs addressed the role of the soul. 
Arguing for a direct influence of the soul on the body, Unzer dismissed theories of 
temperament that separated the body from the soul according to "ein vernünftiges, ein 
sinnliches, ein aufgeräumtes, und ein niederschlagenes" temperament as mere fashion 
(65). These were Meier's categories. The Neue Lehre also rejected as faddish Meier's 
attempts to mathematically describe the relation between the material and the 
metaphysical (cf. van Hoorn, "Affektenlehre" 92).  
 Challenging Meier's theory of preestablished harmony, Unzer posited 
intersubstantial causation played a key role in the emotions. In the Neue Lehre, nerve 
impulses appeared simultaneously with ideas during thought (28). Using a hydraulic 
model of neural function, the essay suggested two possible sources of nerve impulses: 
ideas and sensations. Additionally, emotions amplified perception and evoked intensified 
neural responses (29). Though medical research during the eighteenth century eventually 
replaced the hydraulic explanation of neural function with an electric one, Unzer 
nonetheless popularized the biological basis of human cognition and the emotions. 
Whereas Meier considered the emotions only in terms of systematic philosophy, i.e. non-
biologically, Unzer viewed them from metaphysical and material perspectives. 
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 Unzer insisted sensations, not ideas, were the primary source of the passions (29). 
This perspective necessarily challenged Meier's metaphysical interpretation of human 
feeling. Reaffirming the role of the physical in the emotions, the Neue Lehre rehabilitated 
emotional sources that Meier had condemned in Descartes's Les passions de l'âme. 
 In the Neue Lehre, the nerves themselves represented a material element of the 
human body, while also linking the soul to the human corpus in additional ways. The 
pulse was a key marker for how the emotions affect the body: 
Und wie sich die Bewegung des Bluts zu der Bewegung der Nerven verhält, so verhält sich auch 
die Bewegung der Nerven zu denen der Affecten. Denn je heftiger sich das Blut, je geschwinder 
sich das Blut bewegt, desto heftiger, desto geschwinder muß sich das Herz bewegen. Je heftiger, je 
geschwinder sich das Herz bewegt, desto heftiger, desto geschwinder müssen sich seine Nerven 
bewegen, desto stärcker ist der Affect § 4. Also muß auch der Affect desto stärcker seyn, je 
heftiger und je geschwinder sich das Blut bewegt.  
 
Integrating neurological function and the sources of the passions, the essay 
proposed a chain of causal relationships: the emotions influenced the nerves, and the 
nerves influenced heart rate, and the heart rate impacted the passions. These changes, 
Unzer argued, took place in a proportional fashion, so that as the intensity of the 
emotions increased, the frequency and intensity of the neurotransmissions and the pulse 
also grew. As an example, Unzer used an insane person: 
Wir können uns, um dieses vollkommen zu bestätigen, nur einen Menschen vorstellen, welcher 
die Person eines Rasenden spielet. Ein solcher ist immer im Affect, und man mag ihn betrachten 
auf welcher Seite man will, so findet man hiervon die deutlichsten Spuhren. Bald befürchtet er ein 
Unglück und erschreckt, bald will er einiges ihm angethanes Unrecht rächen und geräth im Zorn; 
sein Zorn nimmt überhand, und der Rasende wird ein wütendes Unthier. Alle diese, und noch 
mehrere solcher Affecten, welche sich bey ihm befinden, sind von grosser Geschwindigkeit und 
heftigen Würckung. Dem zufolge, was wir vorhin gesagt haben, müste es mit der Bewegung 
seiner Nerven, mit der Bewegung des Hertzens, und mit dem Umlaufe des Geblüts eben eine 
solche Beschaffenheit haben. (Neue Lehre 31)  
 
The essay thus suggested that the extreme psychological states of the emotions produced 
physical results. Additionally, an individual's voluntary movements coordinated with 
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their emotional states and functioned as signs. For the careful observer, watching a 
person's movement could provide clues to evaluate their state of mind (32).  
 Analogous to instrument strings, nerves differed in quality and tension, and 
thereby provided a means to differentiate types of temperament. Adopting traditional 
categories, the Neue Lehre featured sanguine, choleric, melancholic, and phlegmatic 
temperaments. The essay substituted humoral divisions with nerve qualities, each of 
which was readable through unique bodily signs. Instead of being characterized by 
yellow bile as under the humoral system, an individual with choleric temperament had 
delicate, taut nerves, which moved quickly and heftily (Neue Lehre von den 
Gemüthsbewegungen 33). Because Unzer's schema aligned qualities of the nerves with 
similarities in heart rate and bodily motion, choleric individuals incited by an emotion 
would have a hard, driving pulse and display agitated behavior such as babbling, 
thumping their hands and feet, or dancing (33). Characterized by coarse, taut nerves, 
melancholic individuals would react slowly, but potentially violently to emotions. If the 
nerve transmissions slowed, yet were sufficiently acute, melancholy types might gnash 
and grind their teeth or appear pale (35). With their fine, relaxed nerves sanguine 
individuals represented a balanced life. Combining a steady, even pulse with a moderate 
level of animation, this group exhibited good behavior, composure, attentiveness to 
others, and frequent sighing (43-45). Phlegmatic individuals would have coarse, relaxed 
nerves and usually not exhibit extreme emotions. They were characterized by calmness 
and satisfaction; therefore, this type was also regarded as a moderating force on the other 
temperaments (59-60). In the case of each temperament type, the movement of the nerves 
corresponded to characteristic actions (27). 
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Like existing temperament systems, Unzer's four temperaments necessarily 
generalized personality traits to make differences distinguishable. To provide further 
distinctions, he specified gradations by introducing mixed temperaments and 
differentiating their qualities. For example, the choleric sanguine had quick and light 
nerve impulses and a joyful disposition, while a sanguine choleric had even lighter nerves 
and a greater degree of merriment (56). Unzer and Meier recognized that any attempt to 
describe human personality using temperament unavoidably erected norms through the 
choice of categories (Unzer, Neue Lehre 27; Meier, Theoretische Lehre 182). But 
differentiations included in systems of temperament proved useful. By developing the 
neurological basis for the emotions initiated by Krüger, Unzer emphasized the function of 
the nerves in moderating between psychic and material life.  
Avoiding a purely mechanistic interpretation of the passions, Unzer argued that 
the soul also played an important role. In response to feelings, the soul primarily directed 
thought. But it also regulated the nerves, directing nerve responses to actuate specific 
regions of the body (Unzer, Neue Lehre 67). In section one, the Neue Lehre analyzed 
emotions to emphasize differentiated organ function. Drawing on anatomical discoveries, 
the treatise posited that the cerebrum received messages from the body's sensuous 
network via the central nervous system (what we now call afferent nerves) (Soderquist 5). 
Using a second neural network (what we now call efferent nerves) (4), the cerebellum 
sent most central nervous system commands to muscles and glands (Unzer, Neue Lehre 
23).  
Epistemological differences prescribed different limits for Meier and Unzer's 
theories of the emotions. Meier explained intersubstantial causation with the 
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preestablished harmony hypothesis to preserve existing theological doctrine and the 
immortality of the soul. Avoiding theological issues, Unzer analyzed how the nerves 
linked the material and metaphysical sides of human nature. This did not preclude him 
from integrating religious perspectives into later works, such as Philosophische 
Betrachtung des menschlichen Körpers überhaupt (1750). An explanation for Unzer's 
professed conversion to preestablished harmony in the 1750 text is beyond the immediate 
scope of this dissertation. 
 Summing up, Meier and Unzer pursued different purposes in their theories of the 
emotions. The Theoretische Lehre elucidated the psychological function of the passions 
according to Baumgartian/Wolffian philosophy and the use of the passions for self-
advancement. While the Neue Lehre also defined the passions' psychological function, it 
sought to better describe people and their psychosomatic experience of the emotions. 
Unzer viewed himself as a contributor to a larger project to survey the neurological 
nature of the emotions, one begun by Krüger, developed further by himself, and prepared 
for completion by a future physician (no one is mentioned) (Neue Lehre von den 
Gemüthsbewegungen 69). Unzer thereby intimated that a physician was necessary to 
interpret the emotions because they were shaped by the body.  
 Together Meier and Unzer pursued an understanding of the psychic and physical 
causes of the emotions and their effects on psychic life. Like the Stahl/Leibniz and 
Lange/Wolff controversies before them, Meier and Unzer made their contribution to 
anthropology through disputation (van Hoorn, "Affektenlehre" 93). Each of these pairs 
thus participated in the larger Enlightenment project of critique (McCarthy, "Criticism 
and Experience" 13-22). Explaining causation was a focus of each of these contests. In 
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the first example, physician Stahl and philosopher Leibniz contested the human role in 
causation. While Stahl insisted that an autonomous soul directed all actions of the body, 
Leibniz maintained a divinely initiated law of nature guided body and soul. In the second 
example, Lange attacked Wolff's systematic formulation of Leibnizian causation, casting 
it under a persistent cloud of determinism. Despite the radiant clarity of Wolff's system, 
he could not disperse the shadow cast by charges of mechanism and atheism and by 
Lange's demand for an autonomous subject that could will its spiritual rebirth. Finally, 
Meier and Unzer wrestled over the source of the emotions. In the spirit of preestablished 
harmony's parallel and divided spheres, Meier saw the origin of the passions only in the 
soul. Unzer argued they also originated in the body and invoked the nerves as the 
communicative medium for the physical influx hypothesis. 
 As the holy grail of philosophical questions in the early Enlightenment, writers 
paid considerable attention to the problem of causation. It played a deciding role in two 
of the primary transformative movements of the early eighteenth century, Pietism and 
enlightenment. It therefore addressed questions relevant not just in scientific disputes 
followed by a few, but also in the broadly discussed pursuit of happiness in the era. For 
this reason, we now turn to essayistic and fictional representations of the emergent, new 
anthropological concepts. Their popular manifestations appeared in the iconic media of 
the eighteenth century: moral weeklies and Enlightenment journals. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE MORAL WEEKLY: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL MEDIUM 
 
 Halle’s anthropological knowledge appeared in popular form. Since the late 
seventeenth century, works in German such as Christian Thomasius' Ausübung der 
Sittenlehre (1696) and Christian Wolff's Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und 
die Seele des Menschen (1719) theorized what comprises human nature. Both connected 
material being to the metaphysical sphere. In the 1740's, Georg Friedrich Meier, Johann 
August Unzer, and the physicians Johann Gottlob Krüger, Ernst Anton Nicolai, and 
Johann Christian Bolten addressed a broad audience of philosophers, theologians, 
doctors, as well as an educated reading public with their treatises on humankind. Yet the 
anthropological theories of the day also began to appear in shorter texts written for 
educated and uneducated readers alike, for example in the moral weeklies. 
 This chapter proposes that Samuel Gotthold Lange and Georg Friedrich Meier's 
moral weeklies Der Gesellige (1748-1750) and Der Mensch (1751-1756) incorporate 
anthropological insights into their investigation of moral human nature. Contemporary 
theories of what it means to be human were being shaped by Friedrich Gottlieb 
Klopstock's Messias (1748-1773), Johann Joachim Spalding's Die Bestimmung des 
Menschen (1748), and Julien Offray de La Mettrie's L'Homme machine (1747). In this 
context, Lange and Meier drew on Halle's own heritage of anthropological theory. By 
evoking the traditions of Friedrich Hoffmann and Johann Gottlob Krüger in diet, the 
tradition of Christian Thomasius in shaping the gallant style, and the tradition of 
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Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's aesthetics, Der Gesellige and Der Mensch produced a 
popular mosaic of what it meant to be human. Using essays and moral narratives, Lange 
and Meier sought to capture a broad audience in the moral weeklies.  
 
Context and Composition of Der Gesellige and Der Mensch 
 As the son of Pietist theologian Joachim Lange, Samuel Gotthold Lange (1711-
1781) spent his youth at Francke's Glaucheschen Anstalten and the Fridericiana 
preparing for a pastoral career, which he began in nearby Laublingen in 1737. Beyond his 
theological profession, he pursued literary aspirations as a poet, essayist, and translator. 
After helping to found a Society for the Advancement of the German Language, Poetry, 
and Rhetoric in 1733, Lange wrote in a circle including Jakob Immanuel Pyra and Johann 
Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim. Lange's greatest poetic success was the co-publication with Pyra 
of Thyrsis und Damons freundschaftlicher Lieder (ed. Bodmer, 1745), the first German 
poetry of sensibility. The Horatzische Oden (1747) followed, temporarily earning Lange 
the title of "Deutscher Horaz." Lessing's negative review of Lange's Horace translation 
stifled further literary fame. Subsequent projects included religious poetry, essays, a 
biography of Meier, and letters (Bohnen 142-143; Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" 
VI:403). 
 Georg Friedrich Meier was also born into a pastor's family near Halle. Like 
Lange, his youth included schooling in the Glaucheschen Anstalten, among others with 
tutor Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, before continuing at the Fridericiana. Meier took 
his master's degree in 1739 and began lecturing in philosophy at Halle with A. G. 
Baumgarten before the latter moved to the University of Frankfurt/Oder in 1740. In the 
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same year, Christian Wolff returned to the philosophical faculty in Halle. Meier 
subsequently studied with theologian Sigmund Jacob Baumgarten, Alexander's brother. 
Meier's reputation stemmed from his adaptation of A. G. Baumgarten's aesthetics lectures 
in Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften (1748-1750). He published books on 
philosophy, theology, poetry, and popular philosophy. Our historical view of early 
Enlightenment theories of literary form favors the continuity of three major genres since 
antiquity: poetry, drama, and the epic. Perhaps in this context, recent evaluations of 
Lange and Meier's creative output have minimized or ignored their writing (primarily 
essays and short narrative prose) in periodicals (cf. Pozzo; Bohnen; Schenk 78-80). A re-
evaluation is in order. 
 As moral weeklies, Der Gesellige and Der Mensch developed from a European 
tradition. With the Monatsgespräche (1688-1689) Christian Thomasius had published 
one of the first literary-critical periodicals in Germany (McCarthy, "Literarisch-kulturelle 
Zeitschriften" 176; Wilke 1:54). By pursuing a popular style, the Monatsgespräche 
prepared the German reading public for the reception of the moral weekly following its 
English inception (McCarthy, "Lektüre" 43). Joseph Addison and Richard Steele's The 
Spectator (1711-1712, 1714) created the moral weekly as a periodical that encouraged 
everyday readers to evaluate their lives with reason (cf. no. 10). In Great Britain, Ireland, 
and across Europe this new form achieved success in reprints, translations, and 
adaptations (Rau). Dutch writer Justus van Effen (1684-1735) produced the first 
imitation, Le Misantrope (1711-1712) (Rau 191-209). Shortly thereafter, Johann 
Mattheson's (1681-1764) Vernünftler (1713-14) translated and adapted the English 
original for his Hamburg readers (215-220). Original German-language moral weeklies 
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were first published in bourgeois Enlightenment centers: Die Discourse der Mahlern 
(1721-1723) in Zürich, Der Patriot (1724-1726) and Die Matrone (1728-1730) in 
Hamburg, Die vernünftigen Tadlerinnen (1725-1726) and Der Biedermann (1727-1728) 
in Leipzig.53 The first moral weeklies thus developed from and mirrored a bourgeois class 
consciousness (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" 424; H. M. Wolff 67). By 
propounding the essential equality of all people according to natural law theory and by 
critiquing prejudice, the moral weeklies became one of the most important media for 
enlightenment (Brandes 225). 
This trend of moral weeklies captured the imagination of Halle's literary circles, 
but local authors' early attempts at the form such as Pyra's Gedanken der unsichtbaren 
Gesellschaft (1741) appeared only briefly (cf. Nadler 2:82). This was certainly influenced 
by the Pietist atmosphere, which encouraged reading the Bible and devout (auto-
)biographies. Whereas orthodox Protestants accepted the practice and study of the arts, 
including the moral weeklies, Pietists warned that pursuing worldly literature and art was 
sinful (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" VI:340). In particular, early leaders of the 
Pietist-dominated Halle University plead with local magistrates and the prince elector to 
ban fairs, masquerades, dance, Mardi Gras celebrations, and comodies. Such 
entertainment wasted valuable time for reflection and aiding the community and was thus 
immoral. As a result, in 1700 the prince elector forbid all theater performances in Halle; 
the ban continued until the close of the eighteenth century (Martens, Literatur und 
Frömmigkeit 27-30). Though some virtuous literature was tolerated, pastors and devout 
parishioners opposed reading secular material because it interrupted study of the Bible 
                                                 
53 The Vernünftige Tadlerinnen was initially printed in Halle, but written in and distributed from Leipzig. 
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(88). Love songs and novels focused on matchmaking were especially irreproachable 
because they promoted "carnal desires" and disrupted student work (93-94). 
From the 1730's, these opinions began to gradually change. After achieving a full 
professorship at the Fridericiana in 1734, the theologian Sigmund Jacob Baumgarten 
(1706-1757) displayed greater openness by gradually steering Halle theology away from 
Pietist revivalism toward a rational and historical study of religion (Martens, "Moralische 
Wochenschriften" 89-90; Sparn 81-85). By reorienting theology and introducing 
aesthetics, the brothers Baumgarten helped open Halle's public sphere to literary projects 
like the poetry of Lange, Pyra, and Gleim, and the essays and narratives in Der Gesellige. 
In this context, the establishment of a successful moral weekly re-created a cultural 
model that was decades old in other leading German Enlightenment centers (Martens, 
"Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" VI:408). For Halle, it was a literary-cultural innovation. We 
will return to the literary nature of the Lange/Meier periodicals in a moment. 
 Readers throughout the German states read Halle's moral weeklies Der Gesellige 
and Der Mensch. While distribution focused on middle Germany and Saxony, they also 
were read in Westphalia, Mark, and Wolfenbüttel (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'" 
XII:417; M. Raabe 1:liii). The print run size for both magazines is unknown. Given the 
fact that at the time, selling a thousand copies made a weekly profitable, historians have 
estimated these periodicals had a larger circulation (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" 
VI:406). Among German weeklies, Der Patriot likely had the largest distribution with a 
stated circulation at 5500 copies. The next most popular moral weekly, Die vernünftigen 
Tadlerinnen, expressed satisfaction at selling 2000 copies. According to reader interest, 
individual issues of a weekly may have garnered spikes in circulation (Martens, Die 
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Botschaft der Tugend 112).  The fact that Der Gesellige and Der Mensch were sold in 
weekly issues as well as in book form supports the hypothesis of a print run larger than 
1000. Additionally, the original publisher, Gebauer, newly typeset and printed both 
magazines in 1764, which suggests that they had sold out and that amid reader demand, 
they remained profitable. By surpassing a successful periodical's normal life (of several 
months to several years) by additional years, the Halle magazines provide further indirect 
testimony to their success (118). Viewed together, the twenty-one year joint publication 
history of Der Gesellige (1748-1750), Der Mensch (1751-1756), Das Reich der Natur 
und der Sitten (1757-1762), and Der Glückselige (1763-1768) is unique for German 
Enlightenment moral weeklies.  
Readers bought the Lange and Meier weeklies either at a bookseller or by mail, 
with each issue costing 12 Pfennig. This was two-thirds of the cost of a meal at an inn 
(Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" VI:406; "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'" XII:415). 
Therefore, in price and in content the weeklies addressed primarily bourgeois readers: 
civil servants, academics, merchants, officers, and especially their wives and daughters. 
Members of bourgeois society and the lower nobility had the ability and the time to read, 
with isolated handworkers, farmers, or higher nobility filling out the spectrum of readers 
(Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" VI:407). Other indirect evidence confirms this 
kind of reading public for the Halle weeklies. To further edification, moral weeklies 
encouraged reader identification by describing characters like their readers. Taking "Die 
Begebenheiten der Frau Elisabeth Irrwisch" from Der Mensch as a representative 
example, we can assert that the characters of salesman, soldier, schoolteacher, mother, 
and daughter reflected the experience of the weekly’s middle-class audience. Through 
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identification strategies, the editors encouraged the reader's moral improvement. In 
Wolfenbüttel, extant lending records from the eighteenth century confirm that Der 
Mensch was primary lent by the middle class.54 Additionally, a similar weekly's 
subscription list provides evidence that bourgeois readers were the primary subscribers to 
moral weeklies (Martens, Die Botschaft der Tugend 150-151).  
In "Lektüre und Lesertypologie im 18. Jahrhundert (1730-1770): Ein Beitrag zur 
Lesergeschichte am Beispiel Wolfebüttels" (1983), John A. McCarthy analyzes Der 
Mensch to identify characteristics of mid-eighteenth century readers in general and 
readers of the moral weekly in particular.55 Because this essay also provides insight into 
the goals of reading that figure in the development of this chapter, key findings are 
addressed here. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, writers emphasize 
reading's function in shaping moral values. Despite the private nature of exploring a text 
individually, reading teaches ethical standards and thereby fulfills a social goal. Indeed, 
the emphasis on reading appears parallel to the goal of the weeklies to encourage and 
train readers in critical thought and virtue. Thus, moral weeklies sought through reading 
to educate, to entertain, and to socialize the public. Given this context, Johann Jakob 
Bodmer (1698-1783) in Discourse der Mahler (1721, no. 1) encouraged other authors to 
more closely consider the reader's reception of a text and to write for a broad audience 
(McCarthy, "Lektüre" 43). 
                                                 
54 Lender occupations included: grocer, lieutenant, doctor's wife, surgeon, major general, salesman, 
counselor, registrar, gatekeeper, library secretary's wife, court counselor's wife, lawyer, cantor, 
"Kollaborator," "Amtsauditor," women listed as "Jungfer" and "Mademoiselle," and school children. 
Mechthild Raabe, Leser und Lektüre im 18. Jahrhundert: Die Ausleihbücher der Herzog August Bibliothek 
Wolfenbüttel 1714-1799 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1989) 3:545-546. 
55 See also John A. McCarthy, "The Art of Reading and the Goals of the German Enlightenment," Lessing 
Yearbook/Jahrbuch 16 (1984): 79-94, John A. McCarthy, "Wieland as Essayist: The Cultivation of an 
Audience," Jahrbuch fur Internationale Germanistik 13.1 (1981): 74-137. 
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Between 1720 and 1760 professional writers pursued this goal (45). They 
increasingly addressed a non-academic audience, but also sought to persuade their 
audience of reading's more noble functions, i.e. education and socialization. To 
emphasize how books and magazines provided more than entertainment, Der Mensch 
categorized readers and their material in view of specific goals into three categories. 
"Elende Leser" took no interest in education and socialization, but read for entertainment 
alone, favoring chap-books, gallant novels like Der göttingische Student, and 
"Robinsonades." "Mittelmäßige Leser" were more difficult to define, but obsessively and 
uncritically read mystical, atheistic, and religious works by authors from Jakob Böhme or 
Madame Guyon. By contrast, the best readers make reading a reflective experience 
characterized by faculties of empathy and critical judgment. To achieve these abilities, 
Der Mensch encouraged perusing Fielding's Tom Jones, Prèvost's Memoires d'un homme 
de qualité, Richardson's Pamela, Fenelon's Télémaque, Gellert and Lichtwer's fables, 
poetry by Gleim, Hagedorn, Opitz, and Milton, texts by Leibniz and Newton, and the 
moral weeklies (McCarthy, "Lektüre" 51-52). Through its pages, Der Mensch aims to 
make all interested persons more reflective and more sociable. 
 Due to a lack of empirical evidence, one can only hypothesize about how 
eighteenth-century men and women read the Halle weeklies. Der Gesellige idealized its 
readership in representations of individuals reading while sewing or in private, others 
reading orally for a group, and still others intensively (repeatedly) reading the weekly 
(Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" VI:407-408; Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'" 
XII:418; cf.Engelsing). Reading aloud to a group fulfilled human destiny as a social 
being (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" VI:420-421). Engaged by particular issues, 
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some readers submitted letters, participating in the production of the public sphere 
(Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'" XII:417-418). Certainly some of the letters were 
fictionalized, but some were real; some reader correspondence was simply never 
published. In readership and ways of reading, the Halle weeklies were representative of 
their form. 
 Traditionally, moral weeklies combined elements including a fictitious editor, a 
religious-philosophical viewpoint, and thematic variation within a single issue. Der 
Gesellige and Der Mensch nominally incorporate a fictitious editor, creating the narrator 
der Gesellige and naming the readers die Gesellschaft der Geselligen, but refer to them 
little thereafter. The combination of Protestantism and philosophy in the weeklies 
represented Lange and Meier's chosen professions and a natural extension of their 
education and interests. Based on Martens' attribution of issues to individual authors, 
Lange and Meier both created religious and philosophical contributions. In most cases, 
the religious and philosophical viewpoints are interwoven. 
Diverging from the moral weekly tradition, the Halle weeklies typically limit each 
issue to one theme. In most cases this means a single topic is developed in prose or poetry 
over eight to sixteen pages, from a half to a full signature. Additionally, each journal 
includes several serialized contributions, a rarity for this literary form. In Der Gesellige 
this includes "Die Geschichte von des Ritters Lucidors Geist" (begins no. 227). Der 
Mensch features at least six, including "Nachrichten von den Begebenheiten bey 
Besetzung des Bälgentreterdiensts zu Einersrode" (begins no. 48). 
 The majority of issues are written in prose, thus making Der Gesellige's 271 
issues and Der Mensch's 488 issues rich resources of essayistic writing and short 
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narrative. From Thomasius's Monatsgespräche (1688-1699) through Bodmer and 
Breitinger's Discourse der Mahlern (1721-1723) to Gottsched's Die vernünftige 
Tadlerinnen (1725-1727), moral weeklies helped shaped the early German tradition of 
the Enlightenment essay. In Der Biedermann (1727-1729), Gottsched (1700-1766) links 
philosophy, rhetoric, psychology, and morality as key elements of the essay. Crafting an 
essay, and by extension an issue of a moral weekly, involves creating poetic prose, a style 
combining clarity of argument with rhetorical appeal (McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries 
136-137, 190). At their best, Der Gesellige and Der Mensch unite Gottsched’s four 
elements with success, reproducing the amusement, relevance to daily life, and critical 
nature, all qualities of the gallant style. They thereby build on the contribution of earlier 
moral weeklies to the German essay tradition (McCarthy, "Gallant Novel" 62, 75-76; cf. 
Schlote 21-42, cit. in Heinz 2001). 
 In Crossing Boundaries: A Theory and History of Essay Writing in German 1680-
1815, McCarthy re-evaluates the essence of essay style for the eighteenth-century and 
thus provides key insight for analysis of the essay in this chapter. Combining functional 
goals of scholarly communication and poetic verve, the essay employs a middle style 
(McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries 16). Essayistic writing is the collective term for many 
literary forms that in the triangular relation of writer, text, and reader especially 
emphasize the author-audience connection (19-20). The act of reading recreates the 
writer's experimental thought process and thereby produces essayistic writing's aesthetic 
quality: a kinetic, creative exposure to new knowledge and new opinions (23). 
Emphasizing thought as process, essayistic writing engages writer and reader to enact 
enlightenment (80). In its heterogeneity, essayistic style displays characteristics such as: 
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(1) associative thought; 
(2) dialogic structure or tone; 
(3) the consideration of possibilities; 
(4) an open form that stimulates thought;  
(5) polyperspectivity;  
(6) subjectivity;  
(7) an experimental nature;  
(8) non-dogmatic views;  
(9) a skeptical attitude;  
(10) playfulness of tone;  
(11) criticism (with an invitation to co-judge); 
(12) and frequent re-making of what has been given cultural form (42). 
These characteristics will be useful in evaluating the journal article on materialism in Der 
Mensch. Understanding their nexus in a middle style is essential for evaluating German 
essayistic writing between 1700 and 1800.  
During the first half of the eighteenth century, McCarthy argues, theories of prose 
writing concentrated on a balanced presentation. Defining this style was not only 
Gottsched's aforementioned Biedermann, but also Christian Thomasius. He argued that 
all people could become a galant homme, i.e. they could be educated in cultivated 
manners, sensibleness, erudition, sound judgment, politeness, and a pleasant manner 
(McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries 138). Thomasius' qualities of gallantry are 
representative of the gallant style. In Anweisung zu Teutschen Briefen (11709), Benjamin 
Neukirch (1665-1729) argued for a balanced approach on multiple levels, first between 
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natural and cultivated speech. And instead of an overt display of artful composition, 
Neukirch favored writing in a colloquial manner; balancing the astute, witty, and satirical 
modes of thought; and adding touches of playfulness and irony (McCarthy, Crossing 
Boundaries 139-140). In Anweisung zur verbesserten Teutschen Oratorie (11725), 
Friedrich Andreas Hallbauer (1692-1750) esteemed similar qualities of clarity, normalcy, 
naturalness, balance, and elegance as representative of good style. Subsequently, Gellert's 
Briefe, nebst einer praktischen Abhandlung von den guten Geschmack in Briefen (1751) 
echoed the call for a natural and simple tone. The Leipzig professor asserted that the 
ideas should determine form and supported individual expression (Crossing Boundaries 
143). From Thomasius to Gellert, McCarthy surveys writers who propose a balanced 
mode as the best way to engage readers and thereby not only to communicate, but to 
promote changes in thinking. In his survey of guidelines for eighteenth-century essayistic 
writing, McCarthy substantiates a claim for the continuing symbiosis of writers 
embracing the audience and choosing a middle style (Crossing Boundaries 142).  
 In her article "'Gedanken' über Gott und die Welt. Die Erprobung der 
Anthropologie im Essay bei Meier, Krüger und Nicolai," Jutta Heinz sketches 
anthropological contours of the essay around 1750, the time frame for the chapter here. 
To focus her study, Heinz empirically evaluates a selection of individually-printed essays 
on human nature, combating superstition, and arousing curiosity – all typical 
Enlightenment themes. The three writers appeal to readers as equal partners in critique 
(Heinz, "Gedanken" 145-147). To define being human, Meier draws on philosophy, and 
Krüger and Nicolai refer to clinical medicine. Heinz argues that Meier’s systematic 
argumentation keeps readers at a distance, while Nicolai and Krüger observe people and 
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more closely address the problems of actual human beings and their contingencies. 
Drawing upon experience, Nicolai and Krüger's approach is more open to the occurrence 
of error ("Gedanken" 148-150).  
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, theories of the divine directly 
influenced the evaluation of human beings. In modeling human nature, theodicy followed 
a drive based on divine perfection for perfectibility in the world; that is, the moral 
improvement of people. Over time, these theories gave way to the representation of 
physical and moral human nature, a move that invoked the relation of the double natures 
in the body/soul problem. Instead of a monolithic spiritual perfection, a balancing of the 
material and the metaphysical became the new goal (150-152).56 In aesthetics, Meier's 
emphasis on logic proves, by comparison with Krüger and Nicolai's irony and pleasurable 
digressions, less appealing (152-154). Combining McCarthy's nuanced evaluation of the 
philosophical and aesthetic history of the Enlightenment essay and Heinz's 
anthropological reading of mid-century essays provides the theoretical framework for an 
evaluation of the anthropological nature of essayistic prose in Der Gesellige and Der 
Mensch.  
Lange, Meier and Unzer also wrote anecdotes and stories using anthropological 
discourses. In his article "Influxus physicus und Seelenstärke. Empirische Psychologie 
und moralische Erzählung in der deutschen Spätaufklärung und bei Jacob Friedrich Abel" 
(1992), Wolfgang Riedel identifies moral narrative as a source of late-Enlightenment 
                                                 
56 This move simulates the ancient mesotes doctrine (Greek: "middle"), which Aristotle integrated into 
ethics as an option for ethical action based on rationalized moderation of other options. In this sense, one 
would respond in generosity to a natural disaster instead of with wastefulness or avarice. Likewise, in 
consoling a friend in a dilemma, a person would act in friendship instead of with flattery or argument 
"Mesotes Lehre," Der Brockhaus Philosophie.  Ideen, Denker, Begriffe (Mannheim, Leipzig: F. A. 
Brockhaus, 2004).  
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psychological narration and anthropology. Narration in moral weeklies, Johann Gottlob 
Benjamin Pfeil's Versuch in moralischen Erzählungen (1757), and Friedrich von 
Blanckenburg's Versuch über den Roman (1774) increasingly encourage psychological 
narration that evokes (1) reader identification and empathy and (2) cultivation of moral 
judgment. (Riedel, "Influxus physicus" 34-36). Simultaneously, moral narration 
emphasizes physical sensibility that Gellert and Lessing develop in drama and Wieland 
incorporates in the novel. Favoring satire, Der Gesellige and Der Mensch integrate 
anthropological discourse into select narratives. "Die Begebenheiten der Jungfer 
Elisabeth Irrwisch," a serialized satire written by Meier, will serve here as a 
representative example of this new kind of writing. However, before turning to it as a 
sample of anthropological discourse in moral narrative, it is first necessary to survey the 
anthropological themes that comprise the journalistic program. 
 
The Anthropological Program 
 Like many other Enlightenment magazines, the first issue of Der Gesellige opens 
with a quotation, an excerpt from Albrecht von Haller's "Über den Ursprung des Übels" 
(1734). The philosophic verses cited resonate with the cult of friendship and community 
at the time: 
Sie, diese Liebe, war der Menschen erste Kette, 
Sie macht uns bürgerlich, und sammlet uns in Städte;  
Die Freundschaft stammt von ihr. (Haller, "Über den Ursprung" 64) 
Friendship and community underscore for Lange and Meier the centrality of sociability in 
civilized society. Two drives regulate human evolution in Haller's poem: self-love and 
neighborly love. But the editors overlook "Liebe für sich selbst" in favor of "Nächsten 
Liebe" (Haller, "Über den Ursprung" 63). Born into interdependence on other people, 
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human beings – the opening essay asserts – are pushed by needs and the natural desire for 
comfort to seek closer relations with others (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Gesellige I:1-2). 
Lange and Meier thus encourage the development of sociability through an 
expanded view of humankind: 
Ich verstehe unter einem geselligen Menschen, einen solchen, der sich in seiner innern und 
äussern Einrichtung nicht als einen einzelnen Menschen, sondern im beständigen Zusammenhange 
mit seinen Nebenmenschen betrachtet, und sich daher in seinen Handlungen so zu verhalten 
bestrebet, daß er zu dem allgemeinen Wohl so viel möglich beytrage, um des allgemeinen Wohls 
insbesondere theilhaftig zu werden. (I:2) 
 
To be human means viewing oneself as interconnected with others. By freely helping 
others as much as one can, the sociable person also has the most to gain from society. 
Participating in community life creates a mutually beneficial relationship and ultimately 
defines the individual human being.  
 In their double nature, individuals represent infinite possibility. But it is the social 
sphere that nurtures physical growth and polishes personality. People often underestimate 
their contribution to the social network and its positive effect on their improvement: 
Der Mensch ist nicht so klein, als sich mancher einzubilden pflegt. Er ist nach Leib und Seele, und 
nach seinem äusserlichen Zustande betrachtet, unendlich vieler Vollkommenheiten fähig....Ein 
Mensch vor sich allein ist völlig ungeschickt, sich selbst alle diese Vollkommenheiten zu 
verschaffen. Er trete aber in die Gesellschaft mit andern Menschen, die Vollkommenheiten werden 
von allen Seiten her durch tausend Canäle auf ihn zuströmen. Der eine wird seinen Geist 
bearbeiten, der andere seinen Körper. (I:34) 
 
People cannot achieve their potential on their own, but require a supportive environment. 
To function as a social being means eschewing notions of exaggerated individualism and 
seeking exposure to outside influences. In Der Gesellige, community moulds all aspects 
of twofold human nature. 
 In Lange and Meier's subsequent weekly Der Mensch, the investigation of 
individual human nature is the primary focus. Citing dualistic Cartesian heritage, the first 
issue highlights the body/soul interrelationship: "Der Mensch ist ein vernünftiges Wesen, 
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das aus Leib und Seele bestehet.  Sein vornehmster Theil ist die Seele: diese wird unser 
Gegenstand seyn, sowol an sich selbst, als nach der Verbindung, in welcher sie mit dem 
Leibe, und durch denselben mit den übrigen Dingen, stehet" (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der 
Mensch I:3-4). Emphasizing rationality underscores the importance of soul before body, 
yet each sphere plays its role. What makes humans unique, the editors claim, is the 
interconnection of religion as a guide to purpose, reason as a guide to action, and the 
mediation aesthetic pleasure through the senses (I:4-5). Hence, the moral sense, reason, 
and sensation each have a proper function. Therein we see the influence of Thomasius 
and Shaftesbury. 
 Combining physical and metaphysical spheres, humans occupy a higher rung on 
the chain of being (cf. Lovejoy). In "Über den Ursprung des Übels" (1734), Albrecht von 
Haller represents human fate in this in-between: 
Fern unter ihnen [Engel] hat das sterbliche Geschlecht 
Im Himmel und im Nichts, sein doppelt Bürgerrecht. 
Aus ungleich festem Stoff hat Gott es auserlesen,  
Halb zu der Ewigkeit, halb aber zum Verwesen 
Zweideutig Mittelding, von Engeln und von Vieh, 
Es überlebt sich selbst, es stirbt und stirbet nie. (Haller, "Über den Ursprung " 62-63) 
 
Like angels, Haller claims, people are drawn to God and to virtue and thus they pursue 
the good. Yet with their hybrid nature, they also heed earthly drives that are unknown to 
angels. In contrast to angels, humans are subject to death. What makes one human is the 
interconnection of two determining natures, the sensual and the spiritual. 
 In Der Mensch, Lange and Meier also define being human through the twofold 
nature and the chain of being. The image begins as a nearly exact quotation of Haller: 
"Der Mensch ist halb ein Engel und halb ein Vieh.  Seine Natur ist, so zu reden, eine 
Zwitternatur, welche etwas von einem Geiste und etwas von einem Viehe an sich hat, 
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oder sie ist aus der Vernunft und der Sinnlichkeit zusammen gesetzt" (S. G. Lange and 
Meier, Der Mensch I:45). Using Zwitternatur as a predicate adjective underscores the 
hybridity of human nature.  
 Lange and Meier continue by explaining that body and soul do not exist in 
isolation from one another, for their very interaction shapes the human being. To live 
according to human nature involves acknowledging that interaction. Pursuing solely 
spiritual life in developing logical thought and exercising freedoms is impossible. While 
people are capable of creating ethical systems to regulate and even fully subdue the body 
and its drives, sensuality belongs to the hybrid essence of humanity. No one, Lange and 
Meier aver, would recommend ignoring sensuality (I:45). This opinion is a variation on 
that of the countess in Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***, who chides 
proponents of spiritual love for denying their sensuality (Gellert, Leben 38-39). Like 
Gellert's countess, Lange and Meier argue: "Ein solches bloß geistiges Verhalten ist gar 
nicht menschlich: denn es ist nur dem einen Theile der menschlichen Natur gemäß" (S. 
G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch I:45). 
To be human does not mean being angelic. There is no expectation of living by 
the spirit alone in the pursuit of the highest moral laws to the exclusion of the body. 
Instead, human existence involves both spiritual and earthly passions. To be human 
means that we acknowledge the call to rise to the level of angels but must also accept the 
limits of the animal. The balancing of these forces should lead to moderation in enjoying 
the pleasures of material life. If something else had been intended, the editors argue, if 
the true good were only following moral law, humans would have been created 
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differently. Here and throughout the weekly, balance of the material and metaphysical 
emerge as the ideal. 
 In the essay "Von der Gesundheit des Cörpers und der rechten Diät, solche 
dauerhaft zu erhalten" (no. 221) the editors of Der Mensch suggest real-world strategies 
to achieve balance in everyday living. In the eighteenth century, dietetics (Diät) referred 
to practical principles for living a healthy, long life. Key proponents included the Halle 
physicians Friedrich Hoffmann and Johann Gottlob Krüger. In Diät oder Lebensordnung 
( Diät oder Lebensordnung), for example, Krüger draws on his experience with patients 
to provide guidance for good living in chapters on children's education, good air, 
nutrition, sleep and rest, exercise, the emotions, excretion, and wellness.57 While related 
works such as Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's translation of Juan Huarte's Examen de 
Ingenios (1594, trans. 1747) provide suggestions to the state on regulating things like 
reproduction, child-rearing, and education for the social good, the texts by Krüger, 
Lange, and Meier emphasize rules for individual benefit.  
In their attempt to reach a broad audience with Der Mensch, the authors make 
moderation a central thematic and structural issue when they suggest: "Es haben manche 
Gelehrte weitläufige Schriften von der Diät geschrieben. Allein unsern Einsichten nach 
ist eine gar zu grosse Menge diätetischer Regeln der Diät zu wider" (S. G. Lange and 
Meier, Der Mensch VI:35). Offering an alternative to works like Krüger's Diät (567 pp.), 
"Von der Gesundheit des Cörpers und der rechten Diät" (16 pp.) concentrates on six 
rules. First, one must try to maintain a healthy soul; second, eat and drink within the 
limits of health; (3) moderate body temperature; (4) exercise regularly; (5) strive for 
                                                 
57 The six chapter subjects from air (i.e. environment) to excretion recall Galen's sex non res naturales, 
whose regulation provided natural body balance (Porter, Greatest Benefit 107; Sarasin Reizbare Maschinen 
36). 
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regularity in the excretion of body waste; and (6) do fitness training (Der Mensch VI:36-
47). Sharing topics with Krüger's Diät, "Von der Gesundheit" proposes guidelines of 
moral wisdom. The philosophers Lange and Meier leave the details of therapy for 
specific illnesses to physicians (VI:35).  
 The ethic of moderation directs physical and moral life. In the physical realm, this 
means not only limiting but also increasing some processes and actions. Finding a 
balance in nutrition means eating more often and on a regular schedule rather than 
sporadically in excess (VI:43). Likewise, an appropriate exercise regimen involves 
neither too little movement, nor too much, but a "proportional" level of activity that 
engages and sets all parts of the body in motion. Walking and horseback riding are ideal 
(VI:45-46). More physical activity is also required to strengthen the body ("mäßig 
strapzire") (VI:47). Underlying the call for physical renewal is a critique of specific 
social groups (e.g. scholars and women of means) who are not normally engaged in 
physical activity (VI:46). Being alive necessitates caring equally body and soul; that is, 
tending to der ganze Mensch. 
 In the moral realm, moderation refers to limiting indulgent behavior. Gluttony, 
drunkenness, fornication, and adultery are examples of overindulgent and sinful behavior. 
"Von der Gesundheit" argues from a Christian moral framework that such transgressions 
can provoke extreme sickness as a natural punishment (VI:48). Representing 
overindulgence as physically and morally dangerous serves the purpose to socialize 
readers against such behavior. In this sense, it can be regarded as "a program of bourgeois 
living" (Tobin, 117). On the other hand, an inflated concern for one's health is equally 
objectionable (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VI:39). 
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Ultimately, "Von der Gesundheit" proposes that body and soul must be regulated 
because they are interconnected. Like lasciviousness and gluttony, the emotions 
(especially sadness, anger, and fear) also demonstrate the influence of the soul on the 
body, because strong emotions can increase blood pressure and provoke sickness or death 
(VI:38). In the same way, a melancholy temperament can concentrate and slow bodily 
fluids, hinder digestion and excretion, and immobilize the body (VI:37). Considering the 
influence of material being on one's mental state, illness can inhibit the use of reason and 
intellectual faculties, as well as one's ability to fulfill moral obligations (VI:33).  
 Dietetics thus affirm the anthropological nature of humankind. On a practical 
level, it outlines principles for individual day-to-day living. It also reveals the 
connections between the physical and moral spheres in illness and volition (the 
indulgences and emotions defined as extreme desires and aversions). It therefore shows 
how managing the physical or the moral being requires treatment of the whole person. 
 
Body/Soul Discourse as a Counterargument to Materialism 
The approach to human nature in Der Gesellige and Der Mensch is infused with 
Christian values. The soul is the human connection to the divine. Lange and Meier 
acknowledge the existence of the body, not only for the history of Christian salvation, but 
as part of a revised Protestant theology that embraces pleasure – in moderation – and 
thereby happiness in this life. Though Der Gesellige and Der Mensch embrace the 
materiality of human existence and incorporate the senses via the latest aesthetic theory 
and poetry, they do not use motion to define human nature, even though materialism was 
a prominent world view. 
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By around 1750, Lange and Meier wrote in their weeklies that materialism posed 
threats to existing knowledge and put representatives of entrenched power at unease (S. 
G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VII:313). The new icon of materialism came from 
France: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751). Born in Saint-Malo, Brittany, La 
Mettrie studied in Paris, receiving his doctorate of medicine in Reims in 1733. From 1733 
to 1734, he attended lectures in Leiden, possibly with Boerhaave, whose work he 
translated for a French readership (Vartanian 2-3). After publication of L'Histoire 
naturelle de l'âme (1745)58, the Paris Parlement ordered the book burned and La Mettrie 
fled France for Holland. There he wrote and published L'homme machine (1747), which 
openly posited a materialist view of the soul (Thomson, "Introduction" xxvii). When 
religious authorities prohibited further sales, destroyed available copies, and admonished 
the book's publisher Luzac, La Mettrie had to flee further, this time to the Prussian court. 
Thus, as his name became synonymous with materialism across Europe, Frederick II 
granted him asylum in Potsdam, the state governmental center for Halle residents Lange 
and Meier. La Mettrie arrived in Berlin on 7 February 1748, within two months of the 
first issue of Der Gesellige (Vartanian 7).59 
 What made La Mettrie's ideas so contested was their rejection of metaphysical 
systems, for example in L'Histoire naturelle de l'âme (1745) (Thomson, "Materialism: La 
Mettrie" 315-316; Wellman 148). The move alienated clergy and philosophers alike. 
Drawing on Haller's theory of irritability, La Mettrie explained reflection as a product of 
                                                 
58 Republished in a revised form and now known as Traité de l'âme (1750). 
59 The fiftieth issue and end of the first half-year of Der Gesellige is dated 3 June 1748. Cf. Lange and 
Meier 1987, I:406. Thus, Lange's first utterances against materialism in issue seven appeared about the time 
La Mettrie arrived in Berlin, and the second reference in issue forty-nine would have been at the end of 
May 1748. La Mettrie's presence in Brandenburg may have contributed to the impetus to take an anti-
materialist stance. 
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physiological sensations joining ideas within the soul. Judgment was a passive faculty 
that required the soul to revisit the truths that made the concept clear and distinct 
(Wellman 160-163). In L'homme machine, La Mettrie argues that humans, like animals, 
have no innate moral sense and that there is no such thing as natural law. Morality stems 
merely from a socialized sense of remorse in the individual (La Mettrie, "L'homme 
machine" 171-173; La Mettrie, Machine Man 20; Crocker, 118-120). For Christians like 
Lange and Meier, this theory was a provocation. 
Because of their insistence on the existence of a soul and their goal of moral 
education, Der Gesellige and Der Mensch openly oppose materialist philosophy from 
their inception. In the seventh issue of Der Gesellige, Lange argues Christian religion and 
divine revelation offered the best resource for improving morals and creating social life. 
Christian moral codes edify the spirit and promote moderation of the passions. 
Downplaying the brutality of Christians in war during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the essay reasons teleologically that human nature has become more civilized 
since antiquity (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Gesellige I:57). Lange views human history 
as moral progress toward increasing sociability. 
Enemies of religion, whom Lange calls "Feinde der Menschlichkeit," mock their 
own human nature by ignoring moral codes and destroying the social regulation of 
government for individual gain. Mimicing the anti-religious stance, Lange portrays it 
with irony:  
Ich will mir keine Mühe geben, ihre Meinungen umzustossen. Lasset uns die Religion abschaffen. 
Die Kanzeln mögen diesen Weltweisen eingeräumet seyn, um ihre Beredsamkeit gegen das 
Daseyn eines höchsten Wesens anzuwenden. Die Obrigkeiten sollen, um sie nicht im Zaum zu 
halten, abgeseßet sein. Es sey also kein Richter in Israel, und jeder thue, was seinem Herzen gut 
deucht. Der Eigennuß und die Wollust sey das einzige Band, welches die Menschen zusammen 
halte. Dieses wird wohl, nach dieser Herren Meinung, die Saturnische Zeit und das güldene 
Jahrhundert seyn.  
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To achieve the golden age, the essay derisively suggests, one need only abolish religion, 
replace the clergy with self-serving philosophers, and allow all people to pursue their 
desires (I:58). Such egoism threatens to destroy the social bonds of brotherhood (I:59).  
 Materialists, Lange claims, represent a grievous danger to society and morality, 
and the weekly's program of enhancing sociability and conscience (Geselligkeit and 
Gewissen) (I:2, 4, 10). Grounding a society in personal interest promises social turmoil 
they contend: "So kommen wir ganz natürlich zu dem ersten Grundsaß des Hobbesischen 
Naturrechts, welcher ist der Krieg eines jeden gegen jedermann." With a polemical turn, 
the essayist proposes that tolerating atheistic philosophy will denigrate religious belief 
and threaten the moral sense.  
Da wir also uns auf nichts kommendes [kein Jenseits mit Gott] anzuschicken haben, da unser 
Geist (wenn der Atheist anders einen zulässet,) nicht der vornehmste Gegenstand unserer 
Handlungen ist: so werden wir nothwendig alles auf die Sinnlichkeit richten. Wir werden uns 
einzig beschäftigen, unsere Empfindungen zu vergnügen und darinnen unser wahres Leben setzen; 
also wird alle Geselligkeit aufgehoben seyn. Eine kleine ehrgeizige Maschine, wird tausend ihres 
gleichen aufopfern, um tausend solche Maschinen in demüthiger Stellung zu ihren Füssen zu 
sehen. Was wird mich hindern, die Maschine meines Nachbarn durch einen Dolch oder durch Gift 
zu zerstören, wenn ich seine weibliche Maschine zur Stillung der Wollust besitzen will. (I:60) 
 
According to this view, Christian faith is the force for social regulation. Without it, the 
teleology of progress to politesse and decorum will cease and humans are reduced to the 
mechanics of self-serving sensuality. All sense of sociability is lost. Moreover, the 
balance of the material and spiritual that social networks refine no longer factors into 
human nature (cf. I:21). Characterizing egoistic human beings as machines, Lange argues 
with Hobbes that people who only respond to their senses are mere automata. While the 
critique is aimed at Hobbes, the materialists, and atheists in general Lange's 
representation of humans as murderous and adulterous machines might include an 
indirect critique of La Mettrie himself. Given the publication of L'homme machine a year 
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earlier, he was the most prominent European representative of the hypothesis man as 
machine.  
 Later in the same year, Der Gesellige openly critiqued the machine-man theory. 
In a letter submitted by a (possibly fictitious) reader, people are grouped according to 
their willingness to help others. Using fellow individuals for personal gain characterizes 
l'homme machine. Noting that an unnamed author (most likely La Mettrie) has dubbed all 
human beings l'homme machine "zur Schande der Menschheit," the letter writer re-
appropriates the term and redirects the shame at the theory itself. Instead of imagining 
people as beings without a soul and free will like La Mettrie, it chides those who make 
choices only for individual profit. Such sheer egoism is a burden to others and lacks all 
higher purpose. Thus the new use of the name "machine man" designates social 
interaction:  
Sie begnügen sich damit, daß andere ihnen nützlich sind, und bekümmern sich wenig darum, ob 
sie des Stromes der Wohlthaten, so sich von den Geselligen dieser Erde auf sie ergiesset, würdig 
sind, oder nicht....Sie schlafen, essen, trinken, holen Othem, bewegen sich, und bereiten sich 
dadurch zu einer unanständigen Fortdauer ihres noch unanständigeren Lebens zu. Sie thun 
eigentlich gar nichts, was nur einiger Aufmerksamkeit wert wäre; sie sind, mit einem Worte, 
unnütze Bürden der Erde. (Der Gesellige I:402) 
 
Given the fact that Der Gesellige, like other moral weeklies, targeted an audience of 
women and non-academics, this may have been a strategy to influence their opinion. 
While they might have heard of L'homme machine, they did not necessarily read it. 
Tainting the phrase with laziness, exploitation, and unsociability places the theory in an 
undesirable light. Perhaps it was designed to dissuade readers from reading L'homme 
machine in the first place. Certainly, this re-appropriation of the term sought to create a 
negative opinion.  
 Several years later, Der Mensch further develops the critique of materialism. 
Citing reader requests, the editors defend the spiritual nature of the soul against 
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materialism in issue 250 (1753) entitled "Erweis der geistigen Natur der menschlichen 
Seele gegen die Materialisten" (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VI:305). According 
to the 1756 preface to the weekly, Meier penned this piece and all other unsigned issues 
of Der Mensch (XI:)(3v). Having judged the dry style of a systematic presentation as 
inappropriate for a weekly, Meier chooses the essayistic mode to influence reader 
attitudes on materialism (cf. I:6). To this end, he seeks to counter materialist theories that 
describe reason and the will as physical faculties. Other materialist positions that describe 
the soul as "fine matter" are of secondary concern because they are virtually 
indistinguishable from spirit (VI:306). Relativizing the materialists' skepticism about the 
existence of a soul, Meier argues that human beings cannot know the essence of all things 
(VI:307). While the nature of the soul cannot be fully explained, a conscious being is 
unthinkable without one. The soul functions in union with the body to form the complete 
person (VI:308).   
To argue the existence of an immaterial soul, Meier draws upon logic, rhetoric, 
and experience. The rational approach goes beyond the interaction of soul and body by 
showing how materialism calls existing knowledge into question (S. G. Lange and Meier, 
Der Mensch VI:313-314). If there were no soul, theological study and Christian belief 
would have little meaning. In view of their ethical project, Lange and Meier insist on the 
existence of a soul. Employing logic, Meier proposes that it is not material being, but 
education and upbringing that shape moral nature (VI:315). Meier thus enters what we 
now call the nature versus culture debate by insisting that the social environment plays a 
greater role than biological factors in shaping thought, directing the will, and stirring up 
  239 
the emotions (together: the soul).60 His assessments that materialists are myopic and only 
concern themselves with sensualism, or the claim that believing in a thinking, self-
determining machine is less comprehensible than the mysteries of Christian faith, 
supplement arguments based on logic (VI:312, 316).  
 Some of the most provocative grounds for the existence of a soul stem from 
attempts to reconcile the coexistence of the physical and the moral functions. Using a 
series of four questions, Meier casts doubt on the persuasiveness of materialist theory and 
instead posits a dualistic anthropology. Assuming the soul is material, he asks, how do 
moral faculties and deep affections such as love, friendship, and sympathy work? 
(VI:308-309)61 Likewise, if one acknowledges that human beings are capable of 
reflective thought, does materialism explain reflection as a pre-programmed motion or as 
the result of an external impact? (VI:309) If language stems from physical being, do 
differences in language signal discrepancies in speakers' physical natures? (VI:310) How 
does aged-based physical degeneration affect the capacity for thought? (VI:311) This 
opening part of the essay argues that human nature is too complex to be circumscribed in 
only physical terms.    
 Experience, Meier maintains, confirms the existence of a soul because of its 
interaction with the body. Physical injury or degeneration inhibits the soul because of this 
union of the body and the soul (VI:313). And the interaction also functions in the 
opposite direction. When people becomes aware of a moral wrong, they can suffer a 
                                                 
60 La Mettrie also asserted that thought and the will were socialized, but this occurred via sensation. See La 
Mettrie L'homme machine 171-173; Wellman ch. 6. 
61 There was a contemporary context for asking how physical reactions reveal moral signs. In his 
Gedancken von Thränen und Weinen (1748), Halle physician Ernst Anton Nicolai experimentally 
differentiated tears generated by touch or pressure from those caused by a (complex) psychosomatic 
emotional reaction. Nicolai concluded that whoever cries for emotional reasons is more than a material 
being (Zelle, "Sinnlichkeit und Therapie" 14). 
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physical shock or a loss of appetite (VI:316). To discredit the idea of a material soul and 
bolster his claim of interaction, Meier briefly mentions the tradition of philosophical 
answers to the question of intersubstantial causation, citing the three hypotheses of 
occasionalism, preestablished harmony, and physical influx (VI:311). Although he tries 
to avoid academic debates, only giving his own treatise "Beweis, daß keine Materie 
denken könne" (1742) brief mention (cf. VI:307), his appeal to authority adds weight to 
his attack on materialism.  
 Overall, Meier's "Erweis der geistigen Natur der menschlichen Seele gegen die 
Materialisten" employs a logical mode of persuasion. With some rhetorical variation, it is 
effectively informative, but not overwhelmingly entertaining. The closing, which 
incorporates a fictitious letter, briefly engages the imagination and underscores preceding 
arguments with an amusing diversion. To accentuate the problems he envisions with a 
material soul, Meier's epistolary interlude addresses a friend in the manner of letters in a 
novel of sensibility: 
Mein theurester Freund Z. du liebst mich; du hast mich geliebt, ehe du mich gesehen hast; und 
deine Gutheit gegen mich hat nicht abgenommen, da du mich kennen lerntest. Die meinige gegen 
dich vermehrte sich in diesem Zeitpunct, und wächst noch täglich: denn ich finde an dir einen 
redlichen tugendliebenden Menschen, einen Mann, der die Wahrheit sucht, und über die 
Vorurtheile des Pöbels weit erhaben ist.  
 
As someone who identifies with Meier before he has seen him, the addressee Z. utilizes 
his powers of imagination, whereas Meier draws on memory. Both employ judgment to 
assess moral character. All of these abilities are faculties of the soul. In the context of 
Meier's preceding long argument assailing a materialistic view of humankind, an ordinary 
reader could separate imagination, memory and judgment as intellectual faculties from 
physical instincts. Communication through writing and shared imagination, the middle of 
the letter makes clear, is the basis for friendship as a value that cannot be attributed to 
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personal acquaintance. Friendship thus appears to be a feeling that transcends a physical 
presence and can do without a body. Meier concludes the letter with the remark:  
Wie, bin ich blosse Materie? bist du es? so lieben zwey Machinen einander, und wissen nicht 
warum: denn wenn sie es wissen, so sind sie mehr, als Machine, also mehr, als blosse Materie. 
Solte ich dich lieben, und du hättest keine Seele, keinen Geist; so liebte ich als ein Thor, oder es 
müste möglich seyn, daß eine Machine tugendhaft und verständig seyn könte. (S. G. Lange and 
Meier, Der Mensch VI:317) 
 
The use of a machine metaphor in a letter of sensibility is clearly ironic. To imagine and 
address a dear friend as a "Materie" or "Machine" was unheard of at the time. By 
comparison, Gellert's address "Lieber Bruder" to his good friend Johann Adolf Schlegel 
represented the ideal of sentimental friendship (Gellert, Briefwechsel I:119). Building on 
his logical and rhetorical criticism of materialist theory at the beginning of the essay, 
Meier's playful irony in the letter accentuates his skepticism. Human beings differentiate 
themselves from other living beings through their powers of reason and their moral sense. 
La Mettrie, by contrast, used comparative anatomy to assert the similarity of humans to 
brute animals, including apes (La Mettrie, "L'homme machine" 158). Using irony in a 
playful manner provides evidence that the author wants to engage his audience and 
encourage their co-judging of materialism. For Meier, to characterize human beings as 
machines implies that they lack the distinguishing quality of what it means to be human.  
 Evaluating the final essay as a whole, Meier follows Gottsched's schema in 
linking philosophy, rhetoric, psychology, and morality (cf. McCarthy, Crossing 
Boundaries 137), and approaches the middle style favored by Neukirch, Hallbauer, and 
Gellert. Meier's essay on materialism addresses the reader in Neukirch's favored 
colloquial speech. "Erweis" proves to be a kind of thought experiment; it questions 
whether thought can function materialistically as a pre-programmed function or as a 
response to external input (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VI:309). Ultimately 
  242 
Meier says no; he denies materialism a purely corporal explanation of thought in favor of 
a human being with a soul. Employing rhetoric to balance the preponderant logic, he 
claims that materialists do not prove their position and that humans cannot know all about 
the soul (VI:306-307). A further use of rhetoric is the letter introduced late in the 
argument, which provides an interlude to lighten the tone. By introducing irony and play 
to the piece in the letter, Meier re-engages and entertains readers in an attempt to earn 
their trust and shape their thought. The letter moves readers by psychologically 
anticipating and challenging their reactions with a cognitive dissonance from imagining a 
human being (even themselves) being affectionately called a machine (cf. VI:317). What 
is at stake for Meier is the soul's role in shaping human nature and the Christian culture's 
system of morality (VI:318-320). Combining levity in the fictitious letter and the pointed 
argument, Meier's text clearly and artfully participates in the German Enlightenment 
tradition of essayistic writing. 
 Materialism provides the backdrop against which Meier argues his traditional 
view of human nature, one that requires a soul independent of its body. Certainly, 
positing body/soul dualism as a corrective to materialist theory only underscores the 
anthropological theme of the essay. Obviously, Meier argues in logical fashion. What 
makes "Erweis" an anthropological version of the essay is the meandering thought – the 
shifting from logic to persuasive discussion to experience that imitates natural human 
non-linear reflection. What makes "Erweis" an anthropological essay is the citing of 
experiences in which body and soul interact, such as when apprehension of a misdeed 
causes a shudder or a loss of appetite (VI:316). Finally, it is the artistic counterargument 
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of the letter that implies the existence of a soul in identifying what is most human and 
employs irony to persuade readers of their dualistic anthropology. 
 
Reading Bodily Signs as Moral Markers 
 Meier further develops anthropological and moral discourse in the serialized satire 
that begins in Der Mensch's twenty-fifth issue. The story entitled "Begebenheiten der 
Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch" was published in ten issues over the period of six years. 
Combining identifiable characters from its target reading public (a daughter, a mother, a 
merchant father, an officer, a school director) the story illustrates the moral foibles of 
ordinary bourgeoisie people. In contrast to the tradition of one-dimensional moral 
characters common in moral weeklies, these characters achieve a more realistic 
representation of human nature (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" VI:410-411). 
Elisabeth and her parents are mixed characters who frequently fail in their pursuit of 
appropriate moral action. 
 Drawing on the Horatian tradition of prodesse et delectare, the narrative 
combines essayistic and narrative texts to educate and to entertain (cf. Brandes 228). The 
first installment opens with an essayistic introduction on the uses of biography, problems 
with contemporary life writing, and different accents developed in this satire. The key 
function of biography is to discover human nature (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch 
I:201, No. 25). Already in Der Gesellige, a similar preface to the "Pragmatischen 
Lebenslauf eines Dorfschulmeisters" (1750), had recommended a redirection of 
biography: Der Gesellige suggests it is more useful for the public to read biographies of 
simple people. Such histories demonstrate the actions and moral principles closest to 
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those of normal readers (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Gesellige V:329, No. 221). 
Extending this call, Der Mensch solicits biographies from its readers to acquaint 
everyone with different temperaments and ways of thinking and acting. Human nature is 
best understood via empirical observation of human actions. Using biography for moral 
edification presents problems because everyone can manipulate their public image. 
Additionally, most biographies profile famous or noble subjects whose extraordinary 
experiences significantly differ from those of average readers. By choosing the 
biographies of ordinary citizens, Meier hopes to access the "most secret thoughts and 
actions" of people "as they actually are" (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch I:201-202). 
Thus, biographies of queens, warriors, martyrs, and discoverers are to be superceded by 
those of middle-class persons. Each weekly sets a slightly different emphasis. Der 
Gesellige accents lives demonstrating social mores, while Der Mensch reorients this 
context by focusing on psychology and the social reasons for human action. 
 Reconceiving the poetics of biographical writing is part of the goal to train the 
public to be self-reflective, critical readers. In addition to choosing the proper subject for 
the readership, a middle-class person, the manner of presentation is also important. Not 
surprisingly, the goals of the middle style are also appropriate in fiction. To change a 
reader's thought, writers must engage their audience. In aiming for naturalness and 
balance, the writing guidelines outlined by Neukirch can be equally applied to narrative: 
a casual conversational tone, varying and balanced narrative modes, and creative touches 
of playfulness and irony are elements of a successful style (cf. McCarthy, Crossing 
Boundaries 139-140).  
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Of the two weeklies considered here, Der Gesellige initiates the focus on 
biography. In the introduction to the biography of the Knight Lucidor, the narrator 
emphasizes the process inherent in identity formation. Body and soul develop separately. 
Whereas the body follows pre-programmed stages of development from the womb, the 
spirit only begins to take shape after birth. By exposing individuals to varied experiences, 
the social environment plays a key role in shaping people over a lifetime. We read, for 
example: 
Die Eindrücke, welche uns bilden, kommen [402] und wirken unvermerkt und nach und nach, und 
daher komt diese Unwissenheit, weil wir nicht acht auf uns selbst gegeben haben, und nicht im 
Stande gewesen sind, so viel Anmerkungen zu machen.  Indessen sind doch die Begebenheiten der 
Seele weit wichtiger und weit anmerkungswürdiger.  Es komt das Verhalten eines Menschen 
durch seine ganze übrige Lebenszeit oft auf eine Kleinigkeit seiner ersten Jugendjahre an; und da 
so oft grosse Glücks- und Unglücksfälle ihren ersten Grund in diesen so wenig wichtig 
scheinenden Begebenheiten haben, so siehet man leicht, wie viel man daran gelegen ist, solche 
wohl zu bemerken. (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Gesellige V:401-402, No. 227)  
 
Impressions shape individual character. The development of the soul depends on 
perceptions archived as text, images, and memories, on which an individual can draw at a 
later date. 
 In this context, autobiography and self-reflection function as key tools. They 
enable reflection and analysis on the development of critical thinking, moral judgment, 
and one's moral stance: 
Ich wolte daher, daß jeder, der die Gabe zu denken besitzet, die Geschichte seiner Seele 
aufzeichnen, und wenigstens zu seiner eigenen weiteren Ueberlegung anwenden möchte.  Ich 
verstehe aber unter der Geschichte der Seele eine Nachricht, wie man habe denken lernen, und die 
Verzeichnung der Begebenheiten, dadurch man die Tugenden und das Laster, die Wahrheit und 
den Irrthum hat kennen lernen.  Hieher gehören auch die kleinen Begebenheiten, und das auf uns 
wirkende Verhalten anderer, dadurch wir gerührt worden sind, und die ihren Einfluß auf die 
nachfolgenden Jahre unsers Lebens gehabt haben; indem sie uns besser oder schlimmer gemacht 
haben, als wir sonst würden gewesen seyn. (402) 
 
Again emphasizing the significance of the details, the narrator encourages readers to 
reflect on how other people shaped their lives. This activation of moral reflection with 
Pietist traditions, which also encouraged a self-evaluation of one's moral history to 
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identify personal transgressions, causes for conversion, and divine blessings. One of the 
movement's founding texts was Philipp Jakob Spener's (1635-1705) autobiographical Pia 
desideria oder Herzliches Verlangen nach gottgefälliger Besserung der wahren 
Evangelischen Kirchen (1675). Johan Henrich Reitz' multi-volume Historie der 
Wiedergebohrnen (1698-1745, 7v.) and Johann Adam Steinmeß' periodical Verbesserte 
Sammlung auserlesener Materien zum Bau des Reichs Gottes (1737-1743, 4v.) each 
featured numerous Pietist biographies and autobiographies that served as form and model 
for middle-class self-evaluation (cf. Wagner-Egelhaaf 140). Der Gesellige and Der 
Mensch thereby connected to an existing tradition of using life stories to inspire self-
reflection, autobiographical production, and personal development. In addition, the 
Pietists and the editors of moral weeklies both targeted women readers (cf. 146-147). In 
the process, the moral weeklies stimulated an increasingly secular trend that encouraged 
self-reflection, telling one's story, and writing as a means to self-cultivation. Just as the 
biographies in Historie der Wiedergebohrnen and Bau des Reichs Gottes encourage 
reader identification, the satire "Begebenheiten der Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch" in Der 
Mensch serves as a mirror for disidentification (Medina). Elisabeth's family name 
Irrwisch signals to the reader that she errs and that she should not to be emulated. 
 To increase their knowledge of human nature, readers must peruse Elisabeth's 
story, acknowledge family Irrwisch's moral foibles, and avoid replicating their choices. 
Reading thus recreates human actions through the imagination, and these actions can then 
be observed and analyzed as if one had experienced them in real life. In a adapting a 
critical stance, readers also observe the narrative as a case study that employs empirical 
methods to discover what it means to be human. Elisabeth's history is portrayed as an 
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archived example of human behavior. In an appeal for authenticity, the narrator 
characterizes himself as an impartial editor of the story's sources, which have been 
corroborated by "einen gerichtlichen Beweis" (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch 
I:202). The story thus employs the editor fiction popular in earlier novels such as Daniel 
Defoe's Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Johann Gottfried Schnabel's Insel Felsenburg 
(1731-1743) and Der im Irr-Garten der Liebe herum taumelnde Cavalier (1738). While 
Lange and Meier minimize the use of the fictional editor for the moral weekly as a whole 
(Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'" XII:423), Meier employs narration in "Die 
Begebenheiten der Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch" to achieve the pedagogical goal of 
instructing the reader in critical thinking. 
 The story advocates principles of moderation and Lebensordnung by citing the 
Irrwisch's parenting model. Lebensordnung refers to a mid-eighteenth-century interest in 
direction for proper living, or Diät. In "Irrwisch," the parents raise their daughter with an 
inconstant concept of morality that ranges from no restrictions to strict discipline. When 
the fifteen-year-old Elisabeth becomes pregnant, the family mores seem unprincipled as 
the parents are more concerned with their reputation than with Elisabeth and the baby's 
well-being. While the mother only insists that Elisabeth complete her religious education, 
the father only wants a rich suitor with a marriage proposal for his daughter. These were 
important considerations for eighteenth-century middle-class families. Yet the toleration 
of fornication and the subsequent cursing (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch II:111, 
No. 55), later eclipsed by corporal beatings (VIII:316, No. 332), all lie outside the ethic 
of moderation (cf. Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" 425), that is idealized in the 
Lange/Meier moral weeklies (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VIII:315). 
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Dramatizing the folly of poor parenting, Meier directs readers to instruct their children to 
act reasonably. 
 Whereas previous moral characters in moral weeklies represented a clear type, the 
introduction of mixed characters in Der Mensch promotes an emphasis on psychology 
(Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'" XII:435). In the history of Elisabeth Irrwisch, 
psychological motivation of characters means that one must address both the corporal and 
the spiritual nature of the title character. Elisabeth receives an education representative of 
her middle class at mid-century that includes reading, writing, arithmetic, and religion. 
But she retains little. In addition to her mental limitations, her only natural beauty lies in 
soft skin. Under her mother's guidance, she trains her body to appear attractive. From 
childhood on, she follows a particular regimen: washing with the March snows, wearing 
gloves to bed to protect her hands, binding her feet in tight shoes to shape their growth, 
and styling her body with the stays of a corset (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch 
I:206, No. 25). She manipulates her appearance from youth through practices designed to 
help her conform to a standard of outer beauty. In addition, her habits and behaviors 
make her even more strange: as a child she is told that she should dress herself like a 
bride, while as a fifteen-year-old she remains attached to her dolls. "[Sie] gewöhnte sich 
an, sich aufs sorgfältigste zu putzen und durchaus schön zu thun: denn die Begriffe von 
einer Braut, von einem Manne, und von der Schönheit waren von Kindesbeinen an in 
ihrer Einbildungskraft mit einander verknüpft worden.  Sie lag demnach beständig vor 
dem Spiegel, und war in ihre eigene Gestalt ungemein verliebt" (I:207). In her youthful 
narcissism, she is captivated by outward appearances and obsesses over the image she 
projects to others. Her parents also instill in her an excessive self-love. Learning that her 
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husband will travel for six months, the mother takes a soldier as a lover and becomes 
pregnant (I:203). Her father, who only occupies himself with his business, fails to 
recognize that he could not have possibly been present at Elisabeth's conception (I:204).  
 "Irrwisch" also informs readers about human nature through psychological 
analysis of the emotions. Early in his career, Meier had published a monograph on the 
topic: the Theoretische Lehre von den Gemütsbewegungen (1744). The study creates a 
system of the emotions to further knowledge of human nature and self-knowledge for all 
readers, but with particular consideration for the needs of writers, orators, and 
philosophers (Meier, Theoretische Lehre 3-4, 8, 12). Studying the emotions promises 
four outcomes: (1) "eine genauere Erkenntniß der menschlichen Seele, ja des ganzen 
Menschen überhaupt" (13, §12), (2) the skill, necessary for writers and orators, to activate 
the emotions in readers and listeners (14, §13), (3) the knowledge and investigation of 
other people's minds to advance in the world and to persuade others to do one's will (15-
16, §14), and (4) the achievement of an advantageous relationship with other people (17, 
§15). Learning to interpret, provoke, and guide the emotions meant acknowledging the 
body as a medium of communication and opened new ways to pursue sociability. 
Key to the nexus of the material and metaphysical being is chapter seven in the 
Theoretische Lehre: "Die Veränderungen des Körpers in den Gemüthsbewegungen." 
Simplifying the array of possibilities, Meier identifies seven bodily changes that signal 
emotive changes. The visual cues are linked to physiological changes such as the 
amassing of blood and increased pressure in the heart. The signs include: changes in 
facial color, alterations in facial expression, fluctuations in breathing, a loss of speech, an 
unnatural physical strength, anxiety (including melancholy), and sickness. The 
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Theoretical Treatise describes these bodily signs as effects of the passions altering the 
circulatory system, especially the movement of the blood. On anxiety, Meier avers:  
In den Leidenschaften pflegt, gewöhnlicher Weise, das Herz beklemmt, und, wie man zu reden 
pflegt, schwer zu seyn. Und wie ist das auch anders möglich? Das Blut ist in der stärcksten 
Bewegung. Es dringt mit grosser Heftigkeit und in grosser Menge in das Herz hinein. Das muß 
nothwendig dadurch mehr ausgedehnt und gedruckt werden. Es fühlt demnach die Last des Bluts 
und wird schwer. So bald die Leidenschaft aufhört, hört auch die ausserordentliche Bewegung des 
Bluts auf, und das Herz wird von seiner Last befreyet, und also leichter. (Meier, Theoretische 
Lehre 404-405) 
 
Psychological and physiological changes occur simultaneously. In this work, Meier 
theorizes the relationship of the material and the metaphysical with preestablished 
harmony (392). The book thus argues that shifts in emotion and alterations in blood 
pressure occur parallel to each other, and because of causes within their separate 
psychological and physiological spheres. Regardless of what theory one chooses to 
explain the causation (preestablished harmony, occasionalism, physical influence), the 
simultaneity of corporal and spiritual fluctuation provokes bodily signs that make the 
emotions readable. 
 The satire of Elisabeth Irrwisch applies this theory to narrative. The attempts of 
father and mother to marry off Elisabeth, and Elisabeth's own search for a lover 
repeatedly cause family conflicts. Drawing on the theory of body language in the 
Theoretische Lehre, Meier psychologically motivates the characters through their 
physiological reactions. For example, one day Herr Irrwisch curses his daughter because 
she is not yet married: "Er sprach mit der verdrießlichsten Miene von der Welt: Ich weiß 
bey meiner Seel nicht Ließgen, warum du keinen Mann bekomst.  Du bleibst mir über 
dem Halse, und wirst ein altes Thier.  Aber so gehts! [...] Kann man doch den Koth hinter 
der Thüre vor Geld los werden, und ich sollte unsere Liese nicht los werden?" This 
inhuman confrontation triggers an immediate reaction from his wife and daughter. 
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Die Tochter brach in eine Fluth von Thranen aus, welche sie mit starkem Schluchzen begleitete. 
[...] Allein sie war wider ihren Vater deswegen erbittert, daß er sie ein altes Thier gescholten.  Sie 
stürmte daher zur Stube hinaus, und lief heulend in ihr Zimmer.[...] [Währenddessen] saß Herr 
Irrwisch mit aufgesperrtem Maule, und erstaunte über das, was er sahe.  Es war ihm nicht möglich, 
sich worauf zu besinnen, um etwas zu sagen.  Seine Frau verzog ihr Gesicht in alle schreckliche 
Mienen einer Furie." (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VIII:306-307) 
 
The narrator describes "erobernden und bestürmenden Augen, Waden, Minen" (II:109), 
paints tear-filled red eyes, flushed cheeks, and vivid portrayals of hopelessness: "Jungfer 
Irrwisch sank an die Lehne ihres Stuhls, und hieng ihren Kopf wie eine Nelke, die ein 
Wurm gestochen hat" (VII:317). Meier uses physical manifestations and metaphors to 
make a character's psychological state come alive. 
 Pushing one's mental and emotional limits to an extreme can also induce physical 
side effects. Not only does Meier propose a relation between the psychological state and 
the condition of the body, but the link is proportional. The degree of emotional agitation 
causes a correspondingly intense physical response: "Ich behaupte ausserdem, daß die 
beyden übereinstimmigen Veränderungen der Seele [und des Körpers], auch der Grösse 
nach, mit einander übereinstimmen" (Meier, Theoretische Lehre 392). Thus, the average 
reader can observe other people, decode their corporal semiotics, and inductively make 
generalizations about the intensity and the nature of their emotional state.  
In the spirit of the time, Meier attempts to apply Newtonian theory to the body-
soul relationship. This would mean that the energy present in a spiritual state shapes 
physical movement and is subject to the law of the conservation of energy. Anticipating 
objections by Cartesians, he concedes that the hypothesis of proportional intensity could 
not technically be proven because the body and soul are different substances. Eschewing 
pure reason, he insists that experience confirms his hypothesis of a proportional 
relationship: "Ich habe Erfahrung auf meiner Seite" (393). Thus, extreme emotions and 
extreme physical reactions develop concurrently:  
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Durch die Leidenschaften kan die Seele, in den Zustand gesetzt werden, in welchen sie sich in den 
Ohnmachten und dem Tode des Menschen befindet.  [Siehe] Paragraph 98.  Aehnliche 
Veränderungen gehen alsdenn auch in dem Körper vor.  In der Ohnmacht kan man die 
Bewegungen, wovon das Leben des Körpers abhänget, kaum noch mercken, und in dem Tode 
hören sie ganz auf.  Dies ist begreiflich aus dem vorhergehenden Absatze.  Wenn sich das Geblüt 
sehr schwach bewegt, so müssen auch alle Bewegungen, davon das Leben abhanget, sehr schwach 
und unmercklich werden.  Und das ist der Zustand des Körpers in den Ohnmachten.  Ja wenn das 
Geblüt stockt, so kan es dergestalt ins Stocken gerathen, daß es nicht wider in Gang kommt, und 
das ist so viel als der Tod. (399) 
 
This psychological-physiological knowledge takes narrative form in "Die Begebenheiten 
des Jungfers Elisabeth Irrwisch." For Elisabeth, reading a break-up letter from her lover 
Seladon crushes her hopes for a renewal of their love and causes her to faint. Her father, 
who dismisses the lover, yet pleads no intention of ruining his daughter's happiness, dies 
because of his sense of guilt (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VIII:317). The fainting 
episode and the father's death represent a pinnacle of psychosomatic stress. 
 Further examples of the integration of bodily signs into the narrative of "Irrwisch" 
are summarized in the following table. All but one of the signs detailed in the 
Theoretische Lehre appear transposed in literary form in the satire "Die Begebenheiten 
des Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch." 
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Table 6-1: The coordination of Meier's aesthetics of the emotions in theory and in 
narrative. 
 
 Bodily Signs  
(Meier, 1744, §§ 230-1) 
Literary Representation in "Die Begebenheiten des Jungfer 
Elisabeth Irrwisch" (Der Mensch, 1751-56) 
(1) Changes in facial color Mrs. Irrwisch (N. 190, P. 137); Maid Irrwisch "lichterloh" (N. 289, P. 
309) 
(2) Alterations in facial 
expression 
Mr. Heißsporn (N. 55, P. 109); Mr. Irrwich (N. 126, P.360); Maid 
Irrwisch (N. 190, P. 139,142); Maid u. Mrs. Irrwisch (N. 332, P. 306-
7)  
(3) Fluctuations in breathing Maid Irrwischs Seufzer (N. 163, P. 289-90) 
(4) Loss of speech Maid Irrwisch (N. 163, P. 290); Mr. Irrwisch (N. 332, P. 307) 
(5) Unnatural physical strength  
(6) Anxiety, "heavy heart" Maid Irrwisch (N. 289, P. 317); Mrs. Irrwisch (N. 442, P. 302, 304) 
(7) Sickness Mr. Irrwisch (N. 332, P. 317); Mrs. Irrwisch (N. 478, P. 257) 
 
 
 
By incorporating concepts from the Theoretische Lehre, "Irrwisch" illustrates how Meier 
translated philosophical ideas for a broad reading public. In narrative form, his ideas 
could entertain all and educate interested readers, much like Friedrich Schiller later did in 
"Der Verbrecher aus Infamie." Studies on Meier's anthropological thought have typically 
focused on his philosophical writings, ignoring the twenty-one year moral weekly project 
altogether. Read in combination with the Theoretische Lehre, "Irrwisch" provides an 
important literary manifestation of Meier's aesthetics of the emotions. This theory of 
bodily signs accentuates the foibles of the characters to further the moral education of 
readers.  
 In conclusion, reading the moral code necessitated embracing the body and the 
soul as both innately human. By re-appropriating l'homme machine to describe people 
who take advantage of others and thereby cheapen sociability and friendship, Lange and 
Meier embrace imaginative self-fashioning. Intellectual faculties like creativity, memory, 
and judgment, coupled with values like honor and friendship make a soul inherent to 
human nature. La Mettrie's denial of an immaterial soul calls into question the source of 
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thought. Yet for Lange and Meier, physiology fails to explain the intricacies of creative 
and moral thought. They believe creativity, logic, and judgment originate in an 
immaterial soul. As intellectuals who contribute to society by shaping ethics and 
entertaining their public, Lange and Meier believe their own thought and writing stem 
from something greater than a physiological mechanism. A key means for the editors to 
counter La Mettrie and the popular materialist doctrine was by emphasizing creative 
production, which Lange and Meier accomplished in their writing.  
 The soul is, however, not the only source of the moral. Reading the moral code 
also means interpreting corporal signs as moral markers. In the history of Elisabeth 
Irrwisch, physiology registered emotional states. What might seem merely visceral in the 
representation of the emotions, functions to prompt moral reflection. Thus for Meier, the 
aesthetics of emotions assisted the production of ethical values based on reason and logic. 
As a sign system producing emotional identification and prompting the creation of moral 
values, "Irrwisch" illustrated the interconnectedness of the material and the metaphysical. 
 In view of the literary production of the time, the essays and narratives in Der 
Gesellige and Der Mensch creatively displayed anthropological thought for a popular 
readership. Whereas Loën's Der redliche Mann am Hofe (1740) and Gellert's Leben der 
schwedischen Gräfin von G*** (1747/1748) integrated elements of physical sensibility, 
the moral weeklies published in Halle offered more anthropological content. This might 
be the outcome of an individual author's interests, but the tradition of anthropological 
thought in Halle was part of a local culture from which Lange and Meier drew 
inspiration. Though the historical record has relegated Der Gesellige and Der Mensch to 
a footnote in the literary and cultural history of the Enlightenment, they were some of the 
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most successful German periodicals in the mid-eighteenth century. By critically engaging 
theorists like Krüger, La Mettrie, and A. G. Baumgarten, Der Gesellige and Der Mensch 
provide key insight into Enlightenment vistas on moral human nature.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation argues that anthropological discourses developed in Germany 
prior to Platner's much heralded Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise published in 
1772. The Halle discourse on the intersection of the corporal and the spiritual begins with 
Christian Thomasius' Ausübung der Sittenlehre (1696). The book's subtitle, "Von der 
Arztney wieder die unvernünftige Liebe und der zuvor nöthigen Erkäntniß Sein Selbst," 
points to its focus on a "medical" treatment of the emotions and on an acquisition of self-
knowledge that characterized anthropological inquiry into the late Enlightenment. 
Likewise, Georg Ernst Stahl's Negotium Otiosum (1720) critiques the parallel spheres of 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's theory preestablished harmony and argues instead that the 
soul directs physical activity. While in the Deutsche Metaphysik (1719) Christian Wolff 
draws his account of intersubstantial causation from Leibniz, Joachim Lange contends 
that Wolff's machine metaphors consign human life to a deterministic existence. This 
stance is incongruent with experience and theology. In his 1724 Bescheidene Entdeckung, 
Lange explains causation with physical influx because it allows the individual self-
determination in a metaphysical and in a religious sense. Continuing the Halle tradition of 
critique, Georg Friedrich Meier's Theoretische Lehre von den Gemütsbewegungen (1744) 
proposes that physicians, particularly Cartesians, err by allowing the body to influence 
psychological states. Instead, according to his preestablished harmony approach, the 
physical and the metaphysical human spheres function in parallel and remain connected 
through Divine Providence. Intersubstantial causation is impossible; thus, only the soul 
shapes psychology. In response, Johann August Unzer's Neue Lehre von den 
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Gemütsbewegungen (1746) proposes a theory of physical influence in the emotions based 
on the neurophysiology of the day. Samuel Gotthold Lange and Meier continue to 
develop the rich Halle tradition of anthropological writings by addressing the emotions, 
dietetics, and causation (via opposition to materialism) in their periodicals Der Gesellige 
(1748-1750) and Der Mensch (1751-1756). After 1740, Halle's contribution to the 
product of German-language anthropological discourse intensified. Numerous important 
texts in this tradition have been excluded, in particular those of the "Vernünftige Ärzte" 
(cf. Zelle, Vernünftige Ärzte). Shaping this group were Johann Gottlob Krüger, his 
student Unzer, Johann Christian Bolten, and Ernst Anton Nicolai.  
Beyond Halle, numerous writers contributed to the formation of German-language 
anthropological theory. Barthold Heinrich Brockes' Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott (1721-
1748), Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon (11726), Albrecht von Haller's "Über den 
Ursprung des Übels" (1734), Adam Bernd's Eigene Lebensbeschreibung (1738), Johann 
Michal Loën's Der redliche Mann am Hofe (1740), and Christian Fürchtegott Gellert's 
Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** (1747/1748) represent popular works with 
anthropological themes. Subsequently, the early writings of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, 
Moses Mendelssohn, and Friedrich Nicolai (cf. Geyer-Kordesch, "Die Psychologie des 
moralischen Handelns. Psychologie, Medizin, und Dramentheorie bei Lessing, 
Mendelssohn und Friedrich Nicolai"; Kosenina, Anthropologie und Schauspielkunst) as 
well as of Christoph Martin Wieland,62 Johann Gottfried Herder and Immanuel Kant 
                                                 
62 The literature on anthropological discourse in Wieland's early writing is fragmentary but significant: e.g. 
Schings, Melancholie und Aufklärung 197-203, Schings, "Anthropologische Roman," 247-275, Margit 
Hacker, Anthropologische und kosmologische Ordnungsutopien: Christoph Martin Wielands "Natur der 
Dinge", Würzburger Beiträge zur deutschen Philologie, Bd. 3 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
1989), Heinz, "Figur des Schwärmers.", Jutta Heinz, Wissen vom Menschen und Erzählen vom Einzelfall.  
Untersuchungen zum anthropologischen Roman der Spätaufklärung (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996). 
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(Zammito) shape German discourse on the body/soul nexus. German anthropological 
thought in the 1770's thus evolves from an extensive German tradition. As formulated in 
Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise, Platner's theory was not a break but a 
continuation of German reflection on the relation of the material and the metaphysical, 
and of sensibility and rationality. Researching earlier thinkers of anthropology provides 
not only a context for anthropological theory of the late Enlightentment (Kosenina, 
"Afterword" 310), but reveals the interesting and important nuances of writings by 
Krüger, Unzer, Lange, and Meier in their own right. Attempts at periodization of the long 
eighteenth century frequently emphasize dissimilarities, threatening to obscure the 
complex and interconnected nature of thought at the time (McCarthy, Crossing 
Boundaries 317). Thus, while moving back the date of the "anthropological turn," I have 
striven to reconstruct some of its early Enlightenment sources. 
To emphasize the continuity of German anthropological thought, I have asked 
readers to refocus on its origins multiple times. Chapter one argued philosophical 
anthropology was a European discourse that discussed the interrelation of body and soul. 
While surveying the writings of Platner, Herder, and Kant as representatives of the so-
called anthropological turn around 1770, the opening chapter redirected readers to the 
Walch and Zedler lexica published earlier. In creatively redefining anthropology in 
Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon, chapter two surveyed the cultural context around 1740. 
Chapters three and four suggested that anthropological discourses developed in the 
English and German novels of sensibility and culminated in Wieland's Agathon. Despite 
careful readings of multiple novels, the combination of the epic genre and the lexica 
provided only a partial account of German anthropology's development between 1740 
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and 1770. Thus, I again asked readers to reconsider how the knowledge of human nature 
developed by going further back in time. Academic debates in Halle (chapter five) and 
the moral weeklies of Lange and Meier (chapter six) provided a rich resource of 
anthropological writing during the first half of the eighteenth century. The dissertation 
thus highlights the intensified use and increasing popularization of anthropological 
discourses in lexica, novels, academic writing, and moral weeklies (narrative prose and 
essayistic writing) beginning in the 1740's. 
 While some historians claim that anthropology in the early Enlightenment was 
primarily an investigation of physical human nature (Linden 19-20n62), this conception 
invites reconsideration. Linking the material and metaphysical spheres – for example, in 
the Ausübung der Sittenlehre, in Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott, and in Bescheidene 
Entdeckung – authors engaged multiple anthropological discourses. In addition to those 
who wrote on physical human nature, philosophers, theologians, and poets linked 
corporal being to moral human nature. Thus, for example, Thomasius in the Ausübung 
der Sittenlehre identifies emotional causes of immorality in Wollust, which is caused in 
part by the physical senses (Thomasius, Ausübung der Sittenlehre 185, 197-198). In a 
similar manner, Lange in Bescheidene Entdeckung insists that only the theory of physical 
influence explains intersubstantial causation without negating human freedom.  
Philosophers and theologians may have had reason to beware of materialism and 
hedonism as challenges to their metaphysics and their way of life. Yet in defining what it 
means to be human, the writers featured here also embrace the body as the soul's equal 
partner. For Lange and Meier in the field of dietetics, this means regulating food, drink, 
exercise, and moderation to promote happiness, health, and longevity. By proposing that 
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emotions rely on neurological functions, Unzer's Neue Lehre von den 
Gemütsbewegungen acknowledges the complex psychosomatic interactions present in the 
passions. Finally, Meier's satire "Die Begebenheiten des Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch" and 
Wieland's Geschichte des Agathon each uses the body to instruct readers in appropriate 
moral behavior. 
In comparing the anthropological content of lexica (chapters one and two), novels 
(chapters three and four), essays and monographs (chapter five) and moral weeklies 
(chapter six), I propose that the sources interrelate in their uses of anthropological 
discourses. For example, Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon and Zedler's 
Universal=Lexicon provide an annotated bibliography of essays and monographs. In 
writing issues of Der Mensch, Meier refers to his own philosophical essays against 
materialism and on the emotions (Meier, Beweis; Theoretische Lehre). Considering the 
novels together, physical sensibility and the anthropological discourses in Der redliche 
Mann am Hofe, Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***, and Miß Fanny Wilkes are 
less pronounced than the fully-developed anthropological discourses in Wieland's novel. 
In contrast to the novels of sensibility, Der Gesellige and Der Mensch more prominently 
feature discourses on the body/soul nexus. They are more distinguishable in the sense that 
theories of dietetics and an opposition to materialism are directly addressed. This is in 
part a product of essayistic writing, which combines rhetoric and reason, psychology and 
ethics (McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries 137). Nonetheless, the moral weeklies provide a 
concentration of anthropological discourses that informs both philosophy and narrative 
theory for a popular audience. Like the novels of sensibility discussed here, the Halle 
weeklies shape what it is good to be and right to do. It has been argued that the moral 
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weeklies and the German novel developed interdependently while also drawing on the 
gallant style (McCarthy, "Gallant Novel"). As an extension of their interrelationship, the 
moral weeklies and the novel both were vehicles for anthropological discourses. 
Many of the authors cited in chapters three through six did not refer to 
anthropology by name, although they investigated the interrelation of body and soul, of 
the physical and the moral. In particular, writers from Halle engaged the following 
anthropological discourses: (1) explanations of intersubstantial causation (occasionalism, 
preestablished harmony, physical influence); (2) dietetics, Lebensordnung [life regimen], 
and moderation via the Mesotes philosophy; (3) an exploration of human nature through 
observation and self-observation; (4) theories of emotion; (5) polyperspectival narration 
through a combination of essays and stories in fictional texts. Walch's Philosophisches 
Lexicon, Loën's Der redliche Mann am Hofe, Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin 
von G***, Hermes' Miß Fanny Wilkes, and Wieland's Geschichte des Agathon each 
engaged at least several of these discourses. In addition, the novels by Loën, Gellert, and 
Hermes developed an anthropological mode that combined knowledge of the nerves and 
of the emotions in what chapter three terms (6) physical sensibility. 
The dissertation title "Reading the Moral Code: Theories of Mind and Body in 
Eighteenth-Century Germany" summarizes the entwinement of defining the moral and 
the anthropological during the eighteenth century. At the time, observation was a 
principal means to learn and to assess mores as guides for human experience. 
Enlighteners taught that people learned by example. Reading a person's physiognomy, 
tracing their movements, or evaluating their judgments – in real life or in a book – thus 
required training in interpretation and critical thought, key goals of enlightenment.  
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 This dissertation seeks to contribute to German Studies by engaging the fields of 
literature, history, the history of philosophy, theology, and the history of medicine. 
Evaluating texts by drawing on the cultural artifacts of their time allows literary and non-
literary sources to come into contact with one another in a manner that allows for new 
perspectives. In the context of contemporary medical writings, for example, the physical 
nature of sensibility as depicted in Pamela, Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***, 
and Miß Fanny Wilkes becomes more recognizable. Knowledge of Pietism's emphasis on 
observation, biography, pursuit of self-knowledge, and the insistence on choosing a 
personal rebirth makes Thomasius' close proximity to the Pietists in Ausübung der 
Sittenlehre identifiable, while also providing a context for life writing in Der Gesellige 
and Der Mensch. Reading Miß Fanny Wilkes in the light of the Enlightenment's focus on 
hypochondria and melancholia reaffirms the relevance of a once popular text long 
relegated to neglected status by literary histories. For the eighteenth century – when 
strong disciplinary boundaries had not been drawn – working between fields was a 
standard practice. Our efforts to understand how eighteenth-century culture functioned 
can be enhanced by current interdisciplinary investigations that recover details, interpret 
their contexts, and make their discourses comprehensible today. Working 
interdisciplinarily thus involves a kind of "thick description" (Geertz 20). 
 Hence, this dissertation provides an example of German cultural studies that 
reevaluates the role of Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon and the moral weeklies Der 
Gesellige and Der Mensch in the rise of anthropology. By reading the Philosophisches 
Lexicon with attention to explicit cross-references, textual guides to appropriate reading, 
and implicit cross-referencing, the lexicon emerges as an archive of cultural knowledge. 
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Similarly, perusing the Lange/Meier moral weeklies to find articles of anthropological 
relevance yields the historian surprisingly great results. These periodicals are more than 
an alternative to sacred writing. Der Gesellige and Der Mensch also contain a defense 
against scientific materialism. Through further research, it may be possible to confirm 
these political biases as the editors' response to Brandenburg-Prussia's implicit support of 
materialism by granting asylum to La Mettrie. The idea of a "nicht hinterfragten 
politisch-sozialen Ordnung" [an unchallenged socio-political order] in Der Gesellige and 
Der Mensch could, with verification of political intent in the writings on materialism, 
require a reevaluation of the weeklies' political stance (cf. Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der 
Gesellige'" VI:424). Thus, using once-popular sources that have fallen from view might 
provide insight into how authors, editors, censors, and other intellectuals iterated political 
positions and how they formed cultural knowledge.  
 
 Future research on the nexus of anthropology and magazines in the German 
Enlightenment should consider the role of Pietist autobiography in shaping 
anthropological discourses. In addition to Johann Henrich Reitz' (1655-1720) Historie 
der Wiedergebohrnen (1698-1745, 7v.), Graf Erdmann Heinrich Henckel initiated the 
Pietist monthly Die leßten Stunden einiger [...] selig in dem Herrn verstorbenen 
Personen (1720-1733, 4v.). Henckel's periodical was followed by five other Pietist 
magazines.63 The Pietist periodicals published after 1731 feature book reviews, articles 
                                                 
63 Magazins that follow Henckel's monthly include Traugott Immanuel Jerichow's Sammlung auserlesener 
Materien zum Bau des Reichs Gottes (1731-1734), the Fortgesetzte Sammlung auserlesener Materien zum 
Bau des Reichs Gottes (1735-1737), Supplementa der auserlesenen Materien zum Bau des Reichs Gottes 
(1737-1740), Verbesserte Sammlung auserlesener Materien zum Bau des Reichs Gottes (1737-1743), and 
the Closter=Bergische Sammlung Nüßlicher Materien zur Erbauung im Wahren Christenthum (1745-
1761). 
  264 
on recent church conventions; on the progress of missionary work in Eastern Europe, 
North America, and Great Britain; and on biblical interpretations. Spanning the period 
from 1731 to 1761, the later magazines also feature numerous biographies and 
autobiographies that demonstrate the interconnection of self-reflection, reading, and 
writing. A further study could trace the development of biographical writing in the 
periodicals over thirty years. It might also compare discourse on self-observation and the 
body to that in Adam Bernd's (1676-1748) Eigene Lebensbeschreibung (1738) (cf. 
Pfotenhauer 55-76; Schings, Melancholie und Aufklärung 97-126). 
 The Pietist magazines provide an important context for evaluating the life writing 
in Lange and Meier's Der Gesellige and Der Mensch. Beyond the "Geschichte meines 
Geistes" and "Die Begebenheiten des Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch," the Lange/Meier 
periodicals incorporate numerous (auto-) biographical texts to promote moral reflection.64 
Just as editors of Pietist autobiographies encourage readers to reflect on and write their 
own life histories, Lange and Meier recommend that readers keep a diary (Der Mensch 
No. 168). Recording one's personal history enables individuals to reflect on their actions 
over time. Histories, journals, and biographies promote self-observation, monitoring 
personal motivations, and contemplating the causes of one's emotions. Consequently, 
writing, reading, and reflection function together in a hermeneutic process to promote 
confession and self-therapy and thereby to increase self-knowledge. 
 In addition, natural law and aesthetics provide a basis for the anthropological 
discourses that has not been fully explored in this dissertation. Researchers have noted 
that the integration of natural law theory into the moral weeklies helps them argue for the 
                                                 
64 In Der Mensch, these include "Schreiben Leberecht Spührers, des Packeseltreibers" (No. 22), 
"Geschichte des Herrn Redlichhausen" (No. 93), and "Des Freyers Schreiben und Abschilderung seiner 
Person, und des Frauenzimmers, welches er zur Ehe haben will" (No. 229). 
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equality of all human beings (Brandes, 225). And though Der Mensch has been cited as 
promoting human equality and social responsibility without regulations imposed through 
state power (Vollhardt), a more complete evaluation of the weekly's natural law sources 
is in order. Similarly, historians have recognized that Der Gesellige addresses aesthetic 
theory in some detail, including rhetorical questions of evoking emotions, while Der 
Mensch distances itself from the theory of sensual knowledge (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der 
Gesellige'", 427-429; Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'", 442-445). In light of the use of 
aesthetics for moral instruction in "Die Begebenheiten des Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch," its 
role in the weeklies, including in stories, essays, and poetry, should be reconsidered. 
 Other articles in Der Mensch address anthropological topics that underscore my 
thesis regarding the participation of moral weeklies in popularizing anthropological 
knowledge. Let two examples suffice. Issue 147 asks "Ob die Verstellung der 
Aufrichtigkeit zuwider sey?" and proposes that dissimulation complicates the pursuit of 
human knowledge via observation (cf. No. 152). This issue provides cause to consider 
how to decode masked emotion and intention and how intimately one must know another 
person to accurately decode their bodily signs. It raises the question of if and when 
deceiving others is ethical. And it broaches the psychology of a conflicted individual, one 
who chooses to hide true feelings or knowledge to some end, yet may feel guilty about it. 
Psychology is a central topic in Der Gesellige and Der Mensch that deserves further 
attention. Acknowledging that some psychological problems require minimal treatment, 
issues 320 and 328 offer general strategies for a psychological cure of moral debilitation. 
In analyzing the periodical, one could also compare proposed physical treatments for 
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psychological problems in Der Mensch (e.g. no. 232) with those in the medical weekly 
Der Arzt (e.g. no. 150-152).  
 Johann August Unzer's Der Arzt, eine medizinische Wochenschrift (1759-1764) 
aims to improve the reader's Lebensordnung or way of living. Citing Addison and 
Steele's Spectator and Fontenelle's scientific writing as his inspiration, Unzer adapts the 
Enlightenment program of education and entertainment in pursuit of a wellness program. 
Issues focus on the mechanical nature of the human body (no. 6), the influence of the 
emotions on physical being (nos. 24, 198) the imagination's influence on the human body 
(no. 69), and hypochondria (Unzer, Der Arzt : eine medicinische Wochenschrift no. 25; 
cf. Bilger; Reiber, 149-162). Positing the interconnection of body and soul (no. 45), Der 
Arzt explores the impact of pleasure (No. 80), desire (No. 159), music (No. 141), and fear 
(No. 131) on one's state of health. Der Arzt thus makes physiological function and its 
influence on intellectual and moral life a topic of popular knowledge. It appears that 
Unzer featured the interaction of the physical and the metaphysical only sparingly in his 
fanciful fictional texts. But further study on this question is needed. With its wide range 
of anthropological topics and the magazine's resounding popularity during the eighteenth 
century, an evaluation of its discourses on human nature could provide a complement to 
similar discourses in Der Gesellige and Der Mensch. Even here I could provide only a 
sampling of the richness of material in the weeklies published by Lange, Meier, and 
Unzer. 
 Looking beyond a synchronic analysis, a future study could survey the 
development of writing on the body/soul nexus from the moral weeklies Der Gesellige 
(1748-1750) and Der Mensch (1751-1756) through Der Arzt (1759-1764) and Melchior 
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Adam Weickard's Der philosophische Arzt (1775-1777) to Karl Philipp Moritz' Magazin 
zur Erfahrungseelenkunde (1783-1793). Indeed, the Halle physicians and Moritz have 
already been shown to share an interest in empirical observation of the soul (Zelle, 
"Experimentalseelenlehre und Erfahrungsseelenkunde. Zur Unterscheidung von 
Erfahrung, Beobachtung und Experiment bei Johann Gottlob Krüger und Karl Philipp 
Moritz"). In looking at the breadth of materials from the late Enlightenment, historians 
have identified other magazines on anthropology and empirical psychology that could 
prove useful for a diachronic study (Eckardt et al.). Linking the development of 
anthropological discourses in magazines over a longer stretch of time would further 
strengthen the argument for the continuity of anthropological thought during the 
eighteenth century as proposed in this dissertation. 
 Finally, the recovery of anthropological discourses in the moral weeklies makes 
one question to what extent these discourses appear in other types of magazines during 
the eighteenth century. Taking Christoph Martin Wieland's Der Teutsche Merkur (1773-
1810) as an example, future studies could trace the role of anthropological discourses 
penned by Wieland in his serialized novel Die Geschichte der Abderiten (1774-1781) or 
the many narrative and essayistic responses to Rousseau in the 1770's. One might peruse 
Johann Karl Wezel's "Ehestands-Geschichte des Herrn Philip Peter Marks" or the excerpt 
from Karl Philipp Moritz' Anton Reiser (both published in the Teutsche Merkur) to 
identify the role of the body/soul nexus in shaping human nature. Readers could also 
evaluate the selection from Johann Reinhold Forster's Reise um die Welt to see how it 
produces ethnographic discourses within the context of reading the moral code.  
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 As the study of the nexus between body and soul, philosophical anthropology 
remains relevant today. In its challenge to Cartesian theory, the idea of an integrated 
human nature historically lost out in the European discourses. Since the nineteenth 
century, for instance, mainstream medical treatment has dissociated the body from the 
soul. Yet in our advancement of research and therapy in fields like neuroscience, we 
return to questions that inspired eighteenth-century holistic anthropological theory. How 
do thought processes work? How does one develop feelings of empathy and love? We are 
thus still asking how the physical and the moral interact and still pondering what makes 
us human. 
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